From 6974f0c4555e285ab217cee58b6e874f776ff409 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Micay Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 14:36:10 -0700 Subject: include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in regular use at runtime too. Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of the source buffer. * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Kees said: "This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already" [arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de [keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast [keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Acked-by: Kees Cook Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Daniel Axtens Cc: Rasmus Villemoes Cc: Andy Shevchenko Cc: Chris Metcalf Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- lib/string.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) (limited to 'lib') diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c index 1c1fc9187b05..ebbb99c775bd 100644 --- a/lib/string.c +++ b/lib/string.c @@ -978,3 +978,10 @@ char *strreplace(char *s, char old, char new) return s; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(strreplace); + +void fortify_panic(const char *name) +{ + pr_emerg("detected buffer overflow in %s\n", name); + BUG(); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(fortify_panic); -- cgit v1.2.3