From 898bd37a92063e46bc8d7b870781cecd66234f92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2019 19:45:00 -0300 Subject: docs: block: convert to ReST Rename the block documentation files to ReST, add an index for them and adjust in order to produce a nice html output via the Sphinx build system. At its new index.rst, let's add a :orphan: while this is not linked to the main index.rst file, in order to avoid build warnings. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab --- Documentation/block/data-integrity.rst | 291 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 291 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/block/data-integrity.rst (limited to 'Documentation/block/data-integrity.rst') diff --git a/Documentation/block/data-integrity.rst b/Documentation/block/data-integrity.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4f2452a95c43 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/block/data-integrity.rst @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +============== +Data Integrity +============== + +1. Introduction +=============== + +Modern filesystems feature checksumming of data and metadata to +protect against data corruption. However, the detection of the +corruption is done at read time which could potentially be months +after the data was written. At that point the original data that the +application tried to write is most likely lost. + +The solution is to ensure that the disk is actually storing what the +application meant it to. Recent additions to both the SCSI family +protocols (SBC Data Integrity Field, SCC protection proposal) as well +as SATA/T13 (External Path Protection) try to remedy this by adding +support for appending integrity metadata to an I/O. The integrity +metadata (or protection information in SCSI terminology) includes a +checksum for each sector as well as an incrementing counter that +ensures the individual sectors are written in the right order. And +for some protection schemes also that the I/O is written to the right +place on disk. + +Current storage controllers and devices implement various protective +measures, for instance checksumming and scrubbing. But these +technologies are working in their own isolated domains or at best +between adjacent nodes in the I/O path. The interesting thing about +DIF and the other integrity extensions is that the protection format +is well defined and every node in the I/O path can verify the +integrity of the I/O and reject it if corruption is detected. This +allows not only corruption prevention but also isolation of the point +of failure. + +2. The Data Integrity Extensions +================================ + +As written, the protocol extensions only protect the path between +controller and storage device. However, many controllers actually +allow the operating system to interact with the integrity metadata +(IMD). We have been working with several FC/SAS HBA vendors to enable +the protection information to be transferred to and from their +controllers. + +The SCSI Data Integrity Field works by appending 8 bytes of protection +information to each sector. The data + integrity metadata is stored +in 520 byte sectors on disk. Data + IMD are interleaved when +transferred between the controller and target. The T13 proposal is +similar. + +Because it is highly inconvenient for operating systems to deal with +520 (and 4104) byte sectors, we approached several HBA vendors and +encouraged them to allow separation of the data and integrity metadata +scatter-gather lists. + +The controller will interleave the buffers on write and split them on +read. This means that Linux can DMA the data buffers to and from +host memory without changes to the page cache. + +Also, the 16-bit CRC checksum mandated by both the SCSI and SATA specs +is somewhat heavy to compute in software. Benchmarks found that +calculating this checksum had a significant impact on system +performance for a number of workloads. Some controllers allow a +lighter-weight checksum to be used when interfacing with the operating +system. Emulex, for instance, supports the TCP/IP checksum instead. +The IP checksum received from the OS is converted to the 16-bit CRC +when writing and vice versa. This allows the integrity metadata to be +generated by Linux or the application at very low cost (comparable to +software RAID5). + +The IP checksum is weaker than the CRC in terms of detecting bit +errors. However, the strength is really in the separation of the data +buffers and the integrity metadata. These two distinct buffers must +match up for an I/O to complete. + +The separation of the data and integrity metadata buffers as well as +the choice in checksums is referred to as the Data Integrity +Extensions. As these extensions are outside the scope of the protocol +bodies (T10, T13), Oracle and its partners are trying to standardize +them within the Storage Networking Industry Association. + +3. Kernel Changes +================= + +The data integrity framework in Linux enables protection information +to be pinned to I/Os and sent to/received from controllers that +support it. + +The advantage to the integrity extensions in SCSI and SATA is that +they enable us to protect the entire path from application to storage +device. However, at the same time this is also the biggest +disadvantage. It means that the protection information must be in a +format that can be understood by the disk. + +Generally Linux/POSIX applications are agnostic to the intricacies of +the storage devices they are accessing. The virtual filesystem switch +and the block layer make things like hardware sector size and +transport protocols completely transparent to the application. + +However, this level of detail is required when preparing the +protection information to send to a disk. Consequently, the very +concept of an end-to-end protection scheme is a layering violation. +It is completely unreasonable for an application to be aware whether +it is accessing a SCSI or SATA disk. + +The data integrity support implemented in Linux attempts to hide this +from the application. As far as the application (and to some extent +the kernel) is concerned, the integrity metadata is opaque information +that's attached to the I/O. + +The current implementation allows the block layer to automatically +generate the protection information for any I/O. Eventually the +intent is to move the integrity metadata calculation to userspace for +user data. Metadata and other I/O that originates within the kernel +will still use the automatic generation interface. + +Some storage devices allow each hardware sector to be tagged with a +16-bit value. The owner of this tag space is the owner of the block +device. I.e. the filesystem in most cases. The filesystem can use +this extra space to tag sectors as they see fit. Because the tag +space is limited, the block interface allows tagging bigger chunks by +way of interleaving. This way, 8*16 bits of information can be +attached to a typical 4KB filesystem block. + +This also means that applications such as fsck and mkfs will need +access to manipulate the tags from user space. A passthrough +interface for this is being worked on. + + +4. Block Layer Implementation Details +===================================== + +4.1 Bio +------- + +The data integrity patches add a new field to struct bio when +CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY is enabled. bio_integrity(bio) returns a +pointer to a struct bip which contains the bio integrity payload. +Essentially a bip is a trimmed down struct bio which holds a bio_vec +containing the integrity metadata and the required housekeeping +information (bvec pool, vector count, etc.) + +A kernel subsystem can enable data integrity protection on a bio by +calling bio_integrity_alloc(bio). This will allocate and attach the +bip to the bio. + +Individual pages containing integrity metadata can subsequently be +attached using bio_integrity_add_page(). + +bio_free() will automatically free the bip. + + +4.2 Block Device +---------------- + +Because the format of the protection data is tied to the physical +disk, each block device has been extended with a block integrity +profile (struct blk_integrity). This optional profile is registered +with the block layer using blk_integrity_register(). + +The profile contains callback functions for generating and verifying +the protection data, as well as getting and setting application tags. +The profile also contains a few constants to aid in completing, +merging and splitting the integrity metadata. + +Layered block devices will need to pick a profile that's appropriate +for all subdevices. blk_integrity_compare() can help with that. DM +and MD linear, RAID0 and RAID1 are currently supported. RAID4/5/6 +will require extra work due to the application tag. + + +5.0 Block Layer Integrity API +============================= + +5.1 Normal Filesystem +--------------------- + + The normal filesystem is unaware that the underlying block device + is capable of sending/receiving integrity metadata. The IMD will + be automatically generated by the block layer at submit_bio() time + in case of a WRITE. A READ request will cause the I/O integrity + to be verified upon completion. + + IMD generation and verification can be toggled using the:: + + /sys/block//integrity/write_generate + + and:: + + /sys/block//integrity/read_verify + + flags. + + +5.2 Integrity-Aware Filesystem +------------------------------ + + A filesystem that is integrity-aware can prepare I/Os with IMD + attached. It can also use the application tag space if this is + supported by the block device. + + + `bool bio_integrity_prep(bio);` + + To generate IMD for WRITE and to set up buffers for READ, the + filesystem must call bio_integrity_prep(bio). + + Prior to calling this function, the bio data direction and start + sector must be set, and the bio should have all data pages + added. It is up to the caller to ensure that the bio does not + change while I/O is in progress. + Complete bio with error if prepare failed for some reson. + + +5.3 Passing Existing Integrity Metadata +--------------------------------------- + + Filesystems that either generate their own integrity metadata or + are capable of transferring IMD from user space can use the + following calls: + + + `struct bip * bio_integrity_alloc(bio, gfp_mask, nr_pages);` + + Allocates the bio integrity payload and hangs it off of the bio. + nr_pages indicate how many pages of protection data need to be + stored in the integrity bio_vec list (similar to bio_alloc()). + + The integrity payload will be freed at bio_free() time. + + + `int bio_integrity_add_page(bio, page, len, offset);` + + Attaches a page containing integrity metadata to an existing + bio. The bio must have an existing bip, + i.e. bio_integrity_alloc() must have been called. For a WRITE, + the integrity metadata in the pages must be in a format + understood by the target device with the notable exception that + the sector numbers will be remapped as the request traverses the + I/O stack. This implies that the pages added using this call + will be modified during I/O! The first reference tag in the + integrity metadata must have a value of bip->bip_sector. + + Pages can be added using bio_integrity_add_page() as long as + there is room in the bip bio_vec array (nr_pages). + + Upon completion of a READ operation, the attached pages will + contain the integrity metadata received from the storage device. + It is up to the receiver to process them and verify data + integrity upon completion. + + +5.4 Registering A Block Device As Capable Of Exchanging Integrity Metadata +-------------------------------------------------------------------------- + + To enable integrity exchange on a block device the gendisk must be + registered as capable: + + `int blk_integrity_register(gendisk, blk_integrity);` + + The blk_integrity struct is a template and should contain the + following:: + + static struct blk_integrity my_profile = { + .name = "STANDARDSBODY-TYPE-VARIANT-CSUM", + .generate_fn = my_generate_fn, + .verify_fn = my_verify_fn, + .tuple_size = sizeof(struct my_tuple_size), + .tag_size = , + }; + + 'name' is a text string which will be visible in sysfs. This is + part of the userland API so chose it carefully and never change + it. The format is standards body-type-variant. + E.g. T10-DIF-TYPE1-IP or T13-EPP-0-CRC. + + 'generate_fn' generates appropriate integrity metadata (for WRITE). + + 'verify_fn' verifies that the data buffer matches the integrity + metadata. + + 'tuple_size' must be set to match the size of the integrity + metadata per sector. I.e. 8 for DIF and EPP. + + 'tag_size' must be set to identify how many bytes of tag space + are available per hardware sector. For DIF this is either 2 or + 0 depending on the value of the Control Mode Page ATO bit. + +---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +2007-12-24 Martin K. Petersen -- cgit v1.2.3