From c6a1fa12d206882757264869f8e32d606b930e2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Tue, 7 Oct 2008 12:04:32 +0200 Subject: mac80211: minor code cleanups Nothing very interesting, some checkpatch inspired stuff, some other things. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg Signed-off-by: John W. Linville --- net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c | 6 +++--- net/mac80211/main.c | 2 +- net/mac80211/mesh.c | 2 +- net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h | 2 +- net/mac80211/rx.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 4 ++-- net/mac80211/wep.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- net/mac80211/wep.h | 2 +- net/mac80211/wpa.c | 29 ++++++++++------------------- 9 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c b/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c index 5824eb225f26..a2fbe0131312 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c +++ b/net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static ssize_t sta_agg_status_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf, p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n DTKN:"); for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++) p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d", - sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_rx[i]? + sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_rx[i] ? sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_rx[i]->dialog_token : 0); p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n TX :"); @@ -148,13 +148,13 @@ static ssize_t sta_agg_status_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf, p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n DTKN:"); for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++) p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d", - sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i]? + sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i] ? sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->dialog_token : 0); p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n SSN :"); for (i = 0; i < STA_TID_NUM; i++) p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "%5d", - sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i]? + sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[i] ? sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[i]->ssn : 0); p += scnprintf(p, sizeof(buf)+buf-p, "\n"); diff --git a/net/mac80211/main.c b/net/mac80211/main.c index ae62ad40ad63..ff39d893a113 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/main.c +++ b/net/mac80211/main.c @@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ static int __init ieee80211_init(void) BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct ieee80211_tx_info) > sizeof(skb->cb)); BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct ieee80211_tx_info, driver_data) + - IEEE80211_TX_INFO_DRIVER_DATA_SIZE > sizeof(skb->cb)); + IEEE80211_TX_INFO_DRIVER_DATA_SIZE > sizeof(skb->cb)); ret = rc80211_minstrel_init(); if (ret) diff --git a/net/mac80211/mesh.c b/net/mac80211/mesh.c index 8013277924f2..d3b6e1a648bd 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mesh.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mesh.c @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static void ieee80211_mesh_rx_bcn_presp(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, size_t len, struct ieee80211_rx_status *rx_status) { - struct ieee80211_local *local= sdata->local; + struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; struct ieee802_11_elems elems; struct ieee80211_channel *channel; u64 supp_rates = 0; diff --git a/net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h b/net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h index 01d64d53f3b9..ce099ea1d5d3 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h +++ b/net/mac80211/rc80211_pid.h @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ /* Arithmetic right shift for positive and negative values for ISO C. */ #define RC_PID_DO_ARITH_RIGHT_SHIFT(x, y) \ - (x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y) + ((x) < 0 ? -((-(x)) >> (y)) : (x) >> (y)) enum rc_pid_event_type { RC_PID_EVENT_TYPE_TX_STATUS, diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 39aaf210e9f5..af6ce1064697 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -26,10 +26,11 @@ #include "tkip.h" #include "wme.h" -u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, - struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx, - struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num, - int bar_req); +static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, + struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx, + struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 mpdu_seq_num, + int bar_req); /* * monitor mode reception * @@ -1988,17 +1989,17 @@ static void __ieee80211_rx_handle_packet(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, static inline int seq_less(u16 sq1, u16 sq2) { - return (((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1)); + return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK) > (SEQ_MODULO >> 1); } static inline u16 seq_inc(u16 sq) { - return ((sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK); + return (sq + 1) & SEQ_MASK; } static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 sq2) { - return ((sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK); + return (sq1 - sq2) & SEQ_MASK; } @@ -2006,10 +2007,11 @@ static inline u16 seq_sub(u16 sq1, u16 sq2) * As it function blongs to Rx path it must be called with * the proper rcu_read_lock protection for its flow. */ -u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, - struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx, - struct sk_buff *skb, u16 mpdu_seq_num, - int bar_req) +static u8 ieee80211_sta_manage_reorder_buf(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, + struct tid_ampdu_rx *tid_agg_rx, + struct sk_buff *skb, + u16 mpdu_seq_num, + int bar_req) { struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw); struct ieee80211_rx_status status; diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c index ca89a848c41e..b22110a4a75e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c +++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ int sta_info_insert(struct sta_info *sta) } if (WARN_ON(compare_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr, sdata->dev->dev_addr) == 0 || - is_multicast_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr))) { + is_multicast_ether_addr(sta->sta.addr))) { err = -EINVAL; goto out_free; } @@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ void ieee80211_sta_expire(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, } struct ieee80211_sta *ieee80211_find_sta(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, - const u8 *addr) + const u8 *addr) { struct sta_info *sta = sta_info_get(hw_to_local(hw), addr); diff --git a/net/mac80211/wep.c b/net/mac80211/wep.c index f0e2d3ecb5c4..7bbb98e846a3 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wep.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wep.c @@ -49,17 +49,19 @@ void ieee80211_wep_free(struct ieee80211_local *local) crypto_free_blkcipher(local->wep_rx_tfm); } -static inline int ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen) +static inline bool ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen) { - /* Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the + /* + * Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the * key scheduling algorithm of RC4. At least IVs (KeyByte + 3, - * 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them. */ + * 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them. + */ if ((iv & 0xff00) == 0xff00) { u8 B = (iv >> 16) & 0xff; if (B >= 3 && B < 3 + keylen) - return 1; + return true; } - return 0; + return false; } @@ -268,7 +270,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb, } -u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key) +bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; unsigned int hdrlen; @@ -276,16 +278,13 @@ u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key) u32 iv; if (!ieee80211_has_protected(hdr->frame_control)) - return NULL; + return false; hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control); ivpos = skb->data + hdrlen; iv = (ivpos[0] << 16) | (ivpos[1] << 8) | ivpos[2]; - if (ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen)) - return ivpos; - - return NULL; + return ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen); } ieee80211_rx_result @@ -329,6 +328,8 @@ static int wep_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) ieee80211_tx_result ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { + int i; + ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->skb) < 0) { @@ -337,9 +338,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) } if (tx->extra_frag) { - int i; for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) { - if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0) { + if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i])) { I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local-> tx_handlers_drop_wep); return TX_DROP; diff --git a/net/mac80211/wep.h b/net/mac80211/wep.h index e587172115b8..d3f0db48314e 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wep.h +++ b/net/mac80211/wep.h @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key); int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key); -u8 *ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key); +bool ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key); ieee80211_rx_result ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx); diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index 3a20b036ef4c..7aa63caf8d50 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) !(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_FRAGMENTED) && !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) && !wpa_test) { - /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for Michael MIC - */ + /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for MMIC */ return TX_CONTINUE; } @@ -67,8 +66,6 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) #else authenticator = 1; #endif - /* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key - * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */ key_offset = authenticator ? NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY : NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY; @@ -91,9 +88,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; int authenticator = 1, wpa_test = 0; - /* - * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it - */ + /* No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it */ if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED) return RX_CONTINUE; @@ -115,8 +110,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) #else authenticator = 1; #endif - /* At this point we know we're using ALG_TKIP. To get the MIC key - * we now will rely on the offset from the ieee80211_key_conf::key */ key_offset = authenticator ? NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY : NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY; @@ -201,6 +194,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; + int i; ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); @@ -208,9 +202,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) return TX_DROP; if (tx->extra_frag) { - int i; for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) { - if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0) + if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i])) return TX_DROP; } } @@ -348,7 +341,7 @@ static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id) } -static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr) +static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr) { pn[0] = hdr[7]; pn[1] = hdr[6]; @@ -356,7 +349,6 @@ static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr) pn[3] = hdr[4]; pn[4] = hdr[1]; pn[5] = hdr[0]; - return (hdr[3] >> 6) & 0x03; } @@ -371,7 +363,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb) if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) && !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) { - /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP " + /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP * header or MIC fields */ info->control.hw_key = &tx->key->conf; return 0; @@ -424,6 +416,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_result ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; + int i; ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); @@ -431,9 +424,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) return TX_DROP; if (tx->extra_frag) { - int i; for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) { - if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i]) < 0) + if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i])) return TX_DROP; } } @@ -465,7 +457,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) return RX_CONTINUE; - (void) ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); + ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) { key->u.ccmp.replays++; @@ -480,9 +472,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) key->u.ccmp.tfm, key->u.ccmp.rx_crypto_buf, skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len, skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN, - skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN)) { + skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - } } memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); -- cgit v1.2.3