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| author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2017-11-29 16:10:51 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2017-12-05 11:26:29 +0100 |
| commit | c16a65582a72d3adea145b9b0a737c6c35ce89fc (patch) | |
| tree | d09ff110c25b1653835abf5e335ce08adbd6c1eb /fs | |
| parent | aab681eb8f3bfe2950c8493f39cef6ae34b731b3 (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-c16a65582a72d3adea145b9b0a737c6c35ce89fc.tar.gz linux-stable-c16a65582a72d3adea145b9b0a737c6c35ce89fc.tar.bz2 linux-stable-c16a65582a72d3adea145b9b0a737c6c35ce89fc.zip | |
exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()
commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375 upstream.
While the defense-in-depth RLIMIT_STACK limit on setuid processes was
protected against races from other threads calling setrlimit(), I missed
protecting it against races from external processes calling prlimit().
This adds locking around the change and makes sure that rlim_max is set
too.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127193457.GA11348@beast
Fixes: 64701dee4178e ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/exec.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 3e14ba25f678..4726c777dd38 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1340,10 +1340,15 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid - * needing to clean up the change on failure. + * races from other threads changing the limits. This also + * must be protected from races with prlimit() calls. */ + task_lock(current->group_leader); if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur > _STK_LIM) current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur = _STK_LIM; + if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_max > _STK_LIM) + current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_max = _STK_LIM; + task_unlock(current->group_leader); } arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm); |