diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig | 126 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 120 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig index 74271dba4f94..80220ed26a35 100644 --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig @@ -13,17 +13,19 @@ config HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS An arch should select this symbol if it supports building with GCC plugins. -menuconfig GCC_PLUGINS - bool "GCC plugins" +config GCC_PLUGINS + bool depends on HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS depends on PLUGIN_HOSTCC != "" + default y help GCC plugins are loadable modules that provide extra features to the compiler. They are useful for runtime instrumentation and static analysis. See Documentation/gcc-plugins.txt for details. -if GCC_PLUGINS +menu "GCC plugins" + depends on GCC_PLUGINS config GCC_PLUGIN_CYC_COMPLEXITY bool "Compute the cyclomatic complexity of a function" if EXPERT @@ -66,71 +68,6 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY * https://grsecurity.net/ * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ -config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK - bool "Zero initialize stack variables" - help - While the kernel is built with warnings enabled for any missed - stack variable initializations, this warning is silenced for - anything passed by reference to another function, under the - occasionally misguided assumption that the function will do - the initialization. As this regularly leads to exploitable - flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize - such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage. - - This plugin was originally ported from grsecurity/PaX. More - information at: - * https://grsecurity.net/ - * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ - -choice - prompt "Coverage" - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK - default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL - help - This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially - uninitialized variables. The selected class will be - zero-initialized before use. - - config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER - bool "structs marked for userspace" - help - Zero-initialize any structures on the stack containing - a __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of - uninitialized stack variable exploits and information - exposures, like CVE-2013-2141: - https://git.kernel.org/linus/b9e146d8eb3b9eca - - config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF - bool "structs passed by reference" - help - Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may - be passed by reference and had not already been - explicitly initialized. This can prevent most classes - of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information - exposures, like CVE-2017-1000410: - https://git.kernel.org/linus/06e7e776ca4d3654 - - config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL - bool "anything passed by reference" - help - Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed - by reference and had not already been explicitly - initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes - of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information - exposures. - -endchoice - -config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE - bool "Report forcefully initialized variables" - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK - depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy - help - This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the - structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be - initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected - by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings. - config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT bool "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures" select MODVERSIONS if MODULES @@ -171,59 +108,8 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT at the cost of weakened randomization. -config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK - bool "Erase the kernel stack before returning from syscalls" - depends on GCC_PLUGINS - depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK - help - This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before - returning from system calls. That reduces the information which - kernel stack leak bugs can reveal and blocks some uninitialized - stack variable attacks. - - The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel - compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary - and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload - before deploying it. - - This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: - * https://grsecurity.net/ - * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ - -config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE - int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK" - default 100 - range 0 4096 - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK - help - The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking - the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes). - It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with - a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter. - If unsure, leave the default value 100. - -config STACKLEAK_METRICS - bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system" - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK - depends on PROC_FS - help - If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in - the /proc file system. In particular, /proc/<pid>/stack_depth - shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and - previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it - can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for - your workloads. - -config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE - bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing" - depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK - help - This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in - runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with - CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK. - config GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK bool depends on GCC_PLUGINS && ARM -endif +endmenu |