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author | Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> | 2021-04-22 17:41:18 +0200 |
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committer | James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> | 2021-04-22 12:22:11 -0700 |
commit | 265885daf3e5082eb9f6e2a23bdbf9ba4456a21b (patch) | |
tree | cc2106017f93b89df7b2a01e475105e0c9860078 /kernel/sys_ni.c | |
parent | a49f4f81cb48925e8d7cbd9e59068f516e984144 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-265885daf3e5082eb9f6e2a23bdbf9ba4456a21b.tar.gz linux-stable-265885daf3e5082eb9f6e2a23bdbf9ba4456a21b.tar.bz2 linux-stable-265885daf3e5082eb9f6e2a23bdbf9ba4456a21b.zip |
landlock: Add syscall implementations
These 3 system calls are designed to be used by unprivileged processes
to sandbox themselves:
* landlock_create_ruleset(2): Creates a ruleset and returns its file
descriptor.
* landlock_add_rule(2): Adds a rule (e.g. file hierarchy access) to a
ruleset, identified by the dedicated file descriptor.
* landlock_restrict_self(2): Enforces a ruleset on the calling thread
and its future children (similar to seccomp). This syscall has the
same usage restrictions as seccomp(2): the caller must have the
no_new_privs attribute set or have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user
namespace.
All these syscalls have a "flags" argument (not currently used) to
enable extensibility.
Here are the motivations for these new syscalls:
* A sandboxed process may not have access to file systems, including
/dev, /sys or /proc, but it should still be able to add more
restrictions to itself.
* Neither prctl(2) nor seccomp(2) (which was used in a previous version)
fit well with the current definition of a Landlock security policy.
All passed structs (attributes) are checked at build time to ensure that
they don't contain holes and that they are aligned the same way for each
architecture.
See the user and kernel documentation for more details (provided by a
following commit):
* Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
* Documentation/security/landlock.rst
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/sys_ni.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/sys_ni.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c index 19aa806890d5..cce430cf2ff2 100644 --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c @@ -266,6 +266,11 @@ COND_SYSCALL(request_key); COND_SYSCALL(keyctl); COND_SYSCALL_COMPAT(keyctl); +/* security/landlock/syscalls.c */ +COND_SYSCALL(landlock_create_ruleset); +COND_SYSCALL(landlock_add_rule); +COND_SYSCALL(landlock_restrict_self); + /* arch/example/kernel/sys_example.c */ /* mm/fadvise.c */ |