From ea72ce5da22806d5713f3ffb39a6d5ae73841f93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2024 00:29:36 +0200 Subject: x86/kaslr: Expose and use the end of the physical memory address space iounmap() on x86 occasionally fails to unmap because the provided valid ioremap address is not below high_memory. It turned out that this happens due to KASLR. KASLR uses the full address space between PAGE_OFFSET and vaddr_end to randomize the starting points of the direct map, vmalloc and vmemmap regions. It thereby limits the size of the direct map by using the installed memory size plus an extra configurable margin for hot-plug memory. This limitation is done to gain more randomization space because otherwise only the holes between the direct map, vmalloc, vmemmap and vaddr_end would be usable for randomizing. The limited direct map size is not exposed to the rest of the kernel, so the memory hot-plug and resource management related code paths still operate under the assumption that the available address space can be determined with MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS. request_free_mem_region() allocates from (1 << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS) - 1 downwards. That means the first allocation happens past the end of the direct map and if unlucky this address is in the vmalloc space, which causes high_memory to become greater than VMALLOC_START and consequently causes iounmap() to fail for valid ioremap addresses. MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS cannot be changed for that because the randomization does not align with address bit boundaries and there are other places which actually require to know the maximum number of address bits. All remaining usage sites of MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS have been analyzed and found to be correct. Cure this by exposing the end of the direct map via PHYSMEM_END and use that for the memory hot-plug and resource management related places instead of relying on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS. In the KASLR case PHYSMEM_END maps to a variable which is initialized by the KASLR initialization and otherwise it is based on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS as before. To prevent future hickups add a check into add_pages() to catch callers trying to add memory above PHYSMEM_END. Fixes: 0483e1fa6e09 ("x86/mm: Implement ASLR for kernel memory regions") Reported-by: Max Ramanouski Reported-by: Alistair Popple Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Tested-By: Max Ramanouski Tested-by: Alistair Popple Reviewed-by: Dan Williams Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87ed6soy3z.ffs@tglx --- arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/mm/init_64.c | 4 ++++ arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'arch') diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h index af4302d79b59..f3d257c45225 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ extern unsigned long phys_base; extern unsigned long page_offset_base; extern unsigned long vmalloc_base; extern unsigned long vmemmap_base; +extern unsigned long physmem_end; static __always_inline unsigned long __phys_addr_nodebug(unsigned long x) { diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h index 9053dfe9fa03..a98e53491a4e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h @@ -140,6 +140,10 @@ extern unsigned int ptrs_per_p4d; # define VMEMMAP_START __VMEMMAP_BASE_L4 #endif /* CONFIG_DYNAMIC_MEMORY_LAYOUT */ +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY +# define PHYSMEM_END physmem_end +#endif + /* * End of the region for which vmalloc page tables are pre-allocated. * For non-KMSAN builds, this is the same as VMALLOC_END. diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c index d8dbeac8b206..ff253648706f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c @@ -958,8 +958,12 @@ static void update_end_of_memory_vars(u64 start, u64 size) int add_pages(int nid, unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages, struct mhp_params *params) { + unsigned long end = ((start_pfn + nr_pages) << PAGE_SHIFT) - 1; int ret; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(end > PHYSMEM_END)) + return -ERANGE; + ret = __add_pages(nid, start_pfn, nr_pages, params); WARN_ON_ONCE(ret); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c index 37db264866b6..230f1dee4f09 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaslr.c @@ -47,13 +47,24 @@ static const unsigned long vaddr_end = CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE; */ static __initdata struct kaslr_memory_region { unsigned long *base; + unsigned long *end; unsigned long size_tb; } kaslr_regions[] = { - { &page_offset_base, 0 }, - { &vmalloc_base, 0 }, - { &vmemmap_base, 0 }, + { + .base = &page_offset_base, + .end = &physmem_end, + }, + { + .base = &vmalloc_base, + }, + { + .base = &vmemmap_base, + }, }; +/* The end of the possible address space for physical memory */ +unsigned long physmem_end __ro_after_init; + /* Get size in bytes used by the memory region */ static inline unsigned long get_padding(struct kaslr_memory_region *region) { @@ -82,6 +93,8 @@ void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void) BUILD_BUG_ON(vaddr_end != CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE); BUILD_BUG_ON(vaddr_end > __START_KERNEL_map); + /* Preset the end of the possible address space for physical memory */ + physmem_end = ((1ULL << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS) - 1); if (!kaslr_memory_enabled()) return; @@ -128,11 +141,18 @@ void __init kernel_randomize_memory(void) vaddr += entropy; *kaslr_regions[i].base = vaddr; + /* Calculate the end of the region */ + vaddr += get_padding(&kaslr_regions[i]); /* - * Jump the region and add a minimum padding based on - * randomization alignment. + * KASLR trims the maximum possible size of the + * direct-map. Update the physmem_end boundary. + * No rounding required as the region starts + * PUD aligned and size is in units of TB. */ - vaddr += get_padding(&kaslr_regions[i]); + if (kaslr_regions[i].end) + *kaslr_regions[i].end = __pa_nodebug(vaddr - 1); + + /* Add a minimum padding based on randomization alignment. */ vaddr = round_up(vaddr + 1, PUD_SIZE); remain_entropy -= entropy; } -- cgit v1.2.3