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* KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failingJarkko Sakkinen2021-03-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8da7520c80468c48f981f0b81fc1be6599e3b0ad upstream. Consider the following transcript: $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u add_key: Invalid argument The documentation has the following description: migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values, default 1 (resealing allowed) The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL. [*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* dump_common_audit_data(): fix racy accesses to ->d_nameAl Viro2021-01-231-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d36a1dd9f77ae1e72da48f4123ed35627848507d upstream. We are not guaranteed the locking environment that would prevent dentry getting renamed right under us. And it's possible for old long name to be freed after rename, leading to UAF here. Cc: stable@kernel.org # v2.6.2+ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()Roberto Sassu2020-10-291-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 60386b854008adc951c470067f90a2d85b5d520f upstream. Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3323eec921efd ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position indexVasily Averin2020-10-011-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8d269a8e2a8f0bca89022f4ec98de460acb90365 ] If seq_file .next function does not change position index, read after some lseek can generate unexpected output. $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats # usual output lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees 817223 810034 7189 7189 6992 7037 1934894 1926896 7998 7998 7632 7683 1322812 1317176 5636 5636 5456 5507 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 189 bytes copied, 5,1564e-05 s, 3,7 MB/s $# read after lseek to midle of last line $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=180 skip=1 dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset 056 9115 <<<< end of last line 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 <<< whole last line once again 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 45 bytes copied, 8,7221e-05 s, 516 kB/s $# read after lseek beyond end of of file $ dd if=/sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats bs=1000 skip=1 dd: /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats: cannot skip to specified offset 1560571 1551548 9023 9023 9056 9115 <<<< generates whole last line 0+1 records in 0+1 records out 36 bytes copied, 9,0934e-05 s, 396 kB/s https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283 Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()Dan Carpenter2020-08-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 42a2df3e829f3c5562090391b33714b2e2e5ad4a ] We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative values. Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* Smack: fix another vsscanf out of boundsDan Carpenter2020-08-211-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit a6bd4f6d9b07452b0b19842044a6c3ea384b0b88 ] This is similar to commit 84e99e58e8d1 ("Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf") where we added a bounds check on "rule". Reported-by: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: f7112e6c9abf ("Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self()Eric Biggers2020-08-211-2/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit beb4ee6770a89646659e6a2178538d2b13e2654e upstream. smk_write_relabel_self() frees memory from the task's credentials with no locking, which can easily cause a use-after-free because multiple tasks can share the same credentials structure. Fix this by using prepare_creds() and commit_creds() to correctly modify the task's credentials. Reproducer for "BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self": #include <fcntl.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <unistd.h> static void *thrproc(void *arg) { int fd = open("/sys/fs/smackfs/relabel-self", O_WRONLY); for (;;) write(fd, "foo", 3); } int main() { pthread_t t; pthread_create(&t, NULL, thrproc, NULL); thrproc(NULL); } Reported-by: syzbot+e6416dabb497a650da40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* nfs: Move call to security_inode_listsecurity into nfs_listxattrAndreas Gruenbacher2020-08-211-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit c4803c497fbdb37e96af614813a7cfb434b6682a ] Add a nfs_listxattr operation. Move the call to security_inode_listsecurity from list operation of the "security.*" xattr handler to nfs_listxattr. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@netapp.com> Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* selinux: fix double freeTom Rix2020-06-291-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 65de50969a77509452ae590e9449b70a22b923bb upstream. Clang's static analysis tool reports these double free memory errors. security/selinux/ss/services.c:2987:4: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc] kfree(bnames[i]); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ security/selinux/ss/services.c:2990:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc] kfree(bvalues); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~ So improve the security_get_bools error handling by freeing these variables and setting their return pointers to NULL and the return len to 0 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rulesRoberto Sassu2020-06-201-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 067a436b1b0aafa593344fddd711a755a58afb3b ] This patch prevents the following oops: [ 10.771813] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000 [...] [ 10.779790] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0xf7/0xb80 [...] [ 10.798576] Call Trace: [ 10.798993] ? ima_lsm_policy_change+0x2b0/0x2b0 [ 10.799753] ? inode_init_owner+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 10.800484] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7a/0xd0 [ 10.801592] ima_must_appraise.part.0+0xb6/0xf0 [ 10.802313] ? ima_fix_xattr.isra.0+0xd0/0xd0 [ 10.803167] ima_must_appraise+0x4f/0x70 [ 10.804004] ima_post_path_mknod+0x2e/0x80 [ 10.804800] do_mknodat+0x396/0x3c0 It occurs when there is a failure during IMA initialization, and ima_init_policy() is not called. IMA hooks still call ima_match_policy() but ima_rules is NULL. This patch prevents the crash by directly assigning the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules when ima_rules is defined. This wouldn't alter the existing behavior, as ima_rules is always set at the end of ima_init_policy(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x Fixes: 07f6a79415d7d ("ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules") Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculationKrzysztof Struczynski2020-06-201-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1129d31b55d509f15e72dc68e4b5c3a4d7b4da8d upstream. Function hash_long() accepts unsigned long, while currently only one byte is passed from ima_hash_key(), which calculates a key for ima_htable. Given that hashing the digest does not give clear benefits compared to using the digest itself, remove hash_long() and return the modulus calculated on the first two bytes of the digest with the number of slots. Also reduce the depth of the hash table by doubling the number of slots. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3323eec921ef ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Acked-by: David.Laight@aculab.com (big endian system concerns) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanfCasey Schaufler2020-06-201-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 84e99e58e8d1e26f04c097f4266e431a33987f36 upstream. Add barrier to soob. Return -EOVERFLOW if the buffer is exceeded. Suggested-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Reported-by: syzbot+bfdd4a2f07be52351350@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* exec: Always set cap_ambient in cap_bprm_set_credsEric W. Biederman2020-06-031-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit a4ae32c71fe90794127b32d26d7ad795813b502e ] An invariant of cap_bprm_set_creds is that every field in the new cred structure that cap_bprm_set_creds might set, needs to be set every time to ensure the fields does not get a stale value. The field cap_ambient is not set every time cap_bprm_set_creds is called, which means that if there is a suid or sgid script with an interpreter that has neither the suid nor the sgid bits set the interpreter should be able to accept ambient credentials. Unfortuantely because cap_ambient is not reset to it's original value the interpreter can not accept ambient credentials. Given that the ambient capability set is expected to be controlled by the caller, I don't think this is particularly serious. But it is definitely worth fixing so the code works correctly. I have tested to verify my reading of the code is correct and the interpreter of a sgid can receive ambient capabilities with this change and cannot receive ambient capabilities without this change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Fixes: 58319057b784 ("capabilities: ambient capabilities") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()Roberto Sassu2020-05-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 53de3b080d5eae31d0de219617155dcc34e7d698 ] This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set by crypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of the following race condition: Task A: *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash() <= error pointer Task B: if (*tfm == NULL) <= *tfm is not NULL, use it Task B: rc = crypto_shash_init(desc) <= panic Task A: *tfm = NULL This patch uses the IS_ERR_OR_NULL macro to determine whether or not a new crypto context must be created. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d46eb3699502b ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash") Co-developed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()Paul Moore2020-05-051-24/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 upstream. Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to SELinux access control. Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected the first message in the sk_buff. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: reaching the keys quotas correctlyYang Xu2020-04-242-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2e356101e72ab1361821b3af024d64877d9a798d upstream. Currently, when we add a new user key, the calltrace as below: add_key() key_create_or_update() key_alloc() __key_instantiate_and_link generic_key_instantiate key_payload_reserve ...... Since commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"), we can reach max bytes/keys in key_alloc, but we forget to remove this limit when we reserver space for payload in key_payload_reserve. So we can only reach max keys but not max bytes when having delta between plen and type->def_datalen. Remove this limit when instantiating the key, so we can keep consistent with key_alloc. Also, fix the similar problem in keyctl_chown_key(). Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys") Fixes: a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update()Jaihind Yadav2020-02-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 030b995ad9ece9fa2d218af4429c1c78c2342096 ] In AVC update we don't call avc_node_kill() when avc_xperms_populate() fails, resulting in the avc->avc_cache.active_nodes counter having a false value. In last patch this changes was missed , so correcting it. Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") Signed-off-by: Jaihind Yadav <jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org> [PM: merge fuzz, minor description cleanup] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is lockedJohn Johansen2019-11-253-13/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 58acf9d911c8831156634a44d0b022d683e1e50c upstream. the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement. split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check, and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* apparmor: fix update the mtime of the profile file on replacementJohn Johansen2019-11-251-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | commit d671e890205a663429da74e1972e652bea4d73ab upstream. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* apparmor: fix uninitialized lsm_audit memberJohn Johansen2019-11-252-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b6b1b81b3afba922505b57f4c812bba022f7c4a9 upstream. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1268727 The task field in the lsm_audit struct needs to be initialized if a change_hat fails, otherwise the following oops will occur BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000002fbead7d08 IP: [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50 PGD 1e3f35067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: pppox crc_ccitt p8023 p8022 psnap llc ax25 btrfs raid6_pq xor xfs libcrc32c dm_multipath scsi_dh kvm_amd dcdbas kvm microcode amd64_edac_mod joydev edac_core psmouse edac_mce_amd serio_raw k10temp sp5100_tco i2c_piix4 ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter mac_hid lp parport hid_generic usbhid hid pata_acpi mpt2sas ahci raid_class pata_atiixp bnx2 libahci scsi_transport_sas [last unloaded: tipc] CPU: 2 PID: 699 Comm: changehat_twice Tainted: GF O 3.13.0-7-generic #25-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R415/08WNM9, BIOS 1.8.6 12/06/2011 task: ffff8802135c6000 ti: ffff880212986000 task.ti: ffff880212986000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8171153e>] [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50 RSP: 0018:ffff880212987b68 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000020000 RBX: 0000002fbead7500 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000292 RSI: ffff880212987ba8 RDI: 0000002fbead7d08 RBP: ffff880212987b68 R08: 0000000000000246 R09: ffff880216e572a0 R10: ffffffff815fd677 R11: ffffea0008469580 R12: ffffffff8130966f R13: ffff880212987ba8 R14: 0000002fbead7d08 R15: ffff8800d8c6b830 FS: 00002b5e6c84e7c0(0000) GS:ffff880216e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000055731700 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000002fbead7d08 CR3: 000000021270f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff880212987b98 ffffffff81075f17 ffffffff8130966f 0000000000000009 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880212987bd0 ffffffff81075f7c 0000000000000292 ffff880212987c08 ffff8800d8c6b800 0000000000000026 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81075f17>] __lock_task_sighand+0x47/0x80 [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50 [<ffffffff81075f7c>] do_send_sig_info+0x2c/0x80 [<ffffffff81075fee>] send_sig_info+0x1e/0x30 [<ffffffff8130242d>] aa_audit+0x13d/0x190 [<ffffffff8130c1dc>] aa_audit_file+0xbc/0x130 [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50 [<ffffffff81304cc2>] aa_change_hat+0x202/0x530 [<ffffffff81308fc6>] aa_setprocattr_changehat+0x116/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8130a11d>] apparmor_setprocattr+0x25d/0x300 [<ffffffff812cee56>] security_setprocattr+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff8121fc87>] proc_pid_attr_write+0x107/0x130 [<ffffffff811b7604>] vfs_write+0xb4/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811b8039>] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [<ffffffff8171a1bf>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: always return negative code for errorSascha Hauer2019-10-171-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit f5e1040196dbfe14c77ce3dfe3b7b08d2d961e88 ] integrity_kernel_read() returns the number of bytes read. If this is a short read then this positive value is returned from ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(). Currently this is only indirectly called from ima_calc_file_hash() and this function only tests for the return value being zero or nonzero and also doesn't forward the return value. Nevertheless there's no point in returning a positive value as an error, so translate a short read into -EINVAL. Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lockEric Biggers2019-10-072-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e5bfad3d7acc5702f32aafeb388362994f4d7bd0 upstream. inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4. Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem transaction to complete. Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is setJann Horn2019-10-071-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3675f052b43ba51b99b85b073c7070e083f3e6fb upstream. There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds(): If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other ->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it): - task A: create task B with fork() - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some conditions - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which destroys the ptrace relationship) Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5663884caab1 ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in ↵Jia-Ju Bai2019-10-071-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb() [ Upstream commit 3f4287e7d98a2954f20bf96c567fdffcd2b63eb9 ] In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL: if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases. But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used: ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL. To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb. These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us. Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* keys: Fix missing null pointer check in request_key_auth_describe()Hillf Danton2019-09-211-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit d41a3effbb53b1bcea41e328d16a4d046a508381 ] If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur: BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038 Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] ... NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0 LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 Call Trace: [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable) [...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0 [...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540 [...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110 [...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70 [...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0 [...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130 [...] system_call+0x5c/0x70 Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key. Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side. [DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check in the read routine] Fixes: 04c567d9313e ("[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key") Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()Ondrej Mosnacek2019-08-061-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 45385237f65aeee73641f1ef737d7273905a233f upstream. Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in the error path. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* apparmor: enforce nullbyte at end of tag stringJann Horn2019-07-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8404d7a674c49278607d19726e0acc0cae299357 upstream. A packed AppArmor policy contains null-terminated tag strings that are read by unpack_nameX(). However, unpack_nameX() uses string functions on them without ensuring that they are actually null-terminated, potentially leading to out-of-bounds accesses. Make sure that the tag string is null-terminated before passing it to strcmp(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: never allow relabeling on context mountsOndrej Mosnacek2019-05-161-9/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a83d6ddaebe541570291205cb538e35ad4ff94f9 upstream. In the SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case we never want to allow relabeling files/directories, so we should never set the SBLABEL_MNT flag. The 'special handling' in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() is only intended for when the behavior is set to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS. While there, make the logic in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() more explicit and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to make sure that introducing a new SECURITY_FS_USE_* forces a review of the logic. Fixes: d5f3a5f6e7e7 ("selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* device_cgroup: fix RCU imbalance in error caseJann Horn2019-04-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0fcc4c8c044e117ac126ab6df4138ea9a67fa2a9 upstream. When dev_exception_add() returns an error (due to a failed memory allocation), make sure that we move the RCU preemption count back to where it was before we were called. We dropped the RCU read lock inside the loop body, so we can't just "break". sparse complains about this, too: $ make -s C=2 security/device_cgroup.o ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:647:9: warning: context imbalance in 'propagate_exception' - unexpected unlock Fixes: d591fb56618f ("device_cgroup: simplify cgroup tree walk in propagate_exception()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* missing barriers in some of unix_sock ->addr and ->path accessesAl Viro2019-03-231-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ae3b564179bfd06f32d051b9e5d72ce4b2a07c37 ] Several u->addr and u->path users are not holding any locks in common with unix_bind(). unix_state_lock() is useless for those purposes. u->addr is assign-once and *(u->addr) is fully set up by the time we set u->addr (all under unix_table_lock). u->path is also set in the same critical area, also before setting u->addr, and any unix_sock with ->path filled will have non-NULL ->addr. So setting ->addr with smp_store_release() is all we need for those "lockless" users - just have them fetch ->addr with smp_load_acquire() and don't even bother looking at ->path if they see NULL ->addr. Users of ->addr and ->path fall into several classes now: 1) ones that do smp_load_acquire(u->addr) and access *(u->addr) and u->path only if smp_load_acquire() has returned non-NULL. 2) places holding unix_table_lock. These are guaranteed that *(u->addr) is seen fully initialized. If unix_sock is in one of the "bound" chains, so's ->path. 3) unix_sock_destructor() using ->addr is safe. All places that set u->addr are guaranteed to have seen all stores *(u->addr) while holding a reference to u and unix_sock_destructor() is called when (atomic) refcount hits zero. 4) unix_release_sock() using ->path is safe. unix_bind() is serialized wrt unix_release() (normally - by struct file refcount), and for the instances that had ->path set by unix_bind() unix_release_sock() comes from unix_release(), so they are fine. Instances that had it set in unix_stream_connect() either end up attached to a socket (in unix_accept()), in which case the call chain to unix_release_sock() and serialization are the same as in the previous case, or they never get accept'ed and unix_release_sock() is called when the listener is shut down and its queue gets purged. In that case the listener's queue lock provides the barriers needed - unix_stream_connect() shoves our unix_sock into listener's queue under that lock right after having set ->path and eventual unix_release_sock() caller picks them from that queue under the same lock right before calling unix_release_sock(). 5) unix_find_other() use of ->path is pointless, but safe - it happens with successful lookup by (abstract) name, so ->path.dentry is guaranteed to be NULL there. earlier-variant-reviewed-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: restrict /proc/keys by credentials at open timeEric Biggers2019-03-231-6/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 4aa68e07d845562561f5e73c04aa521376e95252 upstream. When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from /proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file was opened. This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the file descriptor to a suid program. Following commit 34dbbcdbf633 ("Make file credentials available to the seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it. So let's do it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: always initialize keyring_index_key::desc_lenEric Biggers2019-03-234-6/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ede0fa98a900e657d1fcd80b50920efc896c1a4c upstream. syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin() called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the length of the key description was never calculated. The problem is that we rely on ->desc_len being initialized by search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings(). But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens. Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the description is set, like we already do in some places. The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and no session keyring has been installed. If it doesn't work, try removing pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting. #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <keyutils.h> int main(void) { int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING); keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE); setreuid(5000, 5000); request_key("user", "desc", "", id); } Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactlyEric Biggers2019-03-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a08bf91ce28ed3ae7b6fef35d843fef8dc8c2cd9 upstream. If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys. Likewise for 'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls. But these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page, Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached). Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly. Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* smack: fix access permissions for keyringZoran Markovic2019-02-201-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 5b841bfab695e3b8ae793172a9ff7990f99cc3e2 ] Function smack_key_permission() only issues smack requests for the following operations: - KEY_NEED_READ (issues MAY_READ) - KEY_NEED_WRITE (issues MAY_WRITE) - KEY_NEED_LINK (issues MAY_WRITE) - KEY_NEED_SETATTR (issues MAY_WRITE) A blank smack request is issued in all other cases, resulting in smack access being granted if there is any rule defined between subject and object, or denied with -EACCES otherwise. Request MAY_READ access for KEY_NEED_SEARCH and KEY_NEED_VIEW. Fix the logic in the unlikely case when both MAY_READ and MAY_WRITE are needed. Validate access permission field for valid contents. Signed-off-by: Zoran Markovic <zmarkovic@sierrawireless.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* selinux: fix GPF on invalid policyStephen Smalley2019-01-261-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5b0e7310a2a33c06edc7eb81ffc521af9b2c5610 upstream. levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure sens_destroy handles that case correctly. Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* LSM: Check for NULL cred-security on freeJames Morris2019-01-261-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a5795fd38ee8194451ba3f281f075301a3696ce2 upstream. From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Check that the cred security blob has been set before trying to clean it up. There is a case during credential initialization that could result in this. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reported-by: syzbot+69ca07954461f189e808@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Yama: Check for pid death before checking ancestryKees Cook2019-01-261-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9474f4e7cd71a633fa1ef93b7daefd44bbdfd482 upstream. It's possible that a pid has died before we take the rcu lock, in which case we can't walk the ancestry list as it may be detached. Instead, check for death first before doing the walk. Reported-by: syzbot+a9ac39bf55329e206219@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 2d514487faf1 ("security: Yama LSM") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* mm: replace get_user_pages() write/force parameters with gup_flagsLorenzo Stoakes2018-12-171-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 768ae309a96103ed02eb1e111e838c87854d8b51 upstream. This removes the 'write' and 'force' from get_user_pages() and replaces them with 'gup_flags' to make the use of FOLL_FORCE explicit in callers as use of this flag can result in surprising behaviour (and hence bugs) within the mm subsystem. Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Acked-by: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 4.4: - Drop changes in rapidio, vchiq, goldfish - Keep the "write" variable in amdgpu_ttm_tt_pin_userptr() as it's still needed - Also update calls from various other places that now use get_user_pages_remote() upstream, which were updated there by commit 9beae1ea8930 "mm: replace get_user_pages_remote() write/force ..." - Also update calls from hfi1 and ipath - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count'Eric Biggers2018-11-211-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1e4c8dafbb6bf72fb5eca035b861e39c5896c2b7 upstream. The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold a 'long' value. Increase it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: put keyring if install_session_keyring_to_cred() failsEric Biggers2018-11-101-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit d636bd9f12a66ea3775c9fabbf3f8e118253467a ] In join_session_keyring(), if install_session_keyring_to_cred() were to fail, we would leak the keyring reference, just like in the bug fixed by commit 23567fd052a9 ("KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()"). Fortunately this cannot happen currently, but we really should be more careful. Do this by adding and using a new error label at which the keyring reference is dropped. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_cachesMichal Hocko2018-09-191-8/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 476accbe2f6ef69caeebe99f52a286e12ac35aee upstream. There is a strange __GFP_NOMEMALLOC usage pattern in SELinux, specifically GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC which doesn't make much sense. GFP_ATOMIC on its own allows to access memory reserves while __GFP_NOMEMALLOC dictates we cannot use memory reserves. Replace this with the much more sane GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC code as we can tolerate memory allocation failures in that code. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inodeCasey Schaufler2018-08-241-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 7b4e88434c4e7982fb053c49657e1c8bbb8692d9 ] Smack: Mark inode instant in smack_task_to_inode /proc clean-up in commit 1bbc55131e59bd099fdc568d3aa0b42634dbd188 resulted in smack_task_to_inode() being called before smack_d_instantiate. This resulted in the smk_inode value being ignored, even while present for files in /proc/self. Marking the inode as instant here fixes that. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecuritySachin Grover2018-06-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit efe3de79e0b52ca281ef6691480c8c68c82a4657 upstream. Call trace: [<ffffff9203a8d7a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428 [<ffffff9203a8dbf8>] show_stack+0x28/0x38 [<ffffff920409bfb8>] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124 [<ffffff9203d187e8>] print_address_description+0x68/0x258 [<ffffff9203d18c00>] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0 [<ffffff9203d1927c>] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffff9203d1776c>] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0 [<ffffff9203d17cdc>] memcpy+0x34/0x68 [<ffffff9203d75348>] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160 [<ffffff9203d75490>] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120 [<ffffff9203d75d68>] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8 [<ffffff9203d76fb4>] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0 [<ffffff9203a83f70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr() on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string, it would result in a panic. To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context instead of the length passed by the userspace process. Signed-off-by: Sachin Grover <sgrover@codeaurora.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Revert "ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log modes"Mimi Zohar2018-06-061-6/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f5acb3dcba1ffb7f0b8cbb9dba61500eea5d610b upstream. Userspace applications have been modified to write security xattrs, but they are not context aware. In the case of security.ima, the security xattr can be either a file hash or a file signature. Permitting writing one, but not the other requires the application to be context aware. In addition, userspace applications might write files to a staging area, which might not be in policy, and then change some file metadata (eg. owner) making it in policy. As a result, these files are not labeled properly. This reverts commit c68ed80c97d9720f51ef31fe91560fdd1e121533, which prevents writing file hashes as security.ima xattrs. Requested-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithmPetr Vorel2018-05-302-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ab60368ab6a452466885ef4edf0cefd089465132 ] IMA requires having it's hash algorithm be compiled-in due to it's early use. The default IMA algorithm is protected by Kconfig to be compiled-in. The ima_hash kernel parameter allows to choose the hash algorithm. When the specified algorithm is not available or available as a module, IMA initialization fails, which leads to a kernel panic (mknodat syscall calls ima_post_path_mknod()). Therefore as fallback we force IMA to use the default builtin Kconfig hash algorithm. Fixed crash: $ grep CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4 .config CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=m [ 0.000000] Command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.12.14-2.3-default root=UUID=74ae8202-9ca7-4e39-813b-22287ec52f7a video=1024x768-16 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty resume=/dev/disk/by-path/pci-0000:00:07.0-part3 splash=silent showopts ima_hash=md4 ... [ 1.545190] ima: Can not allocate md4 (reason: -2) ... [ 2.610120] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 2.611903] IP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 [ 2.612967] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 2.613080] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 2.613080] Modules linked in: autofs4 [ 2.613080] Supported: Yes [ 2.613080] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.12.14-2.3-default #1 [ 2.613080] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 2.613080] task: ffff88003e2d0040 task.stack: ffffc90000190000 [ 2.613080] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 [ 2.613080] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000193e88 EFLAGS: 00010296 [ 2.613080] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000004 [ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880037071728 [ 2.613080] RBP: 0000000000008000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 61c8864680b583eb R12: 00005580ff10086f [ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000008000 [ 2.613080] FS: 00007f5c1da08940(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037002000 CR4: 00000000003406f0 [ 2.613080] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 2.613080] Call Trace: [ 2.613080] ? shmem_mknod+0xbf/0xd0 [ 2.613080] ima_post_path_mknod+0x1c/0x40 [ 2.613080] SyS_mknod+0x210/0x220 [ 2.613080] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5 [ 2.613080] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c1bfde570 [ 2.613080] RSP: 002b:00007ffde1c90dc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000085 [ 2.613080] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5c1bfde570 [ 2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000008000 RDI: 00005580ff10086f [ 2.613080] RBP: 00007ffde1c91040 R08: 00005580ff10086f R09: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] R10: 0000000000104000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005580ffb99660 [ 2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002 [ 2.613080] Code: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 44 8d 14 09 41 55 41 54 55 53 44 89 d3 09 cb 48 83 ec 38 48 8b 05 c5 03 29 01 <4c> 8b 20 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d7 01 00 00 4c 89 44 24 08 89 54 24 20 [ 2.613080] RIP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 RSP: ffffc90000193e88 [ 2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 [ 2.613080] ---[ end trace 9a9f0a8a73079f6a ]--- [ 2.673052] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009 [ 2.673052] [ 2.675337] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 2.676405] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009 Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interfaceJiandi An2018-05-301-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit fac37c628fd5d68fd7298d9b57ae8601ee1b4723 ] TPM_CRB driver provides TPM CRB 2.0 support. If it is built as a module, the TPM chip is registered after IMA init. tpm_pcr_read() in IMA fails and displays the following message even though eventually there is a TPM chip on the system. ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=-19) Fix IMA Kconfig to select TPM_CRB so TPM_CRB driver is built in the kernel and initializes before IMA. Signed-off-by: Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: do not check open permission on socketsStephen Smalley2018-04-131-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ccb544781d34afdb73a9a73ae53035d824d193bf ] open permission is currently only defined for files in the kernel (COMMON_FILE_PERMS rather than COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS). Construction of an artificial test case that tries to open a socket via /proc/pid/fd will generate a recvfrom avc denial because recvfrom and open happen to map to the same permission bit in socket vs file classes. open of a socket via /proc/pid/fd is not supported by the kernel regardless and will ultimately return ENXIO. But we hit the permission check first and can thus produce these odd/misleading denials. Omit the open check when operating on a socket. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: Remove redundant check for unknown labeling behaviorMatthias Kaehlcke2018-04-081-16/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 270e8573145a26de924e2dc644596332d400445b upstream. The check is already performed in ocontext_read() when the policy is loaded. Removing the array also fixes the following warning when building with clang: security/selinux/hooks.c:338:20: error: variable 'labeling_behaviors' is not needed and will not be emitted [-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration] Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> [natechancellor: inode_doinit_with_dentry still present] Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* selinux: Remove unnecessary check of array base in selinux_set_mapping()Matthias Kaehlcke2018-04-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 342e91578eb6909529bc7095964cd44b9c057c4e upstream. 'perms' will never be NULL since it isn't a plain pointer but an array of u32 values. This fixes the following warning when building with clang: security/selinux/ss/services.c:158:16: error: address of array 'p_in->perms' will always evaluate to 'true' [-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion] while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) { Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ima: relax requiring a file signature for new files with zero lengthMimi Zohar2018-03-221-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit b7e27bc1d42e8e0cc58b602b529c25cd0071b336 ] Custom policies can require file signatures based on LSM labels. These files are normally created and only afterwards labeled, requiring them to be signed. Instead of requiring file signatures based on LSM labels, entire filesystems could require file signatures. In this case, we need the ability of writing new files without requiring file signatures. The definition of a "new" file was originally defined as any file with a length of zero. Subsequent patches redefined a "new" file to be based on the FILE_CREATE open flag. By combining the open flag with a file size of zero, this patch relaxes the file signature requirement. Fixes: 1ac202e978e1 ima: accept previously set IMA_NEW_FILE Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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