From f5895943d91b41b0368830cdb6eaffb8eda0f4c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 17:44:49 +0000
Subject: KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h

Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key->perm.

Whilst we're at it:

 (1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
     with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.

 (2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
     it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
     directly to that.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
---
 security/capability.c      |  2 +-
 security/keys/internal.h   | 11 +----------
 security/keys/key.c        |  6 +++---
 security/keys/keyctl.c     | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 security/keys/keyring.c    |  8 ++++----
 security/keys/permission.c |  4 ++--
 security/keys/persistent.c |  4 ++--
 security/keys/proc.c       |  2 +-
 security/security.c        |  2 +-
 security/selinux/hooks.c   |  2 +-
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  2 +-
 11 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 8b4f24ae4338..c1426b91f4bd 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ static void cap_key_free(struct key *key)
 }
 
 static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
-			      key_perm_t perm)
+			      unsigned perm)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 80b2aac4f50c..5f20da01fd8d 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -176,20 +176,11 @@ extern int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
 /*
  * Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way.
  */
-static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, key_perm_t perm)
+static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, unsigned perm)
 {
 	return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), perm);
 }
 
-/* required permissions */
-#define	KEY_VIEW	0x01	/* require permission to view attributes */
-#define	KEY_READ	0x02	/* require permission to read content */
-#define	KEY_WRITE	0x04	/* require permission to update / modify */
-#define	KEY_SEARCH	0x08	/* require permission to search (keyring) or find (key) */
-#define	KEY_LINK	0x10	/* require permission to link */
-#define	KEY_SETATTR	0x20	/* require permission to change attributes */
-#define	KEY_ALL		0x3f	/* all the above permissions */
-
 /*
  * Authorisation record for request_key().
  */
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 6e21c11e48bc..2048a110e7f1 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	int ret;
 
 	/* need write permission on the key to update it */
-	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
 
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 
 	/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
 	 * to modify the keyring */
-	ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+	ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
 		goto error_link_end;
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
 	key_check(key);
 
 	/* the key must be writable */
-	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index cee72ce64222..cd5bd0cef25d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
 	}
 
 	/* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error3;
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
 	dest_ref = NULL;
 	if (destringid) {
 		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
-					   KEY_WRITE);
+					   KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
 			goto error3;
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
 	long ret;
 
 	lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
 	}
 
 	/* find the target key (which must be writable) */
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -365,12 +365,12 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
 	key_ref_t key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		if (ret != -EACCES)
 			goto error;
-		key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
+		key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
 		if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 			goto error;
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
 
 	kenter("%d", id);
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 
@@ -470,13 +470,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_LINK);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
 	key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
 	long ret;
 
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
 	char *tmpbuf;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		/* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
 		 * authorisation token handy */
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 	}
 
 	/* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
-	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 		goto error2;
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 	dest_ref = NULL;
 	if (destringid) {
 		dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
-					   KEY_WRITE);
+					   KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
 			goto error3;
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 
 	/* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
 	if (dest_ref) {
-		ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_LINK);
+		ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_LINK);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto error6;
 
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 
 	/* see if we can read it directly */
-	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_READ);
+	ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
 	if (ret == 0)
 		goto can_read_key;
 	if (ret != -EACCES)
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
 		goto error;
 
 	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
-				  KEY_SETATTR);
+				  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
 		goto error;
 
 	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
-				  KEY_SETATTR);
+				  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
 		goto error;
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
 
 	/* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
 	if (ringid > 0) {
-		dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+		dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 		if (IS_ERR(dkref))
 			return PTR_ERR(dkref);
 		*_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
 	long ret;
 
 	key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
-				  KEY_SETATTR);
+				  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		/* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
 		 * if we have the authorisation token handy */
@@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
 	char *context;
 	long ret;
 
-	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+	key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
 	if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
 			return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
@@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 	struct cred *cred;
 	int ret;
 
-	keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
+	keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
 		return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 2fb2576dc644..9cf2575f0d97 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
 	/* key must have search permissions */
 	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
 	    key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
-				ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) {
+				ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) {
 		ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
 		kleave(" = %d [!perm]", ctx->skipped_ret);
 		goto skipped;
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ ascend_to_node:
 		/* Search a nested keyring */
 		if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
 		    key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
-					ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+					ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
 			continue;
 
 		/* stack the current position */
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
 
 	if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM)) {
-		err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
+		err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
 		if (err < 0)
 			return ERR_PTR(err);
 	}
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
 
 			if (!skip_perm_check &&
 			    key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
-					   KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+					   KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
 				continue;
 
 			/* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index efcc0c855a0d..732cc0beffdf 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
  * permissions bits or the LSM check.
  */
 int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
-			key_perm_t perm)
+			unsigned perm)
 {
 	struct key *key;
 	key_perm_t kperm;
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ use_these_perms:
 	if (is_key_possessed(key_ref))
 		kperm |= key->perm >> 24;
 
-	kperm = kperm & perm & KEY_ALL;
+	kperm = kperm & perm & KEY_NEED_ALL;
 
 	if (kperm != perm)
 		return -EACCES;
diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c
index 0ad3ee283781..c9fae5ea89fe 100644
--- a/security/keys/persistent.c
+++ b/security/keys/persistent.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static long key_get_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
 	return PTR_ERR(persistent_ref);
 
 found:
-	ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_LINK);
+	ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_NEED_LINK);
 	if (ret == 0) {
 		persistent = key_ref_to_ptr(persistent_ref);
 		ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), persistent);
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t _uid, key_serial_t destid)
 	}
 
 	/* There must be a destination keyring */
-	dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+	dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(dest_ref))
 		return PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
 	if (key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref)->type != &key_type_keyring) {
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 88e9a466940f..d3f6f2fd21db 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	 * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
 	 *   access to __current_cred() safe
 	 */
-	rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_VIEW);
+	rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return 0;
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 15b6928592ef..8e428ac90233 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1405,7 +1405,7 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key)
 }
 
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
-			    const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
+			    const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
 {
 	return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4b34847208cc..eb5c307fcc9a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5704,7 +5704,7 @@ static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
 
 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 				  const struct cred *cred,
-				  key_perm_t perm)
+				  unsigned perm)
 {
 	struct key *key;
 	struct key_security_struct *ksec;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 14f52be78c75..c47dd8ca019c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3506,7 +3506,7 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
  * an error code otherwise
  */
 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
-				const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
+				const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
 {
 	struct key *keyp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fffea214abf66a8672cfd6697fae65e743e22f11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 17:44:49 +0000
Subject: smack: fix key permission verification

For any keyring access type SMACK always used MAY_READWRITE access check.
It prevents reading the key with label "_", which should be allowed for anyone.

This patch changes default access check to MAY_READ and use MAY_READWRITE in only
appropriate cases.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index c47dd8ca019c..8177e7df8c2d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3511,6 +3511,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	struct key *keyp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+	int request = 0;
 
 	keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 	if (keyp == NULL)
@@ -3531,7 +3532,11 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
 	ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
 #endif
-	return smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ)
+		request = MAY_READ;
+	if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
+		request = MAY_WRITE;
+	return smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 55dfc5da1a9b7e623b6f35620c74280555df0288 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Bollo?= <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2014 15:53:05 +0100
Subject: Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Fix a possible memory access fault when transmute is true and isp is NULL.

Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d814e35987be..efa42991235e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -413,9 +413,11 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	 * Initialize the root inode.
 	 */
 	isp = inode->i_security;
-	if (inode->i_security == NULL) {
-		inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
-		isp = inode->i_security;
+	if (isp == NULL) {
+		isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
+		if (isp == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		inode->i_security = isp;
 	} else
 		isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 959e6c7f1eee42f14d31755b1134f5615db1d9bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 17:07:04 +0100
Subject: Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()

The order of subject/object is currently reversed in
smack_ptrace_traceme(). It is currently checked if the tracee has a
capability to trace tracer and according to this rule a decision is made
whether the tracer will be allowed to trace tracee.

Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
---
 security/smack/smack.h        |  1 +
 security/smack/smack_access.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c    |  4 ++--
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index d072fd32212d..b9dfc4e1d3e0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
  */
 int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
 int smk_access(struct smack_known *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *, char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
 int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
 struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32);
 char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 14293cd9b1e5..f161debed02b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -192,20 +192,21 @@ out_audit:
 }
 
 /**
- * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * smk_tskacc - determine if a task has a specific access to an object
+ * @tsp: a pointer to the subject task
  * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
  * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
  * @a : common audit data
  *
- * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
+ * This function checks the subject task's label/object label pair
  * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
- * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that the task may have the capability
  * to override the rules.
  */
-int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *subject, char *obj_label,
+	       u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
-	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(subject);
 	int may;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 		 * it can further restrict access.
 		 */
 		may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, obj_label,
-					&tsp->smk_rules);
+					&subject->smk_rules);
 		if (may < 0)
 			goto out_audit;
 		if ((mode & may) == mode)
@@ -241,6 +242,24 @@ out_audit:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : common audit data
+ *
+ * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
+ * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
+ * to override the rules.
+ */
+int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+	return smk_tskacc(tsp, obj_label, mode, a);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 /**
  * smack_str_from_perm : helper to transalate an int to a
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index efa42991235e..b23fbdd4cdad 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -207,11 +207,11 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
+	skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
 
-	rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_tskacc(ptp, skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5663884caab166f87ab8c68ec7c62b1cce85a400 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 17:07:05 +0100
Subject: Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack

The decision whether we can trace a process is made in the following
functions:
	smack_ptrace_traceme()
	smack_ptrace_access_check()
	smack_bprm_set_creds() (in case the proces is traced)

This patch unifies all those decisions by introducing one function that
checks whether ptrace is allowed: smk_ptrace_rule_check().

This makes possible to actually trace with TRACEME where first the
TRACEME itself must be allowed and then exec() on a traced process.

Additional bugs fixed:
- The decision is made according to the mode parameter that is now correctly
  translated from PTRACE_MODE_* to MAY_* instead of being treated 1:1.
  PTRACE_MODE_READ requires MAY_READ.
  PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH requires MAY_READWRITE.
- Add a smack audit log in case of exec() refused by bprm_set_creds().
- Honor the PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT flag and don't put smack audit info
  in case this flag is set.

Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index b23fbdd4cdad..4d6f37644baa 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -157,6 +157,54 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
+ * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
+ *
+ * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
+ */
+static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
+{
+	switch (mode) {
+	case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
+		return MAY_READ;
+	case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
+		return MAY_READWRITE;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
+ * @tracer: tracer process
+ * @tracee_label: label of the process that's about to be traced
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
+ * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
+ */
+static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, char *tracee_label,
+				 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
+		saip = &ad;
+	}
+
+	tsp = task_security(tracer);
+	skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+
+	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_label, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 /*
  * LSM hooks.
  * We he, that is fun!
@@ -165,16 +213,15 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
 /**
  * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
  * @ctp: child task pointer
- * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
  *
- * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ * Do the capability checks.
  */
 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
@@ -182,10 +229,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 		return rc;
 
 	skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
 
-	rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, mode, &ad);
+	rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp->smk_known, mode, __func__);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -195,12 +240,11 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
  *
- * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
  */
 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 {
 	int rc;
-	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
@@ -208,10 +252,9 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 		return rc;
 
 	skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
 
-	rc = smk_tskacc(ptp, skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp->smk_known,
+				   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -455,7 +498,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
  * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
  * @bprm: the exec information
  *
- * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
+ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
  */
 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
@@ -475,7 +518,22 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (bprm->unsafe)
+	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+		struct task_struct *tracer;
+		rc = 0;
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+		if (likely(tracer != NULL))
+			rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
+						   isp->smk_task->smk_known,
+						   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
+						   __func__);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+	} else if (bprm->unsafe)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 668678185247303450e60df14569f94cf5775fea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 17:07:06 +0100
Subject: Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface

This allows to limit ptrace beyond the regular smack access rules.
It adds a smackfs/ptrace interface that allows smack to be configured
to require equal smack labels for PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH access.
See the changes in Documentation/security/Smack.txt below for details.

Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
---
 security/smack/smack.h        |  9 ++++++
 security/smack/smack_access.c |  5 ++-
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c    | 22 ++++++++++++-
 security/smack/smackfs.c      | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index b9dfc4e1d3e0..fade085b1128 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -176,6 +176,14 @@ struct smk_port_label {
  */
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM           184     /* 23 * 8 */
 
+/*
+ * Ptrace rules
+ */
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT	0
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT	1
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN	2
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_MAX	SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN
+
 /*
  * Flags for untraditional access modes.
  * It shouldn't be necessary to avoid conflicts with definitions
@@ -245,6 +253,7 @@ extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
 extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
+extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
 
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index f161debed02b..c062e9467b62 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -304,7 +304,10 @@ static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " object=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->object);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", sad->request);
+	if (sad->request[0] == '\0')
+		audit_log_format(ab, " labels_differ");
+	else
+		audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", sad->request);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 4d6f37644baa..787dcf12f15c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -178,7 +178,8 @@ static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
 /**
  * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
  * @tracer: tracer process
- * @tracee_label: label of the process that's about to be traced
+ * @tracee_label: label of the process that's about to be traced,
+ *                the pointer must originate from smack structures
  * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
  * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
  *
@@ -201,6 +202,25 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, char *tracee_label,
 	tsp = task_security(tracer);
 	skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
 
+	if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
+	    (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
+	     smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
+		if (skp->smk_known == tracee_label)
+			rc = 0;
+		else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
+			rc = -EACCES;
+		else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+			rc = 0;
+		else
+			rc = -EACCES;
+
+		if (saip)
+			smack_log(skp->smk_known, tracee_label, 0, rc, saip);
+
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
 	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_label, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 3198cfe1dcc6..177d87875394 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
 	SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ	= 18,	/* set rules with subject label to '-' */
 	SMK_CHANGE_RULE	= 19,	/* change or add rules (long labels) */
 	SMK_SYSLOG	= 20,	/* change syslog label) */
+	SMK_PTRACE	= 21,	/* set ptrace rule */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -100,6 +101,15 @@ struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
  */
 struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
 
+/*
+ * Ptrace current rule
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT    regular smack ptrace rules (/proc based)
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT      labels must match, but can be overriden with
+ *			   CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN  lables must match, CAP_SYS_PTRACE has no effect
+ */
+int smack_ptrace_rule = SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT;
+
 /*
  * Certain IP addresses may be designated as single label hosts.
  * Packets are sent there unlabeled, but only from tasks that
@@ -2243,6 +2253,68 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_syslog_ops = {
 };
 
 
+/**
+ * smk_read_ptrace - read() for /smack/ptrace
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_ptrace(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[32];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d\n", smack_ptrace_rule);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_ptrace - write() for /smack/ptrace
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_ptrace(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[32];
+	int i;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0 || count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	temp[count] = '\0';
+
+	if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (i < SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT || i > SMACK_PTRACE_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	smack_ptrace_rule = i;
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_ptrace_ops = {
+	.write		= smk_write_ptrace,
+	.read		= smk_read_ptrace,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
 /**
  * smk_fill_super - fill the smackfs superblock
  * @sb: the empty superblock
@@ -2296,6 +2368,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 			"change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_SYSLOG] = {
 			"syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_PTRACE] = {
+			"ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		/* last one */
 			{""}
 	};
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5e9ab593c2da3064136ffa1d7f712d0e957e1958 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pankaj Kumar <pankaj.k2@samsung.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Dec 2013 15:12:22 +0530
Subject: bugfix patch for SMACK

1. In order to remove any SMACK extended attribute from a file, a user
should have CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability. But user without having this
capability is able to remove SMACK64MMAP security attribute.

2. While validating size and value of smack extended attribute in
smack_inode_setsecurity hook, wrong error code is returned.

Signed-off-by: Pankaj Kumar <pamkaj.k2@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 787dcf12f15c..9a99f3c485cb 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
 	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
 		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
 			rc = -EPERM;
 	} else
@@ -2156,7 +2156,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
-		return -EACCES;
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
 	if (skp == NULL)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 9598f4c9e7069aee8639be1e04e8af26b5a77fa2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Bollo?= <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
Date: Thu, 3 Apr 2014 13:48:41 +0200
Subject: SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The function `smack_inode_post_setxattr` is called each
time that a setxattr is done, for any value of name.
The kernel allow to put value==NULL when size==0
to set an empty attribute value. The systematic
call to smk_import_entry was causing the dereference
of a NULL pointer hence a KERNEL PANIC!

The problem can be produced easily by issuing the
command `setfattr -n user.data file` under bash prompt
when SMACK is active.

Moving the call to smk_import_entry as proposed by this
patch is correcting the behaviour because the function
smack_inode_post_setxattr is called for the SMACK's
attributes only if the function smack_inode_setxattr validated
the value and its size (what will not be the case when size==0).

It also has a benefical effect to not fill the smack hash
with garbage values coming from any extended attribute
write.

Change-Id: Iaf0039c2be9bccb6cee11c24a3b44d209101fe47
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 9a99f3c485cb..a5d86ffbf9a0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -960,18 +960,20 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return;
 	}
 
-	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
 		if (skp != NULL)
 			isp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
 		else
 			isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
 		if (skp != NULL)
 			isp->smk_task = skp;
 		else
 			isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
 		if (skp != NULL)
 			isp->smk_mmap = skp;
 		else
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f59bdfba3e2b0ba5182f23d96101d106f18132ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2014 16:35:36 -0700
Subject: Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute

Sam Henderson points out that removing the SMACK64TRANSMUTE
attribute from a directory does not result in the directory
transmuting. This is because the inode flag indicating that
the directory is transmuting isn't cleared. The fix is a tad
less than trivial because smk_task and smk_mmap should have
been broken out, too.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a5d86ffbf9a0..3d1c9086d0d6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1026,18 +1026,31 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
-	if (rc == 0)
-		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
-	if (rc == 0) {
-		isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+	/*
+	 * Don't do anything special for these.
+	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
+	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
+	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
 		isp->smk_task = NULL;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
 		isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
-	}
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
+		isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
 
-	return rc;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 54e70ec5eb090193b03e69d551fa6771a5a217c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2014 16:37:08 -0700
Subject: Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check

Smack IPC policy requires that the sender have write access
to the receiver. UDS streams don't do per-packet checks. The
only check is done at connect time. The existing code checks
if the connecting process can write to the other, but not the
other way around. This change adds a check that the other end
can write to the connecting process.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schuafler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack.h     |  6 +++---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index fade085b1128..020307ef0972 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ struct superblock_smack {
 
 struct socket_smack {
 	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outbound label */
-	char			*smk_in;	/* inbound label */
-	char			*smk_packet;	/* TCP peer label */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_in;	/* inbound label */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_packet;	/* TCP peer label */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ struct smk_port_label {
 	struct list_head	list;
 	struct sock		*smk_sock;	/* socket initialized on */
 	unsigned short		smk_port;	/* the port number */
-	char			*smk_in;	/* incoming label */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_in;	/* inbound label */
 	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outgoing label */
 };
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3d1c9086d0d6..3410e3abd19b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
 	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
-		isp = ssp->smk_in;
+		isp = ssp->smk_in->smk_known;
 	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
 		isp = ssp->smk_out->smk_known;
 	else
@@ -1859,7 +1859,7 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 	if (ssp == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+	ssp->smk_in = skp;
 	ssp->smk_out = skp;
 	ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
 
@@ -2099,7 +2099,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
 
 	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
 		skp = smack_net_ambient;
-		object = ssp->smk_in;
+		object = ssp->smk_in->smk_known;
 	} else {
 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
 		object = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
@@ -2129,9 +2129,9 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
 	list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
 		if (spp->smk_port != port)
 			continue;
-		object = spp->smk_in;
+		object = spp->smk_in->smk_known;
 		if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
-			ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out->smk_known;
+			ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -2195,7 +2195,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
-		ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+		ssp->smk_in = skp;
 	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
 		ssp->smk_out = skp;
 		if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
@@ -3054,30 +3054,34 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 				     struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *okp;
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
 	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
 	struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc = 0;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
-
-	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
 #endif
 
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
 		skp = ssp->smk_out;
-		rc = smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		okp = osp->smk_out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
+#endif
+		rc = smk_access(skp, okp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		if (rc == 0)
+			rc = smk_access(okp, okp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
 	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
 	 */
 	if (rc == 0) {
-		nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out->smk_known;
-		ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out->smk_known;
+		nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
+		ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
 	}
 
 	return rc;
@@ -3109,7 +3113,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 		return 0;
 
 	skp = ssp->smk_out;
-	return smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	return smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3204,7 +3208,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
 		if (found)
 			return skp;
 
-		if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known)
+		if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
 			return &smack_known_web;
 		return &smack_known_star;
 	}
@@ -3323,7 +3327,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		 * This is the simplist possible security model
 		 * for networking.
 		 */
-		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 		if (rc != 0)
 			netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
 		break;
@@ -3358,7 +3362,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
 
 	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
 	if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
-		rcp = ssp->smk_packet;
+		rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
 		slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
 	}
 
@@ -3443,7 +3447,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 		return;
 
 	ssp = sk->sk_security;
-	ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+	ssp->smk_in = skp;
 	ssp->smk_out = skp;
 	/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
 }
@@ -3503,7 +3507,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
 	 * here. Read access is not required.
 	 */
-	rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3547,7 +3551,7 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
 
 	if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
 		skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
-		ssp->smk_packet = skp->smk_known;
+		ssp->smk_packet = skp;
 	} else
 		ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From fab71a90eddaf4d5f654fdd0ea7c46315c8da4a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2014 18:55:51 -0700
Subject: security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table

This typedef is unnecessary and should just be removed.

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
 security/keys/sysctl.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/keys/sysctl.c b/security/keys/sysctl.c
index 8c0af08760c8..b68faa1a5cfd 100644
--- a/security/keys/sysctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/sysctl.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 static const int zero, one = 1, max = INT_MAX;
 
-ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
+struct ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
 	{
 		.procname = "maxkeys",
 		.data = &key_quota_maxkeys,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a6834c0b9114c06106efee8e9f2a11fbbb104567 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Mon, 21 Apr 2014 11:10:26 -0700
Subject: Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3

Smack believes that many of the operatons that can
be performed on an open file descriptor are read operations.
The fstat and lseek system calls are examples.
An implication of this is that files shouldn't be open
if the task doesn't have read access even if it has
write access and the file is being opened write only.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 3410e3abd19b..7bcf9edf768d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1462,19 +1462,32 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
 /**
  * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
  * @file: the object
- * @cred: unused
+ * @cred: task credential
  *
  * Set the security blob in the file structure.
+ * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
+ * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
+ * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
  *
  * Returns 0
  */
 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 {
+	struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
 	struct inode_smack *isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
 
-	file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
 
-	return 0;
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+	rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, isp->smk_inode, MAY_READ, &ad);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
+
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /*
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 36ea735b522d09826ae0dac0e540f294436c52f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2014 15:23:01 -0700
Subject: Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd

The cgroup filesystem isn't ready for an LSM to
properly use extented attributes. This patch makes
files created in the cgroup filesystem usable by
a system running Smack and systemd.

Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 7bcf9edf768d..9cb7559d60b2 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2821,6 +2821,15 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 	 * of the superblock.
 	 */
 	if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
+		if (sbp->s_magic == CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC) {
+			/*
+			 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
+			 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
+			 * options.
+			 */
+			sbsp->smk_root = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+			sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		}
 		isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
 		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
 		goto unlockandout;
@@ -2834,16 +2843,20 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 	 */
 	switch (sbp->s_magic) {
 	case SMACK_MAGIC:
+	case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
+	case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
+	case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
 		/*
 		 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
 		 * that the smack file system doesn't do
 		 * extended attributes.
-		 */
-		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
-		break;
-	case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
-		/*
+		 *
 		 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
+		 *
+		 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
+		 * structures associated with the task involved.
+		 *
+		 * Cgroupfs is special
 		 */
 		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
 		break;
@@ -2855,13 +2868,6 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		 */
 		final = ckp->smk_known;
 		break;
-	case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
-		/*
-		 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
-		 * structures associated with the task involved.
-		 */
-		final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
-		break;
 	case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
 		/*
 		 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ec554fa75ec94dcf47e52db9551755679c10235b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Toralf=20F=C3=B6rster?= <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
Date: Sun, 27 Apr 2014 19:33:34 +0200
Subject: Warning in scanf string typing
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This fixes a warning about the mismatch of types between
the declared unsigned and integer.

Signed-off-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
---
 security/smack/smackfs.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 177d87875394..32b248820840 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	data[count] = '\0';
 
-	rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%d %s",
+	rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%u %s",
 		&host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &m, smack);
 	if (rc != 6) {
 		rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd %s",
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ca7786a2f916540931d7114d441efa141c99c898 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2014 11:29:04 -0700
Subject: selinux:  Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.

We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c         | 7 ++++++-
 security/selinux/hooks.c       | 5 +++--
 security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index fc3e6628a864..a18f1fa6440b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -444,11 +444,15 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
 			   ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
 			   ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
+	if (ad->selinux_audit_data->denied) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u",
+				 ad->selinux_audit_data->result ? 0 : 1);
+	}
 }
 
 /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
 noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-		u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+		u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
 		struct common_audit_data *a,
 		unsigned flags)
 {
@@ -477,6 +481,7 @@ noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 	sad.tsid = tsid;
 	sad.audited = audited;
 	sad.denied = denied;
+	sad.result = result;
 
 	a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6ab22720c277..d3a2c2e80fec 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2770,6 +2770,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
 
 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
 					   u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+					   int result,
 					   unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -2780,7 +2781,7 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
 	ad.u.inode = inode;
 
 	rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
-			    audited, denied, &ad, flags);
+			    audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	return 0;
@@ -2822,7 +2823,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (likely(!audited))
 		return rc;
 
-	rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
+	rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
 	if (rc2)
 		return rc2;
 	return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index f53ee3c58d0f..ddf8eec03f21 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested,
 }
 
 int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-		   u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+		   u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
 		   struct common_audit_data *a,
 		   unsigned flags);
 
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	if (likely(!audited))
 		return 0;
 	return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
-			      requested, audited, denied,
+			      requested, audited, denied, result,
 			      a, 0);
 }
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5b589d44fad18228f18749360d008d5c8ff3aaf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 15 May 2014 11:16:06 -0400
Subject: selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES

We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the
security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by
returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when
exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem.  This patch makes things
a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid
case.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d3a2c2e80fec..d4cbf7d16f07 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2123,11 +2123,13 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
 
 		/*
-		 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
-		 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
+		 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs or nosuid and a
+		 * transition is explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
 		 */
 		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
 			return -EPERM;
+		if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+			return -EACCES;
 	} else {
 		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
 		rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 9a591f39a9d11df435652738e7f6e62a09c87909 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 15 May 2014 15:02:53 -0400
Subject: selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while
 loading selinux policy

On a slow machine (with debugging enabled), upgrading selinux policy may take
a considerable amount of time. Long enough that the softlockup detector
gets triggered.

The backtrace looks like this..

 > BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [load_policy:19045]
 > Call Trace:
 >  [<ffffffff81221ddf>] symcmp+0xf/0x20
 >  [<ffffffff81221c27>] hashtab_search+0x47/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff8122e96c>] mls_convert_context+0xdc/0x1c0
 >  [<ffffffff812294e8>] convert_context+0x378/0x460
 >  [<ffffffff81229170>] ? security_context_to_sid_core+0x240/0x240
 >  [<ffffffff812221b5>] sidtab_map+0x45/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff8122bb9f>] security_load_policy+0x3ff/0x580
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50
 >  [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50
 >  [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
 >  [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe
 >  [<ffffffff8109c82d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0
 >  [<ffffffff81279a2e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
 >  [<ffffffff810d28a8>] ? rcu_irq_exit+0x68/0xb0
 >  [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe
 >  [<ffffffff8121e947>] sel_write_load+0xa7/0x770
 >  [<ffffffff81139633>] ? vfs_write+0x1c3/0x200
 >  [<ffffffff81210e8e>] ? security_file_permission+0x1e/0xa0
 >  [<ffffffff8113952b>] vfs_write+0xbb/0x200
 >  [<ffffffff811581c7>] ? fget_light+0x397/0x4b0
 >  [<ffffffff81139c27>] SyS_write+0x47/0xa0
 >  [<ffffffff8153bde4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2

Stephen Smalley suggested:

 > Maybe put a cond_resched() within the ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit()
 > loop in mls_convert_context()?

That seems to do the trick. Tested by downgrading and re-upgrading selinux-policy-targeted.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index c85bc1ec040c..d307b37ddc2b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -492,6 +492,8 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 			rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
 			if (rc)
 				return rc;
+
+			cond_resched();
 		}
 		ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat);
 		c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ed1c96429a6aa6ffd8c4ee3e80bcde28aad270bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 15 May 2014 15:03:53 -0400
Subject: selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading
 selinux policy

After silencing the sleeping warning in mls_convert_context() I started
seeing similar traces from hashtab_insert. Do a cond_resched there too.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index 933e735bb185..2cc496149842 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include "hashtab.h"
 
 struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key),
@@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum)
 	u32 hvalue;
 	struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
 
+	cond_resched();
+
 	if (!h || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f9b2a735bdddf836214b5dca74f6ca7712e5a08c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 12 May 2014 09:28:11 -0400
Subject: ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag

Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy.  When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.

The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash.  The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time.  The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem.  Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages.  A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory.  This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.

Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set.  Based on policy, permit or deny file
access.  This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'.  Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.

Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    | 10 +++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   |  5 ++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |  6 +++++-
 security/integrity/integrity.h      |  1 +
 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index ba9e4d792dd5..d9cd5ce14d2b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
 			    int *xattr_len)
 {
+	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
 	int result = 0;
@@ -213,6 +214,12 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
 		u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
 
+		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
+			audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
+			result = -EACCES;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		/* use default hash algorithm */
 		hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
 
@@ -233,9 +240,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 				result = -ENOMEM;
 		}
 	}
+out:
 	if (result)
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
-				    filename, "collect_data", "failed",
+				    filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
 				    result, 0);
 	return result;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 52ac6cf41f88..dcc98cf542d8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -214,8 +214,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 		xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
 
 	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
-	if (rc != 0)
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+			rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
 		goto out_digsig;
+	}
 
 	pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 93873a450ff7..40a7488f6721 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
 	Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
 	Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
-	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid
+	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
 	{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
 	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
+	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -622,6 +623,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			else
 				result = -EINVAL;
 			break;
+		case Opt_permit_directio:
+			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
+			break;
 		case Opt_err:
 			ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
 			result = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 2fb5e53e927f..33c0a70f6b15 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS	0xff000000
 #define IMA_DIGSIG		0x01000000
 #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED	0x02000000
+#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO	0x04000000
 
 #define IMA_DO_MASK		(IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
 				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3