/** @file AMD Sev Dxe driver. This driver is dispatched early in DXE, due to being list in APRIORI. It clears C-bit from MMIO and NonExistent Memory space when SEV is enabled. Copyright (c) 2017 - 2020, AMD Inc. All rights reserved.
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent **/ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include // Present, initialized, tested bits defined in MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.h #define EFI_MEMORY_INTERNAL_MASK 0x0700000000000000ULL STATIC EFI_STATUS AllocateConfidentialComputingBlob ( OUT CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION **CcBlobPtr ) { EFI_STATUS Status; CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION *CcBlob; Status = gBS->AllocatePool ( EfiACPIReclaimMemory, sizeof (CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION), (VOID **)&CcBlob ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { return Status; } CcBlob->Header = SIGNATURE_32 ('A', 'M', 'D', 'E'); CcBlob->Version = 1; CcBlob->Reserved = 0; CcBlob->SecretsPhysicalAddress = (UINT64)(UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsBase); CcBlob->SecretsSize = FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfSnpSecretsSize); CcBlob->Reserved1 = 0; CcBlob->CpuidPhysicalAddress = (UINT64)(UINTN)FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidBase); CcBlob->CpuidLSize = FixedPcdGet32 (PcdOvmfCpuidSize); CcBlob->Reserved2 = 0; *CcBlobPtr = CcBlob; return EFI_SUCCESS; } STATIC EFI_HANDLE mAmdSevDxeHandle = NULL; STATIC BOOLEAN mAcceptAllMemoryAtEBS = TRUE; STATIC EFI_EVENT mAcceptAllMemoryEvent = NULL; STATIC EFI_STATUS EFIAPI AmdSevMemoryAccept ( IN EDKII_MEMORY_ACCEPT_PROTOCOL *This, IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS StartAddress, IN UINTN Size ) { // // The StartAddress must be page-aligned, and the Size must be a positive // multiple of SIZE_4KB. Use an assert instead of returning an erros since // this is an EDK2-internal protocol. // ASSERT (IS_ALIGNED (StartAddress, SIZE_4KB)); ASSERT (IS_ALIGNED (Size, SIZE_4KB)); ASSERT (Size != 0); MemEncryptSevSnpPreValidateSystemRam ( StartAddress, EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (Size) ); return EFI_SUCCESS; } STATIC EFI_STATUS AcceptAllMemory ( VOID ) { EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *AllDescMap; UINTN NumEntries; UINTN Index; EFI_STATUS Status; DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Accepting all memory\n")); /* * Get a copy of the memory space map to iterate over while * changing the map. */ Status = gDS->GetMemorySpaceMap (&NumEntries, &AllDescMap); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { return Status; } for (Index = 0; Index < NumEntries; Index++) { CONST EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *Desc; Desc = &AllDescMap[Index]; if (Desc->GcdMemoryType != EfiGcdMemoryTypeUnaccepted) { continue; } Status = AmdSevMemoryAccept ( NULL, Desc->BaseAddress, Desc->Length ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { break; } Status = gDS->RemoveMemorySpace (Desc->BaseAddress, Desc->Length); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { break; } Status = gDS->AddMemorySpace ( EfiGcdMemoryTypeSystemMemory, Desc->BaseAddress, Desc->Length, // Allocable system memory resource capabilities as masked // in MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/Mem/Page.c:PromoteMemoryResource Desc->Capabilities & ~(EFI_MEMORY_INTERNAL_MASK | EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME) ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { break; } } gBS->FreePool (AllDescMap); gBS->CloseEvent (mAcceptAllMemoryEvent); return Status; } VOID EFIAPI ResolveUnacceptedMemory ( IN EFI_EVENT Event, IN VOID *Context ) { EFI_STATUS Status; if (!mAcceptAllMemoryAtEBS) { return; } Status = AcceptAllMemory (); ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); } STATIC EFI_STATUS EFIAPI AllowUnacceptedMemory ( IN OVMF_SEV_MEMORY_ACCEPTANCE_PROTOCOL *This ) { mAcceptAllMemoryAtEBS = FALSE; return EFI_SUCCESS; } STATIC OVMF_SEV_MEMORY_ACCEPTANCE_PROTOCOL mMemoryAcceptanceProtocol = { AllowUnacceptedMemory }; STATIC EDKII_MEMORY_ACCEPT_PROTOCOL mMemoryAcceptProtocol = { AmdSevMemoryAccept }; EFI_STATUS EFIAPI AmdSevDxeEntryPoint ( IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable ) { EFI_STATUS Status; EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *AllDescMap; UINTN NumEntries; UINTN Index; CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SNP_BLOB_LOCATION *SnpBootDxeTable; // // Do nothing when SEV is not enabled // if (!MemEncryptSevIsEnabled ()) { return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; } // // Iterate through the GCD map and clear the C-bit from MMIO and NonExistent // memory space. The NonExistent memory space will be used for mapping the // MMIO space added later (eg PciRootBridge). By clearing both known MMIO and // NonExistent memory space can gurantee that current and furture MMIO adds // will have C-bit cleared. // Status = gDS->GetMemorySpaceMap (&NumEntries, &AllDescMap); if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) { for (Index = 0; Index < NumEntries; Index++) { CONST EFI_GCD_MEMORY_SPACE_DESCRIPTOR *Desc; Desc = &AllDescMap[Index]; if ((Desc->GcdMemoryType == EfiGcdMemoryTypeMemoryMappedIo) || (Desc->GcdMemoryType == EfiGcdMemoryTypeNonExistent)) { Status = MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask ( 0, Desc->BaseAddress, EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (Desc->Length) ); ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); } } FreePool (AllDescMap); } // // If PCI Express is enabled, the MMCONFIG area has been reserved, rather // than marked as MMIO, and so the C-bit won't be cleared by the above walk // through the GCD map. Check for the MMCONFIG area and clear the C-bit for // the range. // if (PcdGet16 (PcdOvmfHostBridgePciDevId) == INTEL_Q35_MCH_DEVICE_ID) { Status = MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask ( 0, FixedPcdGet64 (PcdPciExpressBaseAddress), EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES (SIZE_256MB) ); ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); } // // When SMM is enabled, clear the C-bit from SMM Saved State Area // // NOTES: The SavedStateArea address cleared here is before SMBASE // relocation. Currently, we do not clear the SavedStateArea address after // SMBASE is relocated due to the following reasons: // // 1) Guest BIOS never access the relocated SavedStateArea. // // 2) The C-bit works on page-aligned address, but the SavedStateArea // address is not a page-aligned. Theoretically, we could roundup the address // and clear the C-bit of aligned address but looking carefully we found // that some portion of the page contains code -- which will causes a bigger // issues for SEV guest. When SEV is enabled, all the code must be encrypted // otherwise hardware will cause trap. // // We restore the C-bit for this SMM Saved State Area after SMBASE relocation // is completed (See OvmfPkg/Library/SmmCpuFeaturesLib/SmmCpuFeaturesLib.c). // if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdSmmSmramRequire)) { UINTN MapPagesBase; UINTN MapPagesCount; Status = MemEncryptSevLocateInitialSmramSaveStateMapPages ( &MapPagesBase, &MapPagesCount ); ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); // // Although these pages were set aside (i.e., allocated) by PlatformPei, we // could be after a warm reboot from the OS. Don't leak any stale OS data // to the hypervisor. // ZeroMem ((VOID *)MapPagesBase, EFI_PAGES_TO_SIZE (MapPagesCount)); Status = MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask ( 0, // Cr3BaseAddress -- use current CR3 MapPagesBase, // BaseAddress MapPagesCount // NumPages ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { DEBUG (( DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask(): %r\n", __func__, Status )); ASSERT (FALSE); CpuDeadLoop (); } } Status = AllocateConfidentialComputingBlob (&SnpBootDxeTable); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { DEBUG (( DEBUG_ERROR, "%a: AllocateConfidentialComputingBlob(): %r\n", __func__, Status )); ASSERT (FALSE); CpuDeadLoop (); } if (MemEncryptSevSnpIsEnabled ()) { // // Memory acceptance began being required in SEV-SNP, so install the // memory accept protocol implementation for a SEV-SNP active guest. // Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces ( &mAmdSevDxeHandle, &gEdkiiMemoryAcceptProtocolGuid, &mMemoryAcceptProtocol, &gOvmfSevMemoryAcceptanceProtocolGuid, &mMemoryAcceptanceProtocol, NULL ); ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status); // SEV-SNP support does not automatically imply unaccepted memory support, // so make ExitBootServices accept all unaccepted memory if support is // not communicated. Status = gBS->CreateEventEx ( EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL, TPL_CALLBACK, ResolveUnacceptedMemory, NULL, &gEfiEventBeforeExitBootServicesGuid, &mAcceptAllMemoryEvent ); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "AllowUnacceptedMemory event creation for EventBeforeExitBootServices failed.\n")); } // // If its SEV-SNP active guest then install the CONFIDENTIAL_COMPUTING_SEV_SNP_BLOB. // It contains the location for both the Secrets and CPUID page. // return gBS->InstallConfigurationTable ( &gConfidentialComputingSevSnpBlobGuid, SnpBootDxeTable ); } return EFI_SUCCESS; }