From 7a5202190810dde1467718235c1f650fcf57592a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2017 15:07:11 -0800 Subject: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation commit 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d upstream. Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become "locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently. This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse. This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead, an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely. This change is not expected to break any applications. In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations --- waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations, and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed. This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them. Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Acked-by: Michael Halcrow Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/crypto_key.c | 28 +++++++--------------------- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 14 +------------- fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h | 1 - fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c | 28 +++++++--------------------- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 14 +------------- fs/f2fs/f2fs_crypto.h | 1 - 6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) (limited to 'fs') diff --git a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c index 9a16d1e75a49..505f8afde57c 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c +++ b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c @@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ void ext4_free_crypt_info(struct ext4_crypt_info *ci) if (!ci) return; - if (ci->ci_keyring_key) - key_put(ci->ci_keyring_key); crypto_free_ablkcipher(ci->ci_ctfm); kmem_cache_free(ext4_crypt_info_cachep, ci); } @@ -111,7 +109,7 @@ void ext4_free_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, ext4_free_crypt_info(ci); } -int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) +int ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) { struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode); struct ext4_crypt_info *crypt_info; @@ -128,22 +126,15 @@ int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) char mode; int res; + if (ei->i_crypt_info) + return 0; + if (!ext4_read_workqueue) { res = ext4_init_crypto(); if (res) return res; } -retry: - crypt_info = ACCESS_ONCE(ei->i_crypt_info); - if (crypt_info) { - if (!crypt_info->ci_keyring_key || - key_validate(crypt_info->ci_keyring_key) == 0) - return 0; - ext4_free_encryption_info(inode, crypt_info); - goto retry; - } - res = ext4_xattr_get(inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION, EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); @@ -166,7 +157,6 @@ retry: crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode; crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode; crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL; - crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = NULL; memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor, sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key)); if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) @@ -206,7 +196,6 @@ retry: keyring_key = NULL; goto out; } - crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key; if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) { printk_once(KERN_WARNING "ext4: key type must be logon\n"); @@ -253,16 +242,13 @@ got_key: ext4_encryption_key_size(mode)); if (res) goto out; - memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key)); - if (cmpxchg(&ei->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) != NULL) { - ext4_free_crypt_info(crypt_info); - goto retry; - } - return 0; + if (cmpxchg(&ei->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL) + crypt_info = NULL; out: if (res == -ENOKEY) res = 0; + key_put(keyring_key); ext4_free_crypt_info(crypt_info); memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key)); return res; diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index cd5914495ad7..362d59b24f1d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -2330,23 +2330,11 @@ static inline void ext4_fname_free_filename(struct ext4_filename *fname) { } /* crypto_key.c */ void ext4_free_crypt_info(struct ext4_crypt_info *ci); void ext4_free_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_crypt_info *ci); -int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode); #ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION int ext4_has_encryption_key(struct inode *inode); -static inline int ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) -{ - struct ext4_crypt_info *ci = EXT4_I(inode)->i_crypt_info; - - if (!ci || - (ci->ci_keyring_key && - (ci->ci_keyring_key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | - (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) | - (1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD))))) - return _ext4_get_encryption_info(inode); - return 0; -} +int ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode); static inline struct ext4_crypt_info *ext4_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) { diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h b/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h index ac7d4e813796..1b17b05b9f4d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h @@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ struct ext4_crypt_info { char ci_filename_mode; char ci_flags; struct crypto_ablkcipher *ci_ctfm; - struct key *ci_keyring_key; char ci_master_key[EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE]; }; diff --git a/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c b/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c index 5de2d866a25c..18595d7a0efc 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c @@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ static void f2fs_free_crypt_info(struct f2fs_crypt_info *ci) if (!ci) return; - key_put(ci->ci_keyring_key); crypto_free_ablkcipher(ci->ci_ctfm); kmem_cache_free(f2fs_crypt_info_cachep, ci); } @@ -113,7 +112,7 @@ void f2fs_free_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct f2fs_crypt_info *ci) f2fs_free_crypt_info(ci); } -int _f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) +int f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) { struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode); struct f2fs_crypt_info *crypt_info; @@ -129,18 +128,12 @@ int _f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) char mode; int res; + if (fi->i_crypt_info) + return 0; + res = f2fs_crypto_initialize(); if (res) return res; -retry: - crypt_info = ACCESS_ONCE(fi->i_crypt_info); - if (crypt_info) { - if (!crypt_info->ci_keyring_key || - key_validate(crypt_info->ci_keyring_key) == 0) - return 0; - f2fs_free_encryption_info(inode, crypt_info); - goto retry; - } res = f2fs_getxattr(inode, F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION, F2FS_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT, @@ -159,7 +152,6 @@ retry: crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode; crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode; crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL; - crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = NULL; memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor, sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key)); if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) @@ -197,7 +189,6 @@ retry: keyring_key = NULL; goto out; } - crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key; BUG_ON(keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon); ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key); if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct f2fs_encryption_key)) { @@ -230,17 +221,12 @@ retry: if (res) goto out; - memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key)); - if (cmpxchg(&fi->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) != NULL) { - f2fs_free_crypt_info(crypt_info); - goto retry; - } - return 0; - + if (cmpxchg(&fi->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL) + crypt_info = NULL; out: if (res == -ENOKEY && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) res = 0; - + key_put(keyring_key); f2fs_free_crypt_info(crypt_info); memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key)); return res; diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index 9db5500d63d9..b1aeca83f4be 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -2149,7 +2149,6 @@ void f2fs_end_io_crypto_work(struct f2fs_crypto_ctx *, struct bio *); /* crypto_key.c */ void f2fs_free_encryption_info(struct inode *, struct f2fs_crypt_info *); -int _f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode); /* crypto_fname.c */ bool f2fs_valid_filenames_enc_mode(uint32_t); @@ -2170,18 +2169,7 @@ void f2fs_exit_crypto(void); int f2fs_has_encryption_key(struct inode *); -static inline int f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) -{ - struct f2fs_crypt_info *ci = F2FS_I(inode)->i_crypt_info; - - if (!ci || - (ci->ci_keyring_key && - (ci->ci_keyring_key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | - (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) | - (1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD))))) - return _f2fs_get_encryption_info(inode); - return 0; -} +int f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode); void f2fs_fname_crypto_free_buffer(struct f2fs_str *); int f2fs_fname_setup_filename(struct inode *, const struct qstr *, diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs_crypto.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs_crypto.h index c2c1c2b63b25..f113f1a1e8c1 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs_crypto.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs_crypto.h @@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ struct f2fs_crypt_info { char ci_filename_mode; char ci_flags; struct crypto_ablkcipher *ci_ctfm; - struct key *ci_keyring_key; char ci_master_key[F2FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE]; }; -- cgit v1.2.3