From 5ef30ee53b187786e64bdc1f8109e39d17f2ce58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:05 -0500 Subject: audit: make filetype matching consistent with other filters Every other filter that matches part of the inodes list collected by audit will match against any of the inodes on that list. The filetype matching however had a strange way of doing things. It allowed userspace to indicated if it should match on the first of the second name collected by the kernel. Name collection ordering seems like a kernel internal and making userspace rules get that right just seems like a bad idea. As it turns out the userspace audit writers had no idea it was doing this and thus never overloaded the value field. The kernel always checked the first name collected which for the tested rules was always correct. This patch just makes the filetype matching like the major, minor, inode, and LSM rules in that it will match against any of the names collected. It also changes the rule validation to reject the old unused rule types. Noone knew it was there. Noone used it. Why keep around the extra code? Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 ++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 19 +++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index f8277c80d678..d94dde82c3c8 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule) goto exit_free; break; case AUDIT_FILETYPE: - if ((f->val & ~S_IFMT) > S_IFMT) + if (f->val & ~S_IFMT) goto exit_free; break; case AUDIT_INODE: @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, goto exit_free; break; case AUDIT_FILETYPE: - if ((f->val & ~S_IFMT) > S_IFMT) + if (f->val & ~S_IFMT) goto exit_free; break; default: diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index e7fe2b0d29b3..a09c50317059 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -305,21 +305,20 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) } } -static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which) +static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) { - unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT; - umode_t mode = which & S_IFMT; + int index; + umode_t mode = (umode_t)val; if (unlikely(!ctx)) return 0; - if (index >= ctx->name_count) - return 0; - if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1) - return 0; - if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT) - return 0; - return 1; + for (index = 0; index < ctx->name_count; index++) { + if ((ctx->names[index].ino != -1) && + ((ctx->names[index].mode & S_IFMT) == mode)) + return 1; + } + return 0; } /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5195d8e217a78697152d64fc09a16e063a022465 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:05 -0500 Subject: audit: dynamically allocate audit_names when not enough space is in the names array This patch does 2 things. First it reduces the number of audit_names allocated in every audit context from 20 to 5. 5 should be enough for all 'normal' syscalls (rename being the worst). Some syscalls can still touch more the 5 inodes such as mount. When rpc filesystem is mounted it will create inodes and those can exceed 5. To handle that problem this patch will dynamically allocate audit_names if it needs more than 5. This should decrease the typicall memory usage while still supporting all the possible kernel operations. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 403 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 215 insertions(+), 188 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index a09c50317059..1a92d61ddd27 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -71,8 +71,9 @@ #include "audit.h" /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context - * for saving names from getname(). */ -#define AUDIT_NAMES 20 + * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate + * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */ +#define AUDIT_NAMES 5 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */ #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1 @@ -101,9 +102,8 @@ struct audit_cap_data { * * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ struct audit_names { + struct list_head list; /* audit_context->names_list */ const char *name; - int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */ - unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */ unsigned long ino; dev_t dev; umode_t mode; @@ -113,6 +113,14 @@ struct audit_names { u32 osid; struct audit_cap_data fcap; unsigned int fcap_ver; + int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */ + bool name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */ + /* + * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of + * names allocated in the task audit context. Thus this name + * should be freed on syscall exit + */ + bool should_free; }; struct audit_aux_data { @@ -174,8 +182,17 @@ struct audit_context { long return_code;/* syscall return code */ u64 prio; int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ - int name_count; - struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; + /* + * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this + * syscall. The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will + * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance + * reasons. Except during allocation they should never be referenced + * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used + * by running the names_list. + */ + struct audit_names preallocated_names[AUDIT_NAMES]; + int name_count; /* total records in names_list */ + struct list_head names_list; /* anchor for struct audit_names->list */ char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */ struct path pwd; struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ @@ -307,17 +324,18 @@ static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) { - int index; + struct audit_names *n; umode_t mode = (umode_t)val; if (unlikely(!ctx)) return 0; - for (index = 0; index < ctx->name_count; index++) { - if ((ctx->names[index].ino != -1) && - ((ctx->names[index].mode & S_IFMT) == mode)) + list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + if ((n->ino != -1) && + ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode)) return 1; } + return 0; } @@ -456,13 +474,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, bool task_creation) { const struct cred *cred; - int i, j, need_sid = 1; + int i, need_sid = 1; u32 sid; cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; + struct audit_names *n; int result = 0; switch (f->type) { @@ -525,8 +544,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val); else if (ctx) { - for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { + list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val)) { ++result; break; } @@ -538,8 +557,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val); else if (ctx) { - for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { + list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val)) { ++result; break; } @@ -550,8 +569,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, if (name) result = (name->ino == f->val); else if (ctx) { - for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) { + list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) { ++result; break; } @@ -606,11 +625,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, name->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx); } else if (ctx) { - for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (security_audit_rule_match( - ctx->names[j].osid, - f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { + list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type, + f->op, f->lsm_rule, + ctx)) { ++result; break; } @@ -721,40 +739,53 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; } -/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been +/* + * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match. + * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash + */ +static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct audit_names *n, + struct audit_context *ctx) { + int word, bit; + int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); + struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; + struct audit_entry *e; + enum audit_state state; + + word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); + bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); + + if (list_empty(list)) + return 0; + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { + if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && + audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) { + ctx->current_state = state; + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash - * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[]. + * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names. * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). */ void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) { - int i; - struct audit_entry *e; - enum audit_state state; + struct audit_names *n; if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) return; rcu_read_lock(); - for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) { - int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); - int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); - struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i]; - int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); - struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; - if (list_empty(list)) - continue; - - list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { - if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && - audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, - &state, false)) { - rcu_read_unlock(); - ctx->current_state = state; - return; - } - } + list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx)) + break; } rcu_read_unlock(); } @@ -798,7 +829,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) { - int i; + struct audit_names *n, *next; #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { @@ -809,10 +840,9 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, context->name_count, context->put_count, context->ino_count); - for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { + list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, - context->names[i].name, - context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); + n->name, n->name ?: "(null)"); } dump_stack(); return; @@ -823,9 +853,12 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) context->ino_count = 0; #endif - for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { - if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put) - __putname(context->names[i].name); + list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) { + list_del(&n->list); + if (n->name && n->name_put) + __putname(n->name); + if (n->should_free) + kfree(n); } context->name_count = 0; path_put(&context->pwd); @@ -863,6 +896,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) return NULL; audit_zero_context(context, state); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list); return context; } @@ -1323,6 +1357,68 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) audit_log_end(ab); } +static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, + int record_num, int *call_panic) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); + if (!ab) + return; /* audit_panic has been called */ + + audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num); + + if (n->name) { + switch (n->name_len) { + case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: + /* log the full path */ + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name); + break; + case 0: + /* name was specified as a relative path and the + * directory component is the cwd */ + audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd); + break; + default: + /* log the name's directory component */ + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name, + n->name_len); + } + } else + audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); + + if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) { + audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu" + " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho" + " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", + n->ino, + MAJOR(n->dev), + MINOR(n->dev), + n->mode, + n->uid, + n->gid, + MAJOR(n->rdev), + MINOR(n->rdev)); + } + if (n->osid != 0) { + char *ctx = NULL; + u32 len; + if (security_secid_to_secctx( + n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { + audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); + *call_panic = 2; + } else { + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); + } + } + + audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); + + audit_log_end(ab); +} + static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) { const struct cred *cred; @@ -1330,6 +1426,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts struct audit_buffer *ab; struct audit_aux_data *aux; const char *tty; + struct audit_names *n; /* tsk == current */ context->pid = tsk->pid; @@ -1469,66 +1566,10 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts audit_log_end(ab); } } - for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { - struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i]; - - ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH); - if (!ab) - continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ - - audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); - - if (n->name) { - switch(n->name_len) { - case AUDIT_NAME_FULL: - /* log the full path */ - audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name); - break; - case 0: - /* name was specified as a relative path and the - * directory component is the cwd */ - audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd); - break; - default: - /* log the name's directory component */ - audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name, - n->name_len); - } - } else - audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)"); - - if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) { - audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu" - " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho" - " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", - n->ino, - MAJOR(n->dev), - MINOR(n->dev), - n->mode, - n->uid, - n->gid, - MAJOR(n->rdev), - MINOR(n->rdev)); - } - if (n->osid != 0) { - char *ctx = NULL; - u32 len; - if (security_secid_to_secctx( - n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { - audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); - call_panic = 2; - } else { - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); - security_release_secctx(ctx, len); - } - } - - audit_log_fcaps(ab, n); - audit_log_end(ab); - } + i = 0; + list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) + audit_log_name(context, n, i++, &call_panic); /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); @@ -1820,6 +1861,30 @@ retry: #endif } +static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context) +{ + struct audit_names *aname; + + if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) { + aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count]; + memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname)); + } else { + aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS); + if (!aname) + return NULL; + aname->should_free = true; + } + + aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1; + list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list); + + context->name_count++; +#if AUDIT_DEBUG + context->ino_count++; +#endif + return aname; +} + /** * audit_getname - add a name to the list * @name: name to add @@ -1830,6 +1895,7 @@ retry: void __audit_getname(const char *name) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; + struct audit_names *n; if (IS_ERR(name) || !name) return; @@ -1842,13 +1908,15 @@ void __audit_getname(const char *name) #endif return; } - BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); - context->names[context->name_count].name = name; - context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; - context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1; - context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; - context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0; - ++context->name_count; + + n = audit_alloc_name(context); + if (!n) + return; + + n->name = name; + n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; + n->name_put = true; + if (!context->pwd.dentry) get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); } @@ -1870,12 +1938,13 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name) printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); if (context->name_count) { + struct audit_names *n; int i; - for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) + + list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, - context->names[i].name, - context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); - } + n->name, n->name ?: "(null)"); + } #endif __putname(name); } @@ -1896,39 +1965,11 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name) #endif } -static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context, - const struct inode *inode) -{ - if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) { - if (inode) - printk(KERN_DEBUG "audit: name_count maxed, losing inode data: " - "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n", - MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), - MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev), - inode->i_ino); - - else - printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n"); - return 1; - } - context->name_count++; -#if AUDIT_DEBUG - context->ino_count++; -#endif - return 0; -} - - static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry) { struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps; int rc; - memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); - memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t)); - name->fcap.fE = 0; - name->fcap_ver = 0; - if (!dentry) return 0; @@ -1968,30 +2009,25 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dent */ void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry) { - int idx; struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct audit_names *n; if (!context->in_syscall) return; - if (context->name_count - && context->names[context->name_count-1].name - && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) - idx = context->name_count - 1; - else if (context->name_count > 1 - && context->names[context->name_count-2].name - && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) - idx = context->name_count - 2; - else { - /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no - * associated name? */ - if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) - return; - idx = context->name_count - 1; - context->names[idx].name = NULL; + + list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) { + if (n->name && (n->name == name)) + goto out; } + + /* unable to find the name from a previous getname() */ + n = audit_alloc_name(context); + if (!n) + return; +out: handle_path(dentry); - audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode); + audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode); } /** @@ -2010,11 +2046,11 @@ void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry) void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct inode *parent) { - int idx; struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; + struct audit_names *n; int dirlen = 0; if (!context->in_syscall) @@ -2024,9 +2060,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry, handle_one(inode); /* parent is more likely, look for it first */ - for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { - struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; - + list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { if (!n->name) continue; @@ -2039,9 +2073,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry, } /* no matching parent, look for matching child */ - for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) { - struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx]; - + list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { if (!n->name) continue; @@ -2059,34 +2091,29 @@ void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry, add_names: if (!found_parent) { - if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent)) + n = audit_alloc_name(context); + if (!n) return; - idx = context->name_count - 1; - context->names[idx].name = NULL; - audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent); + audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent); } if (!found_child) { - if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode)) + n = audit_alloc_name(context); + if (!n) return; - idx = context->name_count - 1; /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in * audit_free_names() */ if (found_parent) { - context->names[idx].name = found_parent; - context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; + n->name = found_parent; + n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; /* don't call __putname() */ - context->names[idx].name_put = 0; - } else { - context->names[idx].name = NULL; + n->name_put = false; } if (inode) - audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode); - else - context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; + audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 3035c51e8ac0512686ceb9f2bd1d13bdc6e4fb29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:05 -0500 Subject: audit: drop the meaningless and format breaking word 'user' userspace audit messages look like so: type=USER msg=audit(1271170549.415:24710): user pid=14722 uid=0 auid=500 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:auditctl_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 msg='' That third field just says 'user'. That's useless and doesn't follow the key=value pair we are trying to enforce. We already know it came from the user based on the record type. Kill that word. Die. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/audit.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 2c1d6ab7106e..00efe4758c86 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type, } *ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type); - audit_log_format(*ab, "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u", + audit_log_format(*ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u", pid, uid, auid, ses); if (sid) { rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 16c174bd95cb07c9d0ad3fcd8c70f9cea7214c9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:05 -0500 Subject: audit: check current inode and containing object when filtering on major and minor The audit system has the ability to filter on the major and minor number of the device containing the inode being operated upon. Lets say that /dev/sda1 has major,minor 8,1 and that we mount /dev/sda1 on /boot. Now lets say we add a watch with a filter on 8,1. If we proceed to open an inode inside /boot, such as /vboot/vmlinuz, we will match the major,minor filter. Lets instead assume that one were to use a tool like debugfs and were to open /dev/sda1 directly and to modify it's contents. We might hope that this would also be logged, but it isn't. The rules will check the major,minor of the device containing /dev/sda1. In other words the rule would match on the major/minor of the tmpfs mounted at /dev. I believe these rules should trigger on either device. The man page is devoid of useful information about the intended semantics. It only seems logical that if you want to know everything that happened on a major,minor that would include things that happened to the device itself... Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 1a92d61ddd27..7c495147c3d9 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -540,12 +540,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, } break; case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: - if (name) - result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), - f->op, f->val); - else if (ctx) { + if (name) { + if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || + audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) + ++result; + } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { - if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val)) { + if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || + audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { ++result; break; } @@ -553,12 +555,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, } break; case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: - if (name) - result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), - f->op, f->val); - else if (ctx) { + if (name) { + if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || + audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) + ++result; + } else if (ctx) { list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { - if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val)) { + if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || + audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { ++result; break; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 85e7bac33b8d5edafc4e219c7dfdb3d48e0b4e31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:05 -0500 Subject: seccomp: audit abnormal end to a process due to seccomp The audit system likes to collect information about processes that end abnormally (SIGSEGV) as this may me useful intrusion detection information. This patch adds audit support to collect information when seccomp forces a task to exit because of misbehavior in a similar way. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- kernel/seccomp.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 7c495147c3d9..e9bcb93800d8 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2529,6 +2529,25 @@ void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; } +static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr) +{ + uid_t auid, uid; + gid_t gid; + unsigned int sessionid; + + auid = audit_get_loginuid(current); + sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); + current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); + + audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", + auid, uid, gid, sessionid); + audit_log_task_context(ab); + audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); + audit_log_format(ab, " reason="); + audit_log_string(ab, reason); + audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); +} /** * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally * @signr: signal value @@ -2539,10 +2558,6 @@ void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) void audit_core_dumps(long signr) { struct audit_buffer *ab; - u32 sid; - uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid; - gid_t gid; - unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); if (!audit_enabled) return; @@ -2551,24 +2566,17 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr) return; ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); - current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); - audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", - auid, uid, gid, sessionid); - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - if (sid) { - char *ctx = NULL; - u32 len; + audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr); + audit_log_end(ab); +} - if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) - audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid); - else { - audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); - security_release_secctx(ctx, len); - } - } - audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); - audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); +void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + + ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); + audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", SIGKILL); + audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall); audit_log_end(ab); } diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 57d4b13b631d..e8d76c5895ea 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing mode. */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall) #ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG dump_stack(); #endif + audit_seccomp(this_syscall); do_exit(SIGKILL); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From d7e7528bcd456f5c36ad4a202ccfb43c5aa98bc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:06 -0500 Subject: Audit: push audit success and retcode into arch ptrace.h The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was. Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating success or failure. This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall. The fix is to fix the layering foolishness. We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to determine if the syscall was a success or failure. We also define a generic is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the value is < -MAX_ERRNO. This works for arches like x86 which do not use a separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure. We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines instead of macros. The reason is because the audit function must take a void* for the regs. (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs). Since the audit function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the arch correct structure to dereference it. The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure. THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs. In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old audit code as the return value. But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro regs_return_value() as regs[3]. I have no idea which one is correct, but this patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3]. For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3]. regs->gprs[3] is always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative before calling the audit code when appropriate. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin [for x86 portion] Acked-by: Tony Luck [for ia64] Acked-by: Richard Weinberger [for uml] Acked-by: David S. Miller [for sparc] Acked-by: Ralf Baechle [for mips] Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt [for ppc] --- kernel/auditsc.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index e9bcb93800d8..3d2853808185 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -70,6 +70,11 @@ #include "audit.h" +/* flags stating the success for a syscall */ +#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0 +#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1 +#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2 + /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */ @@ -1724,8 +1729,7 @@ void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child) /** * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call - * @valid: success/failure flag - * @return_code: syscall return value + * @pt_regs: syscall registers * * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from @@ -1733,13 +1737,17 @@ void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child) * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, * free the names stored from getname(). */ -void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code) +void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) { struct task_struct *tsk = current; struct audit_context *context; - context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); + if (success) + success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS; + else + success = AUDITSC_FAILURE; + context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code); if (likely(!context)) return; -- cgit v1.2.3 From b05d8447e7821695bc2fa3359431f7a664232743 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:06 -0500 Subject: audit: inline audit_syscall_entry to reduce burden on archs Every arch calls: if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) audit_syscall_entry() which requires knowledge about audit (the existance of audit_context) in the arch code. Just do it all in static inline in audit.h so that arch's can remain blissfully ignorant. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 3d2853808185..b408100dd6ef 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1632,7 +1632,7 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it * be written). */ -void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, +void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 997f5b6444f4608692ec807fb802fd9767c80e76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:06 -0500 Subject: audit: remove AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT as it isn't used Audit contexts have 3 states. Disabled, which doesn't collect anything, build, which collects info but might not emit it, and record, which collects and emits. There is a 4th state, setup, which isn't used. Get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/audit.h | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 91e7071c4d2c..816766803371 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -36,12 +36,8 @@ enum audit_state { AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context. * No syscall-specific audit records can * be generated. */ - AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, - * but don't necessarily fill it in at - * syscall entry time (i.e., filter - * instead). */ AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context, - * and always fill it in at syscall + * and fill it in at syscall * entry time. This makes a full * syscall record available if some * other part of the kernel decides it -- cgit v1.2.3 From 56179a6ec65a56e0279a58e35cb450d38f061b94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:06 -0500 Subject: audit: drop some potentially inadvisable likely notations The audit code makes heavy use of likely() and unlikely() macros, but they don't always make sense. Drop any that seem questionable and let the computer do it's thing. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index b408100dd6ef..d7382c2aaa9e 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, { struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; - if (likely(!context)) + if (!context) return NULL; context->return_valid = return_valid; @@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); - if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) + if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) return 0; if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { @@ -1599,7 +1599,7 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) struct audit_context *context; context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); - if (likely(!context)) + if (!context) return; /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit @@ -1640,7 +1640,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; enum audit_state state; - if (unlikely(!context)) + if (!context) return; /* @@ -1697,7 +1697,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, context->prio = 0; state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); } - if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) + if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) return; context->serial = 0; @@ -1748,7 +1748,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) success = AUDITSC_FAILURE; context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code); - if (likely(!context)) + if (!context) return; if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 07c49417877f8658a6aa0ad9b4e21e4fd4df11b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:07 -0500 Subject: audit: inline checks for not needing to collect aux records A number of audit hooks make function calls before they determine that auxilary records do not need to be collected. Do those checks as static inlines since the most common case is going to be that records are not needed and we can skip the function call overhead. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 15 +++------------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index d7382c2aaa9e..e1062f66b01b 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2309,14 +2309,11 @@ void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mo context->ipc.has_perm = 1; } -int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax; struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; - if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy)) - return 0; - ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ax) return -ENOMEM; @@ -2337,13 +2334,10 @@ int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * @args: args array * */ -void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) +void __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; - if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) - return; - context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); @@ -2369,13 +2363,10 @@ void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) * * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. */ -int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) +int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; - if (likely(!context || context->dummy)) - return 0; - if (!context->sockaddr) { void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); if (!p) -- cgit v1.2.3 From a4ff8dba7d8ce5ceb43fb27df66292251cc73bdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:07 -0500 Subject: audit: inline audit_free to simplify the look of generic code make the conditional a static inline instead of doing it in generic code. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 2 +- kernel/exit.c | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index e1062f66b01b..7aaeb38b262a 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1594,7 +1594,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts * * Called from copy_process and do_exit */ -void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) +void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct audit_context *context; diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 94ed6e20bb53..88dcbbc446f7 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -964,8 +964,7 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code) acct_collect(code, group_dead); if (group_dead) tty_audit_exit(); - if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context)) - audit_free(tsk); + audit_free(tsk); tsk->exit_code = code; taskstats_exit(tsk, group_dead); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7ff68e53ece8c175d2951bb8a30b3cce8f9c5579 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:07 -0500 Subject: audit: reject entry,always rules We deprecated entry,always rules a long time ago. Reject those rules as invalid. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index d94dde82c3c8..903caa269b5c 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -235,13 +235,15 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule) switch(listnr) { default: goto exit_err; - case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: - case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE: #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY: + if (rule->action == AUDIT_ALWAYS) + goto exit_err; case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT: case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK: #endif + case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: + case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE: ; } if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6422e78de6880c66a82af512d9bd0c85eb62e661 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:07 -0500 Subject: audit: remove audit_finish_fork as it can't be called Audit entry,always rules are not allowed and are automatically changed in exit,always rules in userspace. The kernel refuses to load such rules. Thus a task in the middle of a syscall (and thus in audit_finish_fork()) can only be in one of two states: AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT or AUDIT_DISABLED. Since the current task cannot be in AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT we aren't every going to actually use the code in audit_finish_fork() since it will return without doing anything. Thus drop the code. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 20 -------------------- kernel/fork.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 22 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 7aaeb38b262a..4d8920f5ab88 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1707,26 +1707,6 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major, context->ppid = 0; } -void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child) -{ - struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; - struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context; - if (!p || !ctx) - return; - if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) - return; - p->arch = ctx->arch; - p->major = ctx->major; - memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv)); - p->ctime = ctx->ctime; - p->dummy = ctx->dummy; - p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall; - p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL); - p->ppid = current->pid; - p->prio = ctx->prio; - p->current_state = ctx->current_state; -} - /** * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call * @pt_regs: syscall registers diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 443f5125f11e..c1e5c21f48c1 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1525,8 +1525,6 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, init_completion(&vfork); } - audit_finish_fork(p); - /* * We set PF_STARTING at creation in case tracing wants to * use this to distinguish a fully live task from one that -- cgit v1.2.3 From efaffd6e4417860c67576ac760dd6e8bbd15f006 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:07 -0500 Subject: audit: allow matching on obj_uid Allow syscall exit filter matching based on the uid of the owner of an inode used in a syscall. aka: auditctl -a always,exit -S open -F obj_uid=0 -F perm=wa Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 1 + kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 903caa269b5c..13e997423dcd 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -461,6 +461,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_ARG1: case AUDIT_ARG2: case AUDIT_ARG3: + case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: break; case AUDIT_ARCH: entry->rule.arch_f = f; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 4d8920f5ab88..5cf3ecc01517 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -586,6 +586,18 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, } } break; + case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: + if (name) { + result = audit_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->val); + } else if (ctx) { + list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + if (audit_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->val)) { + ++result; + break; + } + } + } + break; case AUDIT_WATCH: if (name) result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 54d3218b31aee5bc9c859ae60fbde933d922448b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:07 -0500 Subject: audit: allow audit matching on inode gid Much like the ability to filter audit on the uid of an inode collected, we should be able to filter on the gid of the inode. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 1 + kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 13e997423dcd..f10605c787e6 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -462,6 +462,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, case AUDIT_ARG2: case AUDIT_ARG3: case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: + case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: break; case AUDIT_ARCH: entry->rule.arch_f = f; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 5cf3ecc01517..87b375fb12ff 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -598,6 +598,18 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, } } break; + case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: + if (name) { + result = audit_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->val); + } else if (ctx) { + list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + if (audit_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->val)) { + ++result; + break; + } + } + } + break; case AUDIT_WATCH: if (name) result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0a300be6d5be8f66cd96609334710c268d0bfdce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:08 -0500 Subject: audit: remove task argument to audit_set_loginuid The function always deals with current. Don't expose an option pretending one can use it for something. You can't. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 87b375fb12ff..9d6dd7d869c0 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2163,16 +2163,16 @@ int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); /** - * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid - * @task: task whose audit context is being modified + * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid * @loginuid: loginuid value * * Returns 0. * * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). */ -int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) +int audit_set_loginuid(uid_t loginuid) { + struct task_struct *task = current; unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 633b45454503489209b0d9a45f9e3cd1b852c614 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:08 -0500 Subject: audit: only allow tasks to set their loginuid if it is -1 At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they log in and it be impossible to ever reset. We had to make it mutable even after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have to restart sshd. Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid. Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel work the way it should. With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed to restart services directly. The system will restart the service for them. Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions. If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his loginuid that should be used! Since we have old systems I make this a Kconfig option. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 9d6dd7d869c0..bd084a13c719 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2173,9 +2173,18 @@ static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); int audit_set_loginuid(uid_t loginuid) { struct task_struct *task = current; - unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context; + unsigned int sessionid; + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE + if (task->loginuid != -1) + return -EPERM; +#else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */ + if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) + return -EPERM; +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */ + sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id); if (context && context->in_syscall) { struct audit_buffer *ab; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4043cde8ecf7f7d880eb1133c201a3d392fd68c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:08 -0500 Subject: audit: do not call audit_getname on error Just a code cleanup really. We don't need to make a function call just for it to return on error. This also makes the VFS function even easier to follow and removes a conditional on a hot path. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index bd084a13c719..9161e70a4379 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1913,9 +1913,6 @@ void __audit_getname(const char *name) struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; struct audit_names *n; - if (IS_ERR(name) || !name) - return; - if (!context->in_syscall) { #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", -- cgit v1.2.3 From 02d86a568c6d2d335256864451ac8ce781bc5652 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:08 -0500 Subject: audit: allow interfield comparison in audit rules We wish to be able to audit when a uid=500 task accesses a file which is uid=0. Or vice versa. This patch introduces a new audit filter type AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE which takes as an 'enum' which indicates which fields should be compared. At this point we only define the task->uid vs inode->uid, but other comparisons can be added. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 5 ++++- kernel/auditsc.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index f10605c787e6..a6c3f1abd206 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -526,7 +526,6 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, goto exit_free; break; case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: - err = -EINVAL; if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN) goto exit_free; str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); @@ -543,6 +542,10 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, if (f->val & ~S_IFMT) goto exit_free; break; + case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: + if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE) + goto exit_free; + break; default: goto exit_free; } diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 9161e70a4379..8fb2c8e6d624 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -463,6 +463,32 @@ static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) return 0; } +static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, + const struct cred *cred, + struct audit_field *f, + struct audit_context *ctx, + struct audit_names *name) +{ + struct audit_names *n; + + switch (f->val) { + case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID: + if (name) { + return audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, name->uid); + } else if (ctx) { + list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + if (audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, n->uid)) + return 1; + } + } + break; + default: + WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); + return 0; + } + return 0; +} + /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 * otherwise. @@ -693,8 +719,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_FILETYPE: result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); break; + case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: + result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name); + break; } - if (!result) return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b34b039324bf081554ee8678f9b8c5d937e5206c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:08 -0500 Subject: audit: complex interfield comparison helper Rather than code the same loop over and over implement a helper function which uses some pointer magic to make it generic enough to be used numerous places as we implement more audit interfield comparisons Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 8fb2c8e6d624..b12cc32fe377 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -463,25 +463,53 @@ static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) return 0; } +static int audit_compare_id(uid_t uid1, + struct audit_names *name, + unsigned long name_offset, + struct audit_field *f, + struct audit_context *ctx) +{ + struct audit_names *n; + unsigned long addr; + uid_t uid2; + int rc; + + if (name) { + addr = (unsigned long)name; + addr += name_offset; + + uid2 = *(uid_t *)addr; + rc = audit_comparator(uid1, f->op, uid2); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + if (ctx) { + list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { + addr = (unsigned long)n; + addr += name_offset; + + uid2 = *(uid_t *)addr; + + rc = audit_comparator(uid1, f->op, uid2); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + } + return 0; +} + static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, struct audit_field *f, struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_names *name) { - struct audit_names *n; - switch (f->val) { case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID: - if (name) { - return audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, name->uid); - } else if (ctx) { - list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { - if (audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, n->uid)) - return 1; - } - } - break; + return audit_compare_id(cred->uid, + name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid), + f, ctx); default: WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c9fe685f7a17a0ee8bf3fbe51e40b1c8b8e65896 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2012 14:23:08 -0500 Subject: audit: allow interfield comparison between gid and ogid Allow audit rules to compare the gid of the running task to the gid of the inode in question. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index b12cc32fe377..861c7b9c565a 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -474,6 +474,8 @@ static int audit_compare_id(uid_t uid1, uid_t uid2; int rc; + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(uid_t) != sizeof(gid_t)); + if (name) { addr = (unsigned long)name; addr += name_offset; @@ -510,6 +512,10 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, return audit_compare_id(cred->uid, name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid), f, ctx); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID: + return audit_compare_id(cred->gid, + name, offsetof(struct audit_names, gid), + f, ctx); default: WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a6633ed08af5ba67790b4d1adcdeb8ceb55677e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Moody Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2011 16:17:51 -0800 Subject: audit: implement all object interfield comparisons This completes the matrix of interfield comparisons between uid/gid information for the current task and the uid/gid information for inodes. aka I can audit based on differences between the euid of the process and the uid of fs objects. Signed-off-by: Peter Moody Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 861c7b9c565a..b8cee462b99e 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -508,6 +508,7 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_names *name) { switch (f->val) { + /* process to file object comparisons */ case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID: return audit_compare_id(cred->uid, name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid), @@ -516,6 +517,34 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, return audit_compare_id(cred->gid, name, offsetof(struct audit_names, gid), f, ctx); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID: + return audit_compare_id(cred->euid, + name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid), + f, ctx); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID: + return audit_compare_id(cred->egid, + name, offsetof(struct audit_names, gid), + f, ctx); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID: + return audit_compare_id(tsk->loginuid, + name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid), + f, ctx); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID: + return audit_compare_id(cred->suid, + name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid), + f, ctx); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID: + return audit_compare_id(cred->sgid, + name, offsetof(struct audit_names, gid), + f, ctx); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID: + return audit_compare_id(cred->fsuid, + name, offsetof(struct audit_names, uid), + f, ctx); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID: + return audit_compare_id(cred->fsgid, + name, offsetof(struct audit_names, gid), + f, ctx); default: WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 10d68360871657204885371cdf2594412675d2f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Moody Date: Wed, 4 Jan 2012 15:24:31 -0500 Subject: audit: comparison on interprocess fields This allows audit to specify rules in which we compare two fields of a process. Such as is the running process uid != to the running process euid? Signed-off-by: Peter Moody Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index b8cee462b99e..593237e3654d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -545,6 +545,45 @@ static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, return audit_compare_id(cred->fsgid, name, offsetof(struct audit_names, gid), f, ctx); + /* uid comparisons */ + case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID: + return audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID: + return audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID: + return audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID: + return audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid); + /* auid comparisons */ + case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID: + return audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID: + return audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID: + return audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid); + /* euid comparisons */ + case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID: + return audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID: + return audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid); + /* suid comparisons */ + case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID: + return audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid); + /* gid comparisons */ + case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID: + return audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID: + return audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID: + return audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid); + /* egid comparisons */ + case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID: + return audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid); + case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID: + return audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid); + /* sgid comparison */ + case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID: + return audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid); default: WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5afb8a3f96573f7ea018abb768f5b6ebe1a6c1a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xi Wang Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2011 18:39:41 -0500 Subject: audit: fix signedness bug in audit_log_execve_info() In the loop, a size_t "len" is used to hold the return value of audit_log_single_execve_arg(), which returns -1 on error. In that case the error handling (len <= 0) will be bypassed since "len" is unsigned, and the loop continues with (p += len) being wrapped. Change the type of "len" to signed int to fix the error handling. size_t len; ... for (...) { len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(...); if (len <= 0) break; p += len; } Signed-off-by: Xi Wang Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/auditsc.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 593237e3654d..86584ecb1039 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1362,8 +1362,8 @@ static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_buffer **ab, struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi) { - int i; - size_t len, len_sent = 0; + int i, len; + size_t len_sent = 0; const char __user *p; char *buf; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c158a35c8a681cf68d36f22f058f9f5466386c71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2012 14:07:10 -0800 Subject: audit: no leading space in audit_log_d_path prefix audit_log_d_path() injects an additional space before the prefix, which serves no purpose and doesn't mix well with other audit_log*() functions that do not sneak extra characters into the log. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Eric Paris --- kernel/audit.c | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 00efe4758c86..705c25a70bff 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -1423,7 +1423,7 @@ void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix, char *p, *pathname; if (prefix) - audit_log_format(ab, " %s", prefix); + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", prefix); /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */ pathname = kmalloc(PATH_MAX+11, ab->gfp_mask); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 86584ecb1039..caaea6e944f8 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk while (vma) { if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) { - audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", + audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &vma->vm_file->f_path); break; } @@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, case 0: /* name was specified as a relative path and the * directory component is the cwd */ - audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd); + audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd); break; default: /* log the name's directory component */ @@ -1725,7 +1725,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); if (ab) { - audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd); + audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd); audit_log_end(ab); } } -- cgit v1.2.3