/* * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the * License. */ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/proc_ns.h> #include <linux/highuid.h> #include <linux/cred.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> #include <linux/keyctl.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> #include <keys/user-type.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/projid.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex); static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, struct uid_gid_map *map); static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work); static struct ucounts *inc_user_namespaces(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid) { return inc_ucount(ns, uid, UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES); } static void dec_user_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts) { return dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES); } static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) { /* Start with the same capabilities as init but useless for doing * anything as the capabilities are bound to the new user namespace. */ cred->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; cred->cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET; cred->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET; cred->cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET; cred->cap_ambient = CAP_EMPTY_SET; cred->cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET; #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS key_put(cred->request_key_auth); cred->request_key_auth = NULL; #endif /* tgcred will be cleared in our caller bc CLONE_THREAD won't be set */ cred->user_ns = user_ns; } /* * Create a new user namespace, deriving the creator from the user in the * passed credentials, and replacing that user with the new root user for the * new namespace. * * This is called by copy_creds(), which will finish setting the target task's * credentials. */ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) { struct user_namespace *ns, *parent_ns = new->user_ns; kuid_t owner = new->euid; kgid_t group = new->egid; struct ucounts *ucounts; int ret, i; ret = -ENOSPC; if (parent_ns->level > 32) goto fail; ucounts = inc_user_namespaces(parent_ns, owner); if (!ucounts) goto fail; /* * Verify that we can not violate the policy of which files * may be accessed that is specified by the root directory, * by verifing that the root directory is at the root of the * mount namespace which allows all files to be accessed. */ ret = -EPERM; if (current_chrooted()) goto fail_dec; /* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace * or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who * created a user_namespace. */ ret = -EPERM; if (!kuid_has_mapping(parent_ns, owner) || !kgid_has_mapping(parent_ns, group)) goto fail_dec; ret = -ENOMEM; ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(user_ns_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ns) goto fail_dec; ret = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns); if (ret) goto fail_free; ns->ns.ops = &userns_operations; atomic_set(&ns->count, 1); /* Leave the new->user_ns reference with the new user namespace. */ ns->parent = parent_ns; ns->level = parent_ns->level + 1; ns->owner = owner; ns->group = group; INIT_WORK(&ns->work, free_user_ns); for (i = 0; i < UCOUNT_COUNTS; i++) { ns->ucount_max[i] = INT_MAX; } ns->ucounts = ucounts; /* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); ns->flags = parent_ns->flags; mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS init_rwsem(&ns->persistent_keyring_register_sem); #endif ret = -ENOMEM; if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns)) goto fail_keyring; set_cred_user_ns(new, ns); return 0; fail_keyring: #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register); #endif ns_free_inum(&ns->ns); fail_free: kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns); fail_dec: dec_user_namespaces(ucounts); fail: return ret; } int unshare_userns(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct cred **new_cred) { struct cred *cred; int err = -ENOMEM; if (!(unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER)) return 0; cred = prepare_creds(); if (cred) { err = create_user_ns(cred); if (err) put_cred(cred); else *new_cred = cred; } return err; } static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work) { struct user_namespace *parent, *ns = container_of(work, struct user_namespace, work); do { struct ucounts *ucounts = ns->ucounts; parent = ns->parent; retire_userns_sysctls(ns); #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register); #endif ns_free_inum(&ns->ns); kmem_cache_free(user_ns_cachep, ns); dec_user_namespaces(ucounts); ns = parent; } while (atomic_dec_and_test(&parent->count)); } void __put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) { schedule_work(&ns->work); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_user_ns); static u32 map_id_range_down(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id, u32 count) { unsigned idx, extents; u32 first, last, id2; id2 = id + count - 1; /* Find the matching extent */ extents = map->nr_extents; smp_rmb(); for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) { first = map->extent[idx].first; last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1; if (id >= first && id <= last && (id2 >= first && id2 <= last)) break; } /* Map the id or note failure */ if (idx < extents) id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].lower_first; else id = (u32) -1; return id; } static u32 map_id_down(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id) { unsigned idx, extents; u32 first, last; /* Find the matching extent */ extents = map->nr_extents; smp_rmb(); for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) { first = map->extent[idx].first; last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1; if (id >= first && id <= last) break; } /* Map the id or note failure */ if (idx < extents) id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].lower_first; else id = (u32) -1; return id; } static u32 map_id_up(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id) { unsigned idx, extents; u32 first, last; /* Find the matching extent */ extents = map->nr_extents; smp_rmb(); for (idx = 0; idx < extents; idx++) { first = map->extent[idx].lower_first; last = first + map->extent[idx].count - 1; if (id >= first && id <= last) break; } /* Map the id or note failure */ if (idx < extents) id = (id - first) + map->extent[idx].first; else id = (u32) -1; return id; } /** * make_kuid - Map a user-namespace uid pair into a kuid. * @ns: User namespace that the uid is in * @uid: User identifier * * Maps a user-namespace uid pair into a kernel internal kuid, * and returns that kuid. * * When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace uid * pair INVALID_UID is returned. Callers are expected to test * for and handle INVALID_UID being returned. INVALID_UID * may be tested for using uid_valid(). */ kuid_t make_kuid(struct user_namespace *ns, uid_t uid) { /* Map the uid to a global kernel uid */ return KUIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->uid_map, uid)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_kuid); /** * from_kuid - Create a uid from a kuid user-namespace pair. * @targ: The user namespace we want a uid in. * @kuid: The kernel internal uid to start with. * * Map @kuid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and * return the resulting uid. * * There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace. * * If @kuid has no mapping in @targ (uid_t)-1 is returned. */ uid_t from_kuid(struct user_namespace *targ, kuid_t kuid) { /* Map the uid from a global kernel uid */ return map_id_up(&targ->uid_map, __kuid_val(kuid)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kuid); /** * from_kuid_munged - Create a uid from a kuid user-namespace pair. * @targ: The user namespace we want a uid in. * @kuid: The kernel internal uid to start with. * * Map @kuid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and * return the resulting uid. * * There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace. * * Unlike from_kuid from_kuid_munged never fails and always * returns a valid uid. This makes from_kuid_munged appropriate * for use in syscalls like stat and getuid where failing the * system call and failing to provide a valid uid are not an * options. * * If @kuid has no mapping in @targ overflowuid is returned. */ uid_t from_kuid_munged(struct user_namespace *targ, kuid_t kuid) { uid_t uid; uid = from_kuid(targ, kuid); if (uid == (uid_t) -1) uid = overflowuid; return uid; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kuid_munged); /** * make_kgid - Map a user-namespace gid pair into a kgid. * @ns: User namespace that the gid is in * @gid: group identifier * * Maps a user-namespace gid pair into a kernel internal kgid, * and returns that kgid. * * When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace gid * pair INVALID_GID is returned. Callers are expected to test * for and handle INVALID_GID being returned. INVALID_GID may be * tested for using gid_valid(). */ kgid_t make_kgid(struct user_namespace *ns, gid_t gid) { /* Map the gid to a global kernel gid */ return KGIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->gid_map, gid)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_kgid); /** * from_kgid - Create a gid from a kgid user-namespace pair. * @targ: The user namespace we want a gid in. * @kgid: The kernel internal gid to start with. * * Map @kgid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and * return the resulting gid. * * There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace. * * If @kgid has no mapping in @targ (gid_t)-1 is returned. */ gid_t from_kgid(struct user_namespace *targ, kgid_t kgid) { /* Map the gid from a global kernel gid */ return map_id_up(&targ->gid_map, __kgid_val(kgid)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kgid); /** * from_kgid_munged - Create a gid from a kgid user-namespace pair. * @targ: The user namespace we want a gid in. * @kgid: The kernel internal gid to start with. * * Map @kgid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and * return the resulting gid. * * There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace. * * Unlike from_kgid from_kgid_munged never fails and always * returns a valid gid. This makes from_kgid_munged appropriate * for use in syscalls like stat and getgid where failing the * system call and failing to provide a valid gid are not options. * * If @kgid has no mapping in @targ overflowgid is returned. */ gid_t from_kgid_munged(struct user_namespace *targ, kgid_t kgid) { gid_t gid; gid = from_kgid(targ, kgid); if (gid == (gid_t) -1) gid = overflowgid; return gid; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kgid_munged); /** * make_kprojid - Map a user-namespace projid pair into a kprojid. * @ns: User namespace that the projid is in * @projid: Project identifier * * Maps a user-namespace uid pair into a kernel internal kuid, * and returns that kuid. * * When there is no mapping defined for the user-namespace projid * pair INVALID_PROJID is returned. Callers are expected to test * for and handle handle INVALID_PROJID being returned. INVALID_PROJID * may be tested for using projid_valid(). */ kprojid_t make_kprojid(struct user_namespace *ns, projid_t projid) { /* Map the uid to a global kernel uid */ return KPROJIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->projid_map, projid)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(make_kprojid); /** * from_kprojid - Create a projid from a kprojid user-namespace pair. * @targ: The user namespace we want a projid in. * @kprojid: The kernel internal project identifier to start with. * * Map @kprojid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and * return the resulting projid. * * There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace. * * If @kprojid has no mapping in @targ (projid_t)-1 is returned. */ projid_t from_kprojid(struct user_namespace *targ, kprojid_t kprojid) { /* Map the uid from a global kernel uid */ return map_id_up(&targ->projid_map, __kprojid_val(kprojid)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kprojid); /** * from_kprojid_munged - Create a projiid from a kprojid user-namespace pair. * @targ: The user namespace we want a projid in. * @kprojid: The kernel internal projid to start with. * * Map @kprojid into the user-namespace specified by @targ and * return the resulting projid. * * There is always a mapping into the initial user_namespace. * * Unlike from_kprojid from_kprojid_munged never fails and always * returns a valid projid. This makes from_kprojid_munged * appropriate for use in syscalls like stat and where * failing the system call and failing to provide a valid projid are * not an options. * * If @kprojid has no mapping in @targ OVERFLOW_PROJID is returned. */ projid_t from_kprojid_munged(struct user_namespace *targ, kprojid_t kprojid) { projid_t projid; projid = from_kprojid(targ, kprojid); if (projid == (projid_t) -1) projid = OVERFLOW_PROJID; return projid; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(from_kprojid_munged); static int uid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; struct uid_gid_extent *extent = v; struct user_namespace *lower_ns; uid_t lower; lower_ns = seq_user_ns(seq); if ((lower_ns == ns) && lower_ns->parent) lower_ns = lower_ns->parent; lower = from_kuid(lower_ns, KUIDT_INIT(extent->lower_first)); seq_printf(seq, "%10u %10u %10u\n", extent->first, lower, extent->count); return 0; } static int gid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; struct uid_gid_extent *extent = v; struct user_namespace *lower_ns; gid_t lower; lower_ns = seq_user_ns(seq); if ((lower_ns == ns) && lower_ns->parent) lower_ns = lower_ns->parent; lower = from_kgid(lower_ns, KGIDT_INIT(extent->lower_first)); seq_printf(seq, "%10u %10u %10u\n", extent->first, lower, extent->count); return 0; } static int projid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; struct uid_gid_extent *extent = v; struct user_namespace *lower_ns; projid_t lower; lower_ns = seq_user_ns(seq); if ((lower_ns == ns) && lower_ns->parent) lower_ns = lower_ns->parent; lower = from_kprojid(lower_ns, KPROJIDT_INIT(extent->lower_first)); seq_printf(seq, "%10u %10u %10u\n", extent->first, lower, extent->count); return 0; } static void *m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos, struct uid_gid_map *map) { struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL; loff_t pos = *ppos; if (pos < map->nr_extents) extent = &map->extent[pos]; return extent; } static void *uid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos) { struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; return m_start(seq, ppos, &ns->uid_map); } static void *gid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos) { struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; return m_start(seq, ppos, &ns->gid_map); } static void *projid_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos) { struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; return m_start(seq, ppos, &ns->projid_map); } static void *m_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) { (*pos)++; return seq->op->start(seq, pos); } static void m_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { return; } const struct seq_operations proc_uid_seq_operations = { .start = uid_m_start, .stop = m_stop, .next = m_next, .show = uid_m_show, }; const struct seq_operations proc_gid_seq_operations = { .start = gid_m_start, .stop = m_stop, .next = m_next, .show = gid_m_show, }; const struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations = { .start = projid_m_start, .stop = m_stop, .next = m_next, .show = projid_m_show, }; static bool mappings_overlap(struct uid_gid_map *new_map, struct uid_gid_extent *extent) { u32 upper_first, lower_first, upper_last, lower_last; unsigned idx; upper_first = extent->first; lower_first = extent->lower_first; upper_last = upper_first + extent->count - 1; lower_last = lower_first + extent->count - 1; for (idx = 0; idx < new_map->nr_extents; idx++) { u32 prev_upper_first, prev_lower_first; u32 prev_upper_last, prev_lower_last; struct uid_gid_extent *prev; prev = &new_map->extent[idx]; prev_upper_first = prev->first; prev_lower_first = prev->lower_first; prev_upper_last = prev_upper_first + prev->count - 1; prev_lower_last = prev_lower_first + prev->count - 1; /* Does the upper range intersect a previous extent? */ if ((prev_upper_first <= upper_last) && (prev_upper_last >= upper_first)) return true; /* Does the lower range intersect a previous extent? */ if ((prev_lower_first <= lower_last) && (prev_lower_last >= lower_first)) return true; } return false; } static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int cap_setid, struct uid_gid_map *map, struct uid_gid_map *parent_map) { struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; struct uid_gid_map new_map; unsigned idx; struct uid_gid_extent *extent = NULL; char *kbuf = NULL, *pos, *next_line; ssize_t ret = -EINVAL; /* * The userns_state_mutex serializes all writes to any given map. * * Any map is only ever written once. * * An id map fits within 1 cache line on most architectures. * * On read nothing needs to be done unless you are on an * architecture with a crazy cache coherency model like alpha. * * There is a one time data dependency between reading the * count of the extents and the values of the extents. The * desired behavior is to see the values of the extents that * were written before the count of the extents. * * To achieve this smp_wmb() is used on guarantee the write * order and smp_rmb() is guaranteed that we don't have crazy * architectures returning stale data. */ mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); ret = -EPERM; /* Only allow one successful write to the map */ if (map->nr_extents != 0) goto out; /* * Adjusting namespace settings requires capabilities on the target. */ if (cap_valid(cap_setid) && !file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) goto out; /* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */ ret = -EINVAL; if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE)) goto out; /* Slurp in the user data */ kbuf = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); if (IS_ERR(kbuf)) { ret = PTR_ERR(kbuf); kbuf = NULL; goto out; } /* Parse the user data */ ret = -EINVAL; pos = kbuf; new_map.nr_extents = 0; for (; pos; pos = next_line) { extent = &new_map.extent[new_map.nr_extents]; /* Find the end of line and ensure I don't look past it */ next_line = strchr(pos, '\n'); if (next_line) { *next_line = '\0'; next_line++; if (*next_line == '\0') next_line = NULL; } pos = skip_spaces(pos); extent->first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10); if (!isspace(*pos)) goto out; pos = skip_spaces(pos); extent->lower_first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10); if (!isspace(*pos)) goto out; pos = skip_spaces(pos); extent->count = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10); if (*pos && !isspace(*pos)) goto out; /* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */ pos = skip_spaces(pos); if (*pos != '\0') goto out; /* Verify we have been given valid starting values */ if ((extent->first == (u32) -1) || (extent->lower_first == (u32) -1)) goto out; /* Verify count is not zero and does not cause the * extent to wrap */ if ((extent->first + extent->count) <= extent->first) goto out; if ((extent->lower_first + extent->count) <= extent->lower_first) goto out; /* Do the ranges in extent overlap any previous extents? */ if (mappings_overlap(&new_map, extent)) goto out; new_map.nr_extents++; /* Fail if the file contains too many extents */ if ((new_map.nr_extents == UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS) && (next_line != NULL)) goto out; } /* Be very certaint the new map actually exists */ if (new_map.nr_extents == 0) goto out; ret = -EPERM; /* Validate the user is allowed to use user id's mapped to. */ if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, ns, cap_setid, &new_map)) goto out; /* Map the lower ids from the parent user namespace to the * kernel global id space. */ for (idx = 0; idx < new_map.nr_extents; idx++) { u32 lower_first; extent = &new_map.extent[idx]; lower_first = map_id_range_down(parent_map, extent->lower_first, extent->count); /* Fail if we can not map the specified extent to * the kernel global id space. */ if (lower_first == (u32) -1) goto out; extent->lower_first = lower_first; } /* Install the map */ memcpy(map->extent, new_map.extent, new_map.nr_extents*sizeof(new_map.extent[0])); smp_wmb(); map->nr_extents = new_map.nr_extents; *ppos = count; ret = count; out: mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); kfree(kbuf); return ret; } ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos) { struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; struct user_namespace *seq_ns = seq_user_ns(seq); if (!ns->parent) return -EPERM; if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent)) return -EPERM; return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, CAP_SETUID, &ns->uid_map, &ns->parent->uid_map); } ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos) { struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; struct user_namespace *seq_ns = seq_user_ns(seq); if (!ns->parent) return -EPERM; if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent)) return -EPERM; return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, CAP_SETGID, &ns->gid_map, &ns->parent->gid_map); } ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos) { struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; struct user_namespace *seq_ns = seq_user_ns(seq); if (!ns->parent) return -EPERM; if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent)) return -EPERM; /* Anyone can set any valid project id no capability needed */ return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, -1, &ns->projid_map, &ns->parent->projid_map); } static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid, struct uid_gid_map *new_map) { const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred; /* Don't allow mappings that would allow anything that wouldn't * be allowed without the establishment of unprivileged mappings. */ if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) { u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first; if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) { kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id); if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid)) return true; } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) { kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id); if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) && gid_eq(gid, cred->egid)) return true; } } /* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */ if (!cap_valid(cap_setid)) return true; /* Allow the specified ids if we have the appropriate capability * (CAP_SETUID or CAP_SETGID) over the parent user namespace. * And the opener of the id file also had the approprpiate capability. */ if (ns_capable(ns->parent, cap_setid) && file_ns_capable(file, ns->parent, cap_setid)) return true; return false; } int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; unsigned long userns_flags = ACCESS_ONCE(ns->flags); seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", (userns_flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) ? "allow" : "deny"); return 0; } ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data; struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private; char kbuf[8], *pos; bool setgroups_allowed; ssize_t ret; /* Only allow a very narrow range of strings to be written */ ret = -EINVAL; if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= sizeof(kbuf))) goto out; /* What was written? */ ret = -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count)) goto out; kbuf[count] = '\0'; pos = kbuf; /* What is being requested? */ ret = -EINVAL; if (strncmp(pos, "allow", 5) == 0) { pos += 5; setgroups_allowed = true; } else if (strncmp(pos, "deny", 4) == 0) { pos += 4; setgroups_allowed = false; } else goto out; /* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */ pos = skip_spaces(pos); if (*pos != '\0') goto out; ret = -EPERM; mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); if (setgroups_allowed) { /* Enabling setgroups after setgroups has been disabled * is not allowed. */ if (!(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED)) goto out_unlock; } else { /* Permanently disabling setgroups after setgroups has * been enabled by writing the gid_map is not allowed. */ if (ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0) goto out_unlock; ns->flags &= ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED; } mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); /* Report a successful write */ *ppos = count; ret = count; out: return ret; out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); goto out; } bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns) { bool allowed; mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); /* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in * the user namespace has been established. */ allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0; /* Is setgroups allowed? */ allowed = allowed && (ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED); mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); return allowed; } /* * Returns true if @ns is the same namespace as or a descendant of * @target_ns. */ bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns) { struct user_namespace *ns; for (ns = current_user_ns(); ns; ns = ns->parent) { if (ns == target_ns) return true; } return false; } static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns) { return container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns); } static struct ns_common *userns_get(struct task_struct *task) { struct user_namespace *user_ns; rcu_read_lock(); user_ns = get_user_ns(__task_cred(task)->user_ns); rcu_read_unlock(); return user_ns ? &user_ns->ns : NULL; } static void userns_put(struct ns_common *ns) { put_user_ns(to_user_ns(ns)); } static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *ns) { struct user_namespace *user_ns = to_user_ns(ns); struct cred *cred; /* Don't allow gaining capabilities by reentering * the same user namespace. */ if (user_ns == current_user_ns()) return -EINVAL; /* Tasks that share a thread group must share a user namespace */ if (!thread_group_empty(current)) return -EINVAL; if (current->fs->users != 1) return -EINVAL; if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; cred = prepare_creds(); if (!cred) return -ENOMEM; put_user_ns(cred->user_ns); set_cred_user_ns(cred, get_user_ns(user_ns)); return commit_creds(cred); } struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns) { struct user_namespace *my_user_ns = current_user_ns(); struct user_namespace *owner, *p; /* See if the owner is in the current user namespace */ owner = p = ns->ops->owner(ns); for (;;) { if (!p) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); if (p == my_user_ns) break; p = p->parent; } return &get_user_ns(owner)->ns; } static struct user_namespace *userns_owner(struct ns_common *ns) { return to_user_ns(ns)->parent; } const struct proc_ns_operations userns_operations = { .name = "user", .type = CLONE_NEWUSER, .get = userns_get, .put = userns_put, .install = userns_install, .owner = userns_owner, .get_parent = ns_get_owner, }; static __init int user_namespaces_init(void) { user_ns_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(user_namespace, SLAB_PANIC); return 0; } subsys_initcall(user_namespaces_init);