From d9ea7a3f66a5c7e1a2f73cf4b20f5eff3ced4ff8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Li Zhijian Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2024 11:43:50 +0800 Subject: hv: vmbus: Convert sprintf() family to sysfs_emit() family Per filesystems/sysfs.rst, show() should only use sysfs_emit() or sysfs_emit_at() when formatting the value to be returned to user space. Coccinelle complains that there are still a couple of functions that use snprintf(). Convert them to sysfs_emit(). sprintf() and scnprintf() will be converted as well if these files have such abused cases. This patch is generated by make coccicheck M= MODE=patch \ COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/api/device_attr_show.cocci No functional change intended. CC: "K. Y. Srinivasan" CC: Haiyang Zhang CC: Wei Liu CC: Dexuan Cui CC: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Li Zhijian Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240319034350.1574454-1-lizhijian@fujitsu.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Message-ID: <20240319034350.1574454-1-lizhijian@fujitsu.com> --- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c index 7f7965f3d187..121f1ab32b51 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static ssize_t id_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *dev_attr, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", hv_dev->channel->offermsg.child_relid); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", hv_dev->channel->offermsg.child_relid); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(id); @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static ssize_t state_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *dev_attr, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", hv_dev->channel->state); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", hv_dev->channel->state); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(state); @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static ssize_t monitor_id_show(struct device *dev, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", hv_dev->channel->offermsg.monitorid); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", hv_dev->channel->offermsg.monitorid); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(monitor_id); @@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ static ssize_t class_id_show(struct device *dev, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "{%pUl}\n", - &hv_dev->channel->offermsg.offer.if_type); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "{%pUl}\n", + &hv_dev->channel->offermsg.offer.if_type); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(class_id); @@ -176,8 +176,8 @@ static ssize_t device_id_show(struct device *dev, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "{%pUl}\n", - &hv_dev->channel->offermsg.offer.if_instance); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "{%pUl}\n", + &hv_dev->channel->offermsg.offer.if_instance); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(device_id); @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static ssize_t modalias_show(struct device *dev, { struct hv_device *hv_dev = device_to_hv_device(dev); - return sprintf(buf, "vmbus:%*phN\n", UUID_SIZE, &hv_dev->dev_type); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "vmbus:%*phN\n", UUID_SIZE, &hv_dev->dev_type); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(modalias); @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static ssize_t numa_node_show(struct device *dev, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cpu_to_node(hv_dev->channel->target_cpu)); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", cpu_to_node(hv_dev->channel->target_cpu)); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(numa_node); #endif @@ -212,9 +212,8 @@ static ssize_t server_monitor_pending_show(struct device *dev, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", - channel_pending(hv_dev->channel, - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0])); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", channel_pending(hv_dev->channel, + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0])); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(server_monitor_pending); @@ -226,9 +225,8 @@ static ssize_t client_monitor_pending_show(struct device *dev, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", - channel_pending(hv_dev->channel, - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1])); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", channel_pending(hv_dev->channel, + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1])); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(client_monitor_pending); @@ -240,9 +238,8 @@ static ssize_t server_monitor_latency_show(struct device *dev, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", - channel_latency(hv_dev->channel, - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0])); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", channel_latency(hv_dev->channel, + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0])); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(server_monitor_latency); @@ -254,9 +251,8 @@ static ssize_t client_monitor_latency_show(struct device *dev, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", - channel_latency(hv_dev->channel, - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1])); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", channel_latency(hv_dev->channel, + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1])); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(client_monitor_latency); @@ -268,9 +264,8 @@ static ssize_t server_monitor_conn_id_show(struct device *dev, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", - channel_conn_id(hv_dev->channel, - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0])); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", channel_conn_id(hv_dev->channel, + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0])); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(server_monitor_conn_id); @@ -282,9 +277,8 @@ static ssize_t client_monitor_conn_id_show(struct device *dev, if (!hv_dev->channel) return -ENODEV; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", - channel_conn_id(hv_dev->channel, - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1])); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", channel_conn_id(hv_dev->channel, + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1])); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(client_monitor_conn_id); @@ -303,7 +297,7 @@ static ssize_t out_intr_mask_show(struct device *dev, if (ret < 0) return ret; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", outbound.current_interrupt_mask); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", outbound.current_interrupt_mask); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(out_intr_mask); @@ -321,7 +315,7 @@ static ssize_t out_read_index_show(struct device *dev, &outbound); if (ret < 0) return ret; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", outbound.current_read_index); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", outbound.current_read_index); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(out_read_index); @@ -340,7 +334,7 @@ static ssize_t out_write_index_show(struct device *dev, &outbound); if (ret < 0) return ret; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", outbound.current_write_index); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", outbound.current_write_index); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(out_write_index); @@ -359,7 +353,7 @@ static ssize_t out_read_bytes_avail_show(struct device *dev, &outbound); if (ret < 0) return ret; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", outbound.bytes_avail_toread); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", outbound.bytes_avail_toread); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(out_read_bytes_avail); @@ -378,7 +372,7 @@ static ssize_t out_write_bytes_avail_show(struct device *dev, &outbound); if (ret < 0) return ret; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", outbound.bytes_avail_towrite); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", outbound.bytes_avail_towrite); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(out_write_bytes_avail); @@ -396,7 +390,7 @@ static ssize_t in_intr_mask_show(struct device *dev, if (ret < 0) return ret; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", inbound.current_interrupt_mask); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", inbound.current_interrupt_mask); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(in_intr_mask); @@ -414,7 +408,7 @@ static ssize_t in_read_index_show(struct device *dev, if (ret < 0) return ret; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", inbound.current_read_index); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", inbound.current_read_index); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(in_read_index); @@ -432,7 +426,7 @@ static ssize_t in_write_index_show(struct device *dev, if (ret < 0) return ret; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", inbound.current_write_index); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", inbound.current_write_index); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(in_write_index); @@ -451,7 +445,7 @@ static ssize_t in_read_bytes_avail_show(struct device *dev, if (ret < 0) return ret; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", inbound.bytes_avail_toread); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", inbound.bytes_avail_toread); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(in_read_bytes_avail); @@ -470,7 +464,7 @@ static ssize_t in_write_bytes_avail_show(struct device *dev, if (ret < 0) return ret; - return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", inbound.bytes_avail_towrite); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", inbound.bytes_avail_towrite); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(in_write_bytes_avail); @@ -480,7 +474,7 @@ static ssize_t channel_vp_mapping_show(struct device *dev, { struct hv_device *hv_dev = device_to_hv_device(dev); struct vmbus_channel *channel = hv_dev->channel, *cur_sc; - int buf_size = PAGE_SIZE, n_written, tot_written; + int n_written; struct list_head *cur; if (!channel) @@ -488,25 +482,21 @@ static ssize_t channel_vp_mapping_show(struct device *dev, mutex_lock(&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex); - tot_written = snprintf(buf, buf_size, "%u:%u\n", - channel->offermsg.child_relid, channel->target_cpu); + n_written = sysfs_emit(buf, "%u:%u\n", + channel->offermsg.child_relid, + channel->target_cpu); list_for_each(cur, &channel->sc_list) { - if (tot_written >= buf_size - 1) - break; cur_sc = list_entry(cur, struct vmbus_channel, sc_list); - n_written = scnprintf(buf + tot_written, - buf_size - tot_written, - "%u:%u\n", - cur_sc->offermsg.child_relid, - cur_sc->target_cpu); - tot_written += n_written; + n_written += sysfs_emit_at(buf, n_written, "%u:%u\n", + cur_sc->offermsg.child_relid, + cur_sc->target_cpu); } mutex_unlock(&vmbus_connection.channel_mutex); - return tot_written; + return n_written; } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(channel_vp_mapping); @@ -516,7 +506,7 @@ static ssize_t vendor_show(struct device *dev, { struct hv_device *hv_dev = device_to_hv_device(dev); - return sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", hv_dev->vendor_id); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "0x%x\n", hv_dev->vendor_id); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(vendor); @@ -526,7 +516,7 @@ static ssize_t device_show(struct device *dev, { struct hv_device *hv_dev = device_to_hv_device(dev); - return sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", hv_dev->device_id); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "0x%x\n", hv_dev->device_id); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(device); @@ -551,7 +541,7 @@ static ssize_t driver_override_show(struct device *dev, ssize_t len; device_lock(dev); - len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", hv_dev->driver_override); + len = sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", hv_dev->driver_override); device_unlock(dev); return len; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 03f5a999adba062456c8c818a683beb1b498983a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rick Edgecombe Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 09:15:54 -0700 Subject: Drivers: hv: vmbus: Leak pages if set_memory_encrypted() fails In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared) memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security issues. VMBus code could free decrypted pages if set_memory_encrypted()/decrypted() fails. Leak the pages if this happens. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-2-mhklinux@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Message-ID: <20240311161558.1310-2-mhklinux@outlook.com> --- drivers/hv/connection.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/hv/connection.c b/drivers/hv/connection.c index 3cabeeabb1ca..f001ae880e1d 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/connection.c +++ b/drivers/hv/connection.c @@ -237,8 +237,17 @@ int vmbus_connect(void) vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0], 1); ret |= set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long) vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1], 1); - if (ret) + if (ret) { + /* + * If set_memory_decrypted() fails, the encryption state + * of the memory is unknown. So leak the memory instead + * of risking returning decrypted memory to the free list. + * For simplicity, always handle both pages the same. + */ + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] = NULL; + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] = NULL; goto cleanup; + } /* * Set_memory_decrypted() will change the memory contents if @@ -337,13 +346,19 @@ void vmbus_disconnect(void) vmbus_connection.int_page = NULL; } - set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0], 1); - set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1], 1); + if (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]) { + if (!set_memory_encrypted( + (unsigned long)vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0], 1)) + hv_free_hyperv_page(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]); + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] = NULL; + } - hv_free_hyperv_page(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0]); - hv_free_hyperv_page(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]); - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0] = NULL; - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] = NULL; + if (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]) { + if (!set_memory_encrypted( + (unsigned long)vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1], 1)) + hv_free_hyperv_page(vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1]); + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1] = NULL; + } } /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 211f514ebf1ef5de37b1cf6df9d28a56cfd242ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rick Edgecombe Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 09:15:55 -0700 Subject: Drivers: hv: vmbus: Track decrypted status in vmbus_gpadl In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared) memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security issues. In order to make sure callers of vmbus_establish_gpadl() and vmbus_teardown_gpadl() don't return decrypted/shared pages to allocators, add a field in struct vmbus_gpadl to keep track of the decryption status of the buffers. This will allow the callers to know if they should free or leak the pages. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-3-mhklinux@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Message-ID: <20240311161558.1310-3-mhklinux@outlook.com> --- drivers/hv/channel.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel.c b/drivers/hv/channel.c index adbf674355b2..98259b492502 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/channel.c +++ b/drivers/hv/channel.c @@ -436,9 +436,18 @@ static int __vmbus_establish_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel, (atomic_inc_return(&vmbus_connection.next_gpadl_handle) - 1); ret = create_gpadl_header(type, kbuffer, size, send_offset, &msginfo); - if (ret) + if (ret) { + gpadl->decrypted = false; return ret; + } + /* + * Set the "decrypted" flag to true for the set_memory_decrypted() + * success case. In the failure case, the encryption state of the + * memory is unknown. Leave "decrypted" as true to ensure the + * memory will be leaked instead of going back on the free list. + */ + gpadl->decrypted = true; ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer, PFN_UP(size)); if (ret) { @@ -527,9 +536,15 @@ cleanup: kfree(msginfo); - if (ret) - set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer, - PFN_UP(size)); + if (ret) { + /* + * If set_memory_encrypted() fails, the decrypted flag is + * left as true so the memory is leaked instead of being + * put back on the free list. + */ + if (!set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer, PFN_UP(size))) + gpadl->decrypted = false; + } return ret; } @@ -850,6 +865,8 @@ post_msg_err: if (ret) pr_warn("Fail to set mem host visibility in GPADL teardown %d.\n", ret); + gpadl->decrypted = ret; + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vmbus_teardown_gpadl); -- cgit v1.2.3 From bbf9ac34677b57506a13682b31a2a718934c0e31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rick Edgecombe Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 09:15:56 -0700 Subject: hv_netvsc: Don't free decrypted memory In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared) memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security issues. The netvsc driver could free decrypted/shared pages if set_memory_decrypted() fails. Check the decrypted field in the gpadl to decide whether to free the memory. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-4-mhklinux@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Message-ID: <20240311161558.1310-4-mhklinux@outlook.com> --- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c index a6fcbda64ecc..2b6ec979a62f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c +++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c @@ -154,8 +154,11 @@ static void free_netvsc_device(struct rcu_head *head) int i; kfree(nvdev->extension); - vfree(nvdev->recv_buf); - vfree(nvdev->send_buf); + + if (!nvdev->recv_buf_gpadl_handle.decrypted) + vfree(nvdev->recv_buf); + if (!nvdev->send_buf_gpadl_handle.decrypted) + vfree(nvdev->send_buf); bitmap_free(nvdev->send_section_map); for (i = 0; i < VRSS_CHANNEL_MAX; i++) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3d788b2fbe6a1a1a9e3db09742b90809d51638b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rick Edgecombe Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 09:15:57 -0700 Subject: uio_hv_generic: Don't free decrypted memory In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared) memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security issues. The VMBus device UIO driver could free decrypted/shared pages if set_memory_decrypted() fails. Check the decrypted field in the gpadl to decide whether to free the memory. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-5-mhklinux@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Message-ID: <20240311161558.1310-5-mhklinux@outlook.com> --- drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c b/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c index 20d9762331bd..6be3462b109f 100644 --- a/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c +++ b/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c @@ -181,12 +181,14 @@ hv_uio_cleanup(struct hv_device *dev, struct hv_uio_private_data *pdata) { if (pdata->send_gpadl.gpadl_handle) { vmbus_teardown_gpadl(dev->channel, &pdata->send_gpadl); - vfree(pdata->send_buf); + if (!pdata->send_gpadl.decrypted) + vfree(pdata->send_buf); } if (pdata->recv_gpadl.gpadl_handle) { vmbus_teardown_gpadl(dev->channel, &pdata->recv_gpadl); - vfree(pdata->recv_buf); + if (!pdata->recv_gpadl.decrypted) + vfree(pdata->recv_buf); } } @@ -295,7 +297,8 @@ hv_uio_probe(struct hv_device *dev, ret = vmbus_establish_gpadl(channel, pdata->recv_buf, RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, &pdata->recv_gpadl); if (ret) { - vfree(pdata->recv_buf); + if (!pdata->recv_gpadl.decrypted) + vfree(pdata->recv_buf); goto fail_close; } @@ -317,7 +320,8 @@ hv_uio_probe(struct hv_device *dev, ret = vmbus_establish_gpadl(channel, pdata->send_buf, SEND_BUFFER_SIZE, &pdata->send_gpadl); if (ret) { - vfree(pdata->send_buf); + if (!pdata->send_gpadl.decrypted) + vfree(pdata->send_buf); goto fail_close; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 30d18df6567be09c1433e81993e35e3da573ac48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Kelley Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 09:15:58 -0700 Subject: Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't free ring buffers that couldn't be re-encrypted In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared) memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security issues. The VMBus ring buffer code could free decrypted/shared pages if set_memory_decrypted() fails. Check the decrypted field in the struct vmbus_gpadl for the ring buffers to decide whether to free the memory. Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-6-mhklinux@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Message-ID: <20240311161558.1310-6-mhklinux@outlook.com> --- drivers/hv/channel.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel.c b/drivers/hv/channel.c index 98259b492502..fb8cd8469328 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/channel.c +++ b/drivers/hv/channel.c @@ -153,7 +153,9 @@ void vmbus_free_ring(struct vmbus_channel *channel) hv_ringbuffer_cleanup(&channel->inbound); if (channel->ringbuffer_page) { - __free_pages(channel->ringbuffer_page, + /* In a CoCo VM leak the memory if it didn't get re-encrypted */ + if (!channel->ringbuffer_gpadlhandle.decrypted) + __free_pages(channel->ringbuffer_page, get_order(channel->ringbuffer_pagecount << PAGE_SHIFT)); channel->ringbuffer_page = NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3