Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (43 commits)
  TOMOYO: Fix wrong domainname validation.
  SELINUX: add /sys/fs/selinux mount point to put selinuxfs
  CRED: Fix load_flat_shared_library() to initialise bprm correctly
  SELinux: introduce path_has_perm
  flex_array: allow 0 length elements
  flex_arrays: allow zero length flex arrays
  flex_array: flex_array_prealloc takes a number of elements, not an end
  SELinux: pass last path component in may_create
  SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable
  SELinux: generic hashtab entry counter
  SELinux: calculate and print hashtab stats with a generic function
  SELinux: skip filename trans rules if ttype does not match parent dir
  SELinux: rename filename_compute_type argument to *type instead of *con
  SELinux: fix comment to state filename_compute_type takes an objname not a qstr
  SMACK: smack_file_lock can use the struct path
  LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH
  LSM: split LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS into _PATH and _INODE
  SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe
  SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modules
  SELinux: security_read_policy should take a size_t not ssize_t
  ...

39 files changed, 603 insertions, 284 deletions

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index b64825ddaf32..98c324b07a16 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -5592,10 +5592,11 @@ M:	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
 M:	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
 L:	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov (subscribers-only, general discussion)
 W:	http://selinuxproject.org
-T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6.git
+T:	git git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux.git
 S:	Supported
 F:	include/linux/selinux*
 F:	security/selinux/
+F:	scripts/selinux/
 
 APPARMOR SECURITY MODULE
 M:	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_flat.c b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
index 397d3057d336..1bffbe0ed778 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_flat.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_flat.c
@@ -820,6 +820,8 @@ static int load_flat_shared_library(int id, struct lib_info *libs)
 	int res;
 	char buf[16];
 
+	memset(&bprm, 0, sizeof(bprm));
+
 	/* Create the file name */
 	sprintf(buf, "/lib/lib%d.so", id);
 
@@ -835,6 +837,12 @@ static int load_flat_shared_library(int id, struct lib_info *libs)
 	if (!bprm.cred)
 		goto out;
 
+	/* We don't really care about recalculating credentials at this point
+	 * as we're past the point of no return and are dealing with shared
+	 * libraries.
+	 */
+	bprm.cred_prepared = 1;
+
 	res = prepare_binprm(&bprm);
 
 	if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(res))
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 4554db0cde86..c42112350003 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -417,7 +417,6 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
 
 # define CAP_EMPTY_SET    ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
 # define CAP_FULL_SET     ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
-# define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }})
 # define CAP_FS_SET       ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
 				    | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
 				    CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
@@ -427,11 +426,7 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
 
 #endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */
 
-#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET    CAP_EMPTY_SET
-
 # define cap_clear(c)         do { (c) = __cap_empty_set; } while (0)
-# define cap_set_full(c)      do { (c) = __cap_full_set; } while (0)
-# define cap_set_init_eff(c)  do { (c) = __cap_init_eff_set; } while (0)
 
 #define cap_raise(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] |= CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
 #define cap_lower(c, flag)  ((c).cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(flag)] &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
index 689496bb6654..bafc58c00fc3 100644
--- a/include/linux/init_task.h
+++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
@@ -83,13 +83,6 @@ extern struct group_info init_groups;
 #define INIT_IDS
 #endif
 
-/*
- * Because of the reduced scope of CAP_SETPCAP when filesystem
- * capabilities are in effect, it is safe to allow CAP_SETPCAP to
- * be available in the default configuration.
- */
-# define CAP_INIT_BSET  CAP_FULL_SET
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_RCU_BOOST
 #define INIT_TASK_RCU_BOOST()						\
 	.rcu_boost_mutex = NULL,
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index b2bb01719561..ef19b99aff98 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -276,6 +276,19 @@ static inline key_serial_t key_serial(struct key *key)
 	return key ? key->serial : 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * key_is_instantiated - Determine if a key has been positively instantiated
+ * @key: The key to check.
+ *
+ * Return true if the specified key has been positively instantiated, false
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool key_is_instantiated(const struct key *key)
+{
+	return test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) &&
+		!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
+}
+
 #define rcu_dereference_key(KEY)					\
 	(rcu_dereference_protected((KEY)->payload.rcudata,		\
 				   rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)(KEY))->sem)))
diff --git a/include/linux/kmod.h b/include/linux/kmod.h
index 310231823852..d4a5c84c503d 100644
--- a/include/linux/kmod.h
+++ b/include/linux/kmod.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
 
 #define KMOD_PATH_LEN 256
 
@@ -109,6 +110,8 @@ call_usermodehelper(char *path, char **argv, char **envp, enum umh_wait wait)
 				       NULL, NULL, NULL);
 }
 
+extern struct ctl_table usermodehelper_table[];
+
 extern void usermodehelper_init(void);
 
 extern int usermodehelper_disable(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index 112a55033352..88e78dedc2e8 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 /* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */
 struct common_audit_data {
 	char type;
-#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS	1
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH	1
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET	2
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP	3
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC	4
@@ -35,12 +35,13 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY	6
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE	7
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD	8
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE	9
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY	10
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	union 	{
-		struct {
-			struct path path;
-			struct inode *inode;
-		} fs;
+		struct path path;
+		struct dentry *dentry;
+		struct inode *inode;
 		struct {
 			int netif;
 			struct sock *sk;
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 32a80e08ff4b..283c529f8b1c 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -22,12 +22,8 @@
  */
 
 const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
-const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set = CAP_FULL_SET;
-const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set);
 
 int file_caps_enabled = 1;
 
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 8093c16b84b1..e12c8af793f8 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -49,10 +49,10 @@ struct cred init_cred = {
 	.magic			= CRED_MAGIC,
 #endif
 	.securebits		= SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
-	.cap_inheritable	= CAP_INIT_INH_SET,
+	.cap_inheritable	= CAP_EMPTY_SET,
 	.cap_permitted		= CAP_FULL_SET,
-	.cap_effective		= CAP_INIT_EFF_SET,
-	.cap_bset		= CAP_INIT_BSET,
+	.cap_effective		= CAP_FULL_SET,
+	.cap_bset		= CAP_FULL_SET,
 	.user			= INIT_USER,
 	.user_ns		= &init_user_ns,
 	.group_info		= &init_groups,
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index 5ae0ff38425f..ad6a81c58b44 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/kmod.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/completion.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
@@ -43,6 +44,13 @@ extern int max_threads;
 
 static struct workqueue_struct *khelper_wq;
 
+#define CAP_BSET	(void *)1
+#define CAP_PI		(void *)2
+
+static kernel_cap_t usermodehelper_bset = CAP_FULL_SET;
+static kernel_cap_t usermodehelper_inheritable = CAP_FULL_SET;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(umh_sysctl_lock);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
 
 /*
@@ -132,6 +140,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__request_module);
 static int ____call_usermodehelper(void *data)
 {
 	struct subprocess_info *sub_info = data;
+	struct cred *new;
 	int retval;
 
 	spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
@@ -153,6 +162,19 @@ static int ____call_usermodehelper(void *data)
 			goto fail;
 	}
 
+	retval = -ENOMEM;
+	new = prepare_kernel_cred(current);
+	if (!new)
+		goto fail;
+
+	spin_lock(&umh_sysctl_lock);
+	new->cap_bset = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_bset, new->cap_bset);
+	new->cap_inheritable = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_inheritable,
+					     new->cap_inheritable);
+	spin_unlock(&umh_sysctl_lock);
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+
 	retval = kernel_execve(sub_info->path,
 			       (const char *const *)sub_info->argv,
 			       (const char *const *)sub_info->envp);
@@ -420,6 +442,84 @@ unlock:
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_usermodehelper_exec);
 
+static int proc_cap_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+			 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct ctl_table t;
+	unsigned long cap_array[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
+	kernel_cap_t new_cap;
+	int err, i;
+
+	if (write && (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP) ||
+		      !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/*
+	 * convert from the global kernel_cap_t to the ulong array to print to
+	 * userspace if this is a read.
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&umh_sysctl_lock);
+	for (i = 0; i < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; i++)  {
+		if (table->data == CAP_BSET)
+			cap_array[i] = usermodehelper_bset.cap[i];
+		else if (table->data == CAP_PI)
+			cap_array[i] = usermodehelper_inheritable.cap[i];
+		else
+			BUG();
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&umh_sysctl_lock);
+
+	t = *table;
+	t.data = &cap_array;
+
+	/*
+	 * actually read or write and array of ulongs from userspace.  Remember
+	 * these are least significant 32 bits first
+	 */
+	err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
+	/*
+	 * convert from the sysctl array of ulongs to the kernel_cap_t
+	 * internal representation
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; i++)
+		new_cap.cap[i] = cap_array[i];
+
+	/*
+	 * Drop everything not in the new_cap (but don't add things)
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&umh_sysctl_lock);
+	if (write) {
+		if (table->data == CAP_BSET)
+			usermodehelper_bset = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_bset, new_cap);
+		if (table->data == CAP_PI)
+			usermodehelper_inheritable = cap_intersect(usermodehelper_inheritable, new_cap);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&umh_sysctl_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct ctl_table usermodehelper_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname	= "bset",
+		.data		= CAP_BSET,
+		.maxlen		= _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S * sizeof(unsigned long),
+		.mode		= 0600,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_cap_handler,
+	},
+	{
+		.procname	= "inheritable",
+		.data		= CAP_PI,
+		.maxlen		= _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S * sizeof(unsigned long),
+		.mode		= 0600,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_cap_handler,
+	},
+	{ }
+};
+
 void __init usermodehelper_init(void)
 {
 	khelper_wq = create_singlethread_workqueue("khelper");
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 3dd0c46fa3bb..4bffd62c2f13 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
 #include <linux/oom.h>
+#include <linux/kmod.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -616,6 +617,11 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.child		= random_table,
 	},
 	{
+		.procname	= "usermodehelper",
+		.mode		= 0555,
+		.child		= usermodehelper_table,
+	},
+	{
 		.procname	= "overflowuid",
 		.data		= &overflowuid,
 		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
diff --git a/lib/flex_array.c b/lib/flex_array.c
index 854b57bd7d9d..cab7621f98aa 100644
--- a/lib/flex_array.c
+++ b/lib/flex_array.c
@@ -88,8 +88,11 @@ struct flex_array *flex_array_alloc(int element_size, unsigned int total,
 					gfp_t flags)
 {
 	struct flex_array *ret;
-	int max_size = FLEX_ARRAY_NR_BASE_PTRS *
-				FLEX_ARRAY_ELEMENTS_PER_PART(element_size);
+	int max_size = 0;
+
+	if (element_size)
+		max_size = FLEX_ARRAY_NR_BASE_PTRS *
+			   FLEX_ARRAY_ELEMENTS_PER_PART(element_size);
 
 	/* max_size will end up 0 if element_size > PAGE_SIZE */
 	if (total > max_size)
@@ -183,15 +186,18 @@ __fa_get_part(struct flex_array *fa, int part_nr, gfp_t flags)
 int flex_array_put(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr, void *src,
 			gfp_t flags)
 {
-	int part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr);
+	int part_nr;
 	struct flex_array_part *part;
 	void *dst;
 
 	if (element_nr >= fa->total_nr_elements)
 		return -ENOSPC;
+	if (!fa->element_size)
+		return 0;
 	if (elements_fit_in_base(fa))
 		part = (struct flex_array_part *)&fa->parts[0];
 	else {
+		part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr);
 		part = __fa_get_part(fa, part_nr, flags);
 		if (!part)
 			return -ENOMEM;
@@ -211,15 +217,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(flex_array_put);
  */
 int flex_array_clear(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr)
 {
-	int part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr);
+	int part_nr;
 	struct flex_array_part *part;
 	void *dst;
 
 	if (element_nr >= fa->total_nr_elements)
 		return -ENOSPC;
+	if (!fa->element_size)
+		return 0;
 	if (elements_fit_in_base(fa))
 		part = (struct flex_array_part *)&fa->parts[0];
 	else {
+		part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr);
 		part = fa->parts[part_nr];
 		if (!part)
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -264,6 +273,8 @@ int flex_array_prealloc(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int start,
 
 	if (end >= fa->total_nr_elements)
 		return -ENOSPC;
+	if (!fa->element_size)
+		return 0;
 	if (elements_fit_in_base(fa))
 		return 0;
 	start_part = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, start);
@@ -291,14 +302,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(flex_array_prealloc);
  */
 void *flex_array_get(struct flex_array *fa, unsigned int element_nr)
 {
-	int part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr);
+	int part_nr;
 	struct flex_array_part *part;
 
+	if (!fa->element_size)
+		return NULL;
 	if (element_nr >= fa->total_nr_elements)
 		return NULL;
 	if (elements_fit_in_base(fa))
 		part = (struct flex_array_part *)&fa->parts[0];
 	else {
+		part_nr = fa_element_to_part_nr(fa, element_nr);
 		part = fa->parts[part_nr];
 		if (!part)
 			return NULL;
@@ -353,7 +367,7 @@ int flex_array_shrink(struct flex_array *fa)
 	int part_nr;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (!fa->total_nr_elements)
+	if (!fa->total_nr_elements || !fa->element_size)
 		return 0;
 	if (elements_fit_in_base(fa))
 		return ret;
diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
index cfa7a5e1c5c9..fa000d26dc60 100644
--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
+++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
@@ -212,10 +212,12 @@ static void dns_resolver_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
 	int err = key->type_data.x[0];
 
 	seq_puts(m, key->description);
-	if (err)
-		seq_printf(m, ": %d", err);
-	else
-		seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
+	if (key_is_instantiated(key)) {
+		if (err)
+			seq_printf(m, ": %d", err);
+		else
+			seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
+	}
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 95accd442d55..e0f08b52e4ab 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ config INTEL_TXT
 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
 	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
 	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default 32768 if ARM
 	default 65536
 	help
 	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f20e984ccfb4..a93b3b733079 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -529,15 +529,10 @@ skip:
 	new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
 	new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
 
-	/* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set in the initial
-	 * task.  Thus we skip the usual capability rules
-	 */
-	if (!is_global_init(current)) {
-		if (effective)
-			new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
-		else
-			cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
-	}
+	if (effective)
+		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
+	else
+		cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
 	bprm->cap_effective = effective;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 07a025f81902..f375152a2500 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -109,11 +109,13 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 				    const struct cred *cred,
 				    struct key_type *type,
 				    const void *description,
-				    key_match_func_t match);
+				    key_match_func_t match,
+				    bool no_state_check);
 
 extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 					    const void *description,
 					    key_match_func_t match,
+					    bool no_state_check,
 					    const struct cred *cred);
 extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 					 const void *description,
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 427fddcaeb19..eca51918c951 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -206,8 +206,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
 		goto error5;
 	}
 
+	/* wait for the key to finish being constructed */
+	ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error6;
+
 	ret = key->serial;
 
+error6:
  	key_put(key);
 error5:
 	key_type_put(ktype);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index cdd2f3f88c88..a06ffab38568 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -176,13 +176,15 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
 	else
 		seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
-	if (klist)
-		seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
-	else
-		seq_puts(m, ": empty");
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+	if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
+		if (klist)
+			seq_printf(m, ": %u/%u", klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
+		else
+			seq_puts(m, ": empty");
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -271,6 +273,7 @@ struct key *keyring_alloc(const char *description, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
  * @type: The type of key to search for.
  * @description: Parameter for @match.
  * @match: Function to rule on whether or not a key is the one required.
+ * @no_state_check: Don't check if a matching key is bad
  *
  * Search the supplied keyring tree for a key that matches the criteria given.
  * The root keyring and any linked keyrings must grant Search permission to the
@@ -303,7 +306,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 			     const struct cred *cred,
 			     struct key_type *type,
 			     const void *description,
-			     key_match_func_t match)
+			     key_match_func_t match,
+			     bool no_state_check)
 {
 	struct {
 		struct keyring_list *keylist;
@@ -345,6 +349,8 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 	kflags = keyring->flags;
 	if (keyring->type == type && match(keyring, description)) {
 		key = keyring;
+		if (no_state_check)
+			goto found;
 
 		/* check it isn't negative and hasn't expired or been
 		 * revoked */
@@ -384,11 +390,13 @@ descend:
 			continue;
 
 		/* skip revoked keys and expired keys */
-		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
-			continue;
+		if (!no_state_check) {
+			if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))
+				continue;
 
-		if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
-			continue;
+			if (key->expiry && now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
+				continue;
+		}
 
 		/* keys that don't match */
 		if (!match(key, description))
@@ -399,6 +407,9 @@ descend:
 					cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
 			continue;
 
+		if (no_state_check)
+			goto found;
+
 		/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
 		if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
 			err = key->type_data.reject_error;
@@ -478,7 +489,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
 
 	return keyring_search_aux(keyring, current->cred,
-				  type, description, type->match);
+				  type, description, type->match, false);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 525cf8a29cdd..49bbc97943ad 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
 		skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
 						      lookup_user_key_possessed,
-						      cred);
+						      true, cred);
 		if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
 			key_ref_put(skey_ref);
 			key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 930634e45149..6c0480db8885 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
 key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 				     const void *description,
 				     key_match_func_t match,
+				     bool no_state_check,
 				     const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
@@ -350,7 +351,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 	if (cred->thread_keyring) {
 		key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
 			make_key_ref(cred->thread_keyring, 1),
-			cred, type, description, match);
+			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 			goto found;
 
@@ -371,7 +372,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 	if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
 		key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
 			make_key_ref(cred->tgcred->process_keyring, 1),
-			cred, type, description, match);
+			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 			goto found;
 
@@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 			make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(
 					     cred->tgcred->session_keyring),
 				     1),
-			cred, type, description, match);
+			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 
 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
@@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 	else if (cred->user->session_keyring) {
 		key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
 			make_key_ref(cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
-			cred, type, description, match);
+			cred, type, description, match, no_state_check);
 		if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 			goto found;
 
@@ -459,7 +460,8 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type,
 
 	might_sleep();
 
-	key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match, cred);
+	key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match,
+					     false, cred);
 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
 		goto found;
 	err = key_ref;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index df3c0417ee40..b18a71745901 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -530,8 +530,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
 	       dest_keyring, flags);
 
 	/* search all the process keyrings for a key */
-	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match,
-					  cred);
+	key_ref = search_process_keyrings(type, description, type->match, cred);
 
 	if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
 		key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 68164031a74e..f6337c9082eb 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
 
 	seq_puts(m, "key:");
 	seq_puts(m, key->description);
-	seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
+	if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+		seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index f66baf44f32d..5b366d7af3c4 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);
 void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
 {
 	seq_puts(m, key->description);
-
-	seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
+	if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+		seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
 }
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe);
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 908aa712816a..893af8a2fa1e 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -210,7 +210,6 @@ static inline void print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
 static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 				   struct common_audit_data *a)
 {
-	struct inode *inode = NULL;
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 
 	if (a->tsk)
@@ -229,33 +228,47 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP:
 		audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d ", a->u.cap);
 		break;
-	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
-		if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) {
-			struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry;
-			if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) {
-				audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &a->u.fs.path);
-			} else {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
-						 dentry->d_name.name);
-			}
-			inode = dentry->d_inode;
-		} else if (a->u.fs.inode) {
-			struct dentry *dentry;
-			inode = a->u.fs.inode;
-			dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
-			if (dentry) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-				audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
-						 dentry->d_name.name);
-				dput(dentry);
-			}
-		}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH: {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", &a->u.path);
+
+		inode = a->u.path.dentry->d_inode;
 		if (inode)
 			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
 					inode->i_sb->s_id,
 					inode->i_ino);
 		break;
+	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY: {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, a->u.dentry->d_name.name);
+
+		inode = a->u.dentry->d_inode;
+		if (inode)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
+					inode->i_sb->s_id,
+					inode->i_ino);
+		break;
+	}
+	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE: {
+		struct dentry *dentry;
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		inode = a->u.inode;
+		dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+		if (dentry) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+			audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+					 dentry->d_name.name);
+			dput(dentry);
+		}
+		audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu", inode->i_sb->s_id,
+				 inode->i_ino);
+		break;
+	}
 	case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK:
 		tsk = a->u.tsk;
 		if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 3d2715fd35ea..fcb89cb0f223 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	 * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation
 	 * happened a little later.
 	 */
-	if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS) &&
+	if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE) &&
 	    (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU))
 		return -ECHILD;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8fb248843009..a0d38459d650 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -990,6 +990,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
 			continue;
 		default:
 			BUG();
+			return;
 		};
 		/* we need a comma before each option */
 		seq_putc(m, ',');
@@ -1443,6 +1444,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		printk(KERN_ERR
 		       "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
 		BUG();
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
@@ -1487,8 +1489,8 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	if (!adp) {
 		adp = &ad;
-		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-		ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
+		ad.u.inode = inode;
 	}
 
 	return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
@@ -1498,16 +1500,29 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
    pathname if needed. */
 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
-				  struct vfsmount *mnt,
 				  struct dentry *dentry,
 				  u32 av)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+   the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+   pathname if needed. */
+static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
+				struct path *path,
+				u32 av)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.u.path = *path;
 	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 }
 
@@ -1529,8 +1544,8 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	int rc;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
 
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
 		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
@@ -1568,8 +1583,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	sid = tsec->sid;
 	newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
@@ -1621,8 +1636,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 	dsec = dir->i_security;
 	isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
 	av = DIR__SEARCH;
 	av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
@@ -1667,9 +1682,9 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 	old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
 	new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
 
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
+	ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1685,7 +1700,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
+	ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
 	av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
 	if (new_dentry->d_inode)
 		av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
@@ -1895,7 +1910,7 @@ static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
 }
 
 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
@@ -1992,8 +2007,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
+	ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
 
 	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
 		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
@@ -2121,7 +2136,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 
 	/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
 
 	spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
 	for (;;) {
@@ -2469,8 +2484,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
 		return 0;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -2479,8 +2494,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
 	return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -2496,8 +2511,7 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
 		return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
 					   FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
 	else
-		return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
-				       FILE__MOUNTON);
+		return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
 }
 
 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
@@ -2630,14 +2644,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
@@ -2654,8 +2668,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flag
 	if (!mask)
 		return 0;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
+	ad.u.inode = inode;
 
 	if (from_access)
 		ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
@@ -2680,16 +2694,20 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 
 	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
 			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
-		return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+		return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct path path;
+
+	path.dentry = dentry;
+	path.mnt = mnt;
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+	return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
@@ -2710,7 +2728,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 
 	/* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
 	   ordinary setattr permission. */
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
@@ -2733,8 +2751,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
-	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
+	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
 			  FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
@@ -2797,14 +2815,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
-	return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 348eb00cb668..3ba4feba048a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -30,13 +30,14 @@
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE	23
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY	24
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS	25
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS	26
 
 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN   POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
 #else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX	POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS
 #endif
 
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
 int security_mls_enabled(void);
 
 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len);
-int security_read_policy(void **data, ssize_t *len);
+int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len);
 size_t security_policydb_len(void);
 
 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
@@ -111,8 +112,8 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-				 u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid);
 
 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index 65ebfe954f85..3618251d0fdb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family)
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
+		return NULL;
 	}
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list, list)
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 2d3373b2e256..77d44138864f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kobject.h>
 
 /* selinuxfs pseudo filesystem for exporting the security policy API.
    Based on the proc code and the fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c code. */
@@ -753,11 +754,13 @@ out:
 static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
 	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
+	char *namebuf = NULL, *objname = NULL;
 	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
 	u16 tclass;
 	ssize_t length;
 	char *newcon = NULL;
 	u32 len;
+	int nargs;
 
 	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE);
 	if (length)
@@ -773,9 +776,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (!tcon)
 		goto out;
 
+	length = -ENOMEM;
+	namebuf = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!namebuf)
+		goto out;
+
 	length = -EINVAL;
-	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
+	nargs = sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu %s", scon, tcon, &tclass, namebuf);
+	if (nargs < 3 || nargs > 4)
 		goto out;
+	if (nargs == 4)
+		objname = namebuf;
 
 	length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
 	if (length)
@@ -785,7 +796,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+					      objname, &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -804,6 +816,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	length = len;
 out:
 	kfree(newcon);
+	kfree(namebuf);
 	kfree(tcon);
 	kfree(scon);
 	return length;
@@ -1901,6 +1914,7 @@ static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = {
 };
 
 struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
+static struct kobject *selinuxfs_kobj;
 
 static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
 {
@@ -1908,9 +1922,16 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
 
 	if (!selinux_enabled)
 		return 0;
+
+	selinuxfs_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("selinux", fs_kobj);
+	if (!selinuxfs_kobj)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	err = register_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
-	if (err)
+	if (err) {
+		kobject_put(selinuxfs_kobj);
 		return err;
+	}
 
 	selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
 	if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
@@ -1927,6 +1948,7 @@ __initcall(init_sel_fs);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
 void exit_sel_fs(void)
 {
+	kobject_put(selinuxfs_kobj);
 	unregister_filesystem(&sel_fs_type);
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 7102457661d6..102e9ec1b77a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -128,6 +128,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
 		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
 		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
 	},
+	{
+		.version	= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS,
+		.sym_num	= SYM_NUM,
+		.ocon_num	= OCON_NUM,
+	},
 };
 
 static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
@@ -179,6 +184,43 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static u32 filenametr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
+{
+	const struct filename_trans *ft = k;
+	unsigned long hash;
+	unsigned int byte_num;
+	unsigned char focus;
+
+	hash = ft->stype ^ ft->ttype ^ ft->tclass;
+
+	byte_num = 0;
+	while ((focus = ft->name[byte_num++]))
+		hash = partial_name_hash(focus, hash);
+	return hash & (h->size - 1);
+}
+
+static int filenametr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+	const struct filename_trans *ft1 = k1;
+	const struct filename_trans *ft2 = k2;
+	int v;
+
+	v = ft1->stype - ft2->stype;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = ft1->ttype - ft2->ttype;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	v = ft1->tclass - ft2->tclass;
+	if (v)
+		return v;
+
+	return strcmp(ft1->name, ft2->name);
+
+}
+
 static u32 rangetr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
 {
 	const struct range_trans *key = k;
@@ -231,15 +273,22 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
+	p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp, (1 << 10));
+	if (!p->filename_trans)
+		goto out;
+
 	p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256);
 	if (!p->range_tr)
 		goto out;
 
+	ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
 	ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
 	ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
 
 	return 0;
 out:
+	hashtab_destroy(p->filename_trans);
+	hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
 	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
 		hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
 	return rc;
@@ -417,32 +466,26 @@ static int (*index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
 };
 
 #ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
-static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
+static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
 {
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
-		struct hashtab *h = s[i].table;
-		struct hashtab_info info;
+	struct hashtab_info info;
 
-		hashtab_stat(h, &info);
-		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
-		       "longest chain length %d\n", symtab_name[i], h->nel,
-		       info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
-	}
+	hashtab_stat(h, &info);
+	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+	       "longest chain length %d\n", hash_name, h->nel,
+	       info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
 }
 
-static void rangetr_hash_eval(struct hashtab *h)
+static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
 {
-	struct hashtab_info info;
+	int i;
 
-	hashtab_stat(h, &info);
-	printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: rangetr:  %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
-	       "longest chain length %d\n", h->nel,
-	       info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
+	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+		hash_eval(s[i].table, symtab_name[i]);
 }
+
 #else
-static inline void rangetr_hash_eval(struct hashtab *h)
+static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, char *hash_name)
 {
 }
 #endif
@@ -675,6 +718,16 @@ static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
 	cat_destroy,
 };
 
+static int filenametr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+	struct filename_trans *ft = key;
+	kfree(ft->name);
+	kfree(key);
+	kfree(datum);
+	cond_resched();
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
 {
 	struct mls_range *rt = datum;
@@ -709,7 +762,6 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	int i;
 	struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
 	struct role_trans *tr, *ltr = NULL;
-	struct filename_trans *ft, *nft;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
 		cond_resched();
@@ -773,6 +825,9 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 	}
 	kfree(lra);
 
+	hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, filenametr_destroy, NULL);
+	hashtab_destroy(p->filename_trans);
+
 	hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_tr_destroy, NULL);
 	hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
 
@@ -788,14 +843,7 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 		flex_array_free(p->type_attr_map_array);
 	}
 
-	ft = p->filename_trans;
-	while (ft) {
-		nft = ft->next;
-		kfree(ft->name);
-		kfree(ft);
-		ft = nft;
-	}
-
+	ebitmap_destroy(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
 	ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
 
@@ -1795,7 +1843,7 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		rt = NULL;
 		r = NULL;
 	}
-	rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr);
+	hash_eval(p->range_tr, "rangetr");
 	rc = 0;
 out:
 	kfree(rt);
@@ -1805,9 +1853,10 @@ out:
 
 static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
-	struct filename_trans *ft, *last;
-	u32 nel, len;
+	struct filename_trans *ft;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
 	char *name;
+	u32 nel, len;
 	__le32 buf[4];
 	int rc, i;
 
@@ -1816,25 +1865,23 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 
 	rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
 	if (rc)
-		goto out;
+		return rc;
 	nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 
-	last = p->filename_trans;
-	while (last && last->next)
-		last = last->next;
-
 	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+		ft = NULL;
+		otype = NULL;
+		name = NULL;
+
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		ft = kzalloc(sizeof(*ft), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!ft)
 			goto out;
 
-		/* add it to the tail of the list */
-		if (!last)
-			p->filename_trans = ft;
-		else
-			last->next = ft;
-		last = ft;
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		otype = kmalloc(sizeof(*otype), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!otype)
+			goto out;
 
 		/* length of the path component string */
 		rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
@@ -1862,10 +1909,22 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		ft->stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 		ft->ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 		ft->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
-		ft->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+		otype->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+		rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ft->ttype, 1);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+
+		hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, otype);
 	}
-	rc = 0;
+	hash_eval(p->filename_trans, "filenametr");
+	return 0;
 out:
+	kfree(ft);
+	kfree(name);
+	kfree(otype);
+
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2266,6 +2325,11 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		p->symtab[i].nprim = nprim;
 	}
 
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process");
+	if (!p->process_class)
+		goto bad;
+
 	rc = avtab_read(&p->te_avtab, fp, p);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
@@ -2298,8 +2362,17 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		tr->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
 		tr->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
 		tr->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+			rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+			if (rc)
+				goto bad;
+			tr->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+		} else
+			tr->tclass = p->process_class;
+
 		if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->role) ||
 		    !policydb_type_isvalid(p, tr->type) ||
+		    !policydb_class_isvalid(p, tr->tclass) ||
 		    !policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->new_role))
 			goto bad;
 		ltr = tr;
@@ -2341,11 +2414,6 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 		goto bad;
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process");
-	if (!p->process_class)
-		goto bad;
-
-	rc = -EINVAL;
 	p->process_trans_perms = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "transition");
 	p->process_trans_perms |= string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "dyntransition");
 	if (!p->process_trans_perms)
@@ -2517,8 +2585,9 @@ static int cat_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int role_trans_write(struct role_trans *r, void *fp)
+static int role_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
+	struct role_trans *r = p->role_tr;
 	struct role_trans *tr;
 	u32 buf[3];
 	size_t nel;
@@ -2538,6 +2607,12 @@ static int role_trans_write(struct role_trans *r, void *fp)
 		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
+		if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+			buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(tr->tclass);
+			rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -3045,7 +3120,7 @@ static int genfs_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int range_count(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+static int hashtab_cnt(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
 {
 	int *cnt = ptr;
 	*cnt = *cnt + 1;
@@ -3093,7 +3168,7 @@ static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 
 	/* count the number of entries in the hashtab */
 	nel = 0;
-	rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_count, &nel);
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->range_tr, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3110,43 +3185,60 @@ static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
 {
-	struct filename_trans *ft;
-	u32 len, nel = 0;
 	__le32 buf[4];
+	struct filename_trans *ft = key;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *otype = data;
+	void *fp = ptr;
 	int rc;
+	u32 len;
 
-	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next)
-		nel++;
-
-	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	len = strlen(ft->name);
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
 	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
-		len = strlen(ft->name);
-		buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
-		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
-		if (rc)
-			return rc;
+	rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
-		rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
-		if (rc)
-			return rc;
+	buf[0] = ft->stype;
+	buf[1] = ft->ttype;
+	buf[2] = ft->tclass;
+	buf[3] = otype->otype;
 
-		buf[0] = ft->stype;
-		buf[1] = ft->ttype;
-		buf[2] = ft->tclass;
-		buf[3] = ft->otype;
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
-		rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
-		if (rc)
-			return rc;
-	}
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+	u32 nel;
+	__le32 buf[1];
+	int rc;
+
+	nel = 0;
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+	rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, filename_write_helper, fp);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Write the configuration data in a policy database
  * structure to a policy database binary representation
@@ -3249,7 +3341,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = role_trans_write(p->role_tr, fp);
+	rc = role_trans_write(p, fp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 732ea4a68682..b846c0387180 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -72,17 +72,20 @@ struct role_datum {
 
 struct role_trans {
 	u32 role;		/* current role */
-	u32 type;		/* program executable type */
+	u32 type;		/* program executable type, or new object type */
+	u32 tclass;		/* process class, or new object class */
 	u32 new_role;		/* new role */
 	struct role_trans *next;
 };
 
 struct filename_trans {
-	struct filename_trans *next;
 	u32 stype;		/* current process */
 	u32 ttype;		/* parent dir context */
 	u16 tclass;		/* class of new object */
 	const char *name;	/* last path component */
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_datum {
 	u32 otype;		/* expected of new object */
 };
 
@@ -227,7 +230,10 @@ struct policydb {
 	struct role_trans *role_tr;
 
 	/* file transitions with the last path component */
-	struct filename_trans *filename_trans;
+	/* quickly exclude lookups when parent ttype has no rules */
+	struct ebitmap filename_trans_ttypes;
+	/* actual set of filename_trans rules */
+	struct hashtab *filename_trans;
 
 	/* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
 	struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 6ef4af47dac4..c3e4b52699f4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1359,26 +1359,35 @@ out:
 }
 
 static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
-				  u32 scon, u32 tcon, u16 tclass,
-				  const struct qstr *qstr)
-{
-	struct filename_trans *ft;
-	for (ft = p->filename_trans; ft; ft = ft->next) {
-		if (ft->stype == scon &&
-		    ft->ttype == tcon &&
-		    ft->tclass == tclass &&
-		    !strcmp(ft->name, qstr->name)) {
-			newcontext->type = ft->otype;
-			return;
-		}
-	}
+				  u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
+				  const char *objname)
+{
+	struct filename_trans ft;
+	struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
+
+	/*
+	 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
+	 * like /dev or /var/run.  This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
+	 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
+	 */
+	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
+		return;
+
+	ft.stype = stype;
+	ft.ttype = ttype;
+	ft.tclass = tclass;
+	ft.name = objname;
+
+	otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
+	if (otype)
+		newcontext->type = otype->otype;
 }
 
 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				u32 tsid,
 				u16 orig_tclass,
 				u32 specified,
-				const struct qstr *qstr,
+				const char *objname,
 				u32 *out_sid,
 				bool kern)
 {
@@ -1478,23 +1487,21 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 		newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
 	}
 
-	/* if we have a qstr this is a file trans check so check those rules */
-	if (qstr)
+	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
+	if (objname)
 		filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
-				      tcontext->type, tclass, qstr);
+				      tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
 
 	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
-	if  (tclass == policydb.process_class) {
-		if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
-			/* Look for a role transition rule. */
-			for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr;
-			     roletr = roletr->next) {
-				if (roletr->role == scontext->role &&
-				    roletr->type == tcontext->type) {
-					/* Use the role transition rule. */
-					newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
-					break;
-				}
+	if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+		/* Look for a role transition rule. */
+		for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
+			if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
+			    (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
+			    (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
+				/* Use the role transition rule. */
+				newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
+				break;
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -1541,13 +1548,14 @@ int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
 {
 	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
-				    qstr, out_sid, true);
+				    qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
 }
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid)
+int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
 {
 	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
-				    NULL, out_sid, false);
+				    objname, out_sid, false);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3190,7 +3198,7 @@ out:
  * @len: length of data in bytes
  *
  */
-int security_read_policy(void **data, ssize_t *len)
+int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct policy_file fp;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index b449cfdad21c..2b6c6a516123 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -316,22 +316,17 @@ static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 						    struct dentry *d)
 {
-	a->a.u.fs.path.dentry = d;
-}
-static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(struct smk_audit_info *a,
-						 struct vfsmount *m)
-{
-	a->a.u.fs.path.mnt = m;
+	a->a.u.dentry = d;
 }
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 					      struct inode *i)
 {
-	a->a.u.fs.inode = i;
+	a->a.u.inode = i;
 }
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 					     struct path p)
 {
-	a->a.u.fs.path = p;
+	a->a.u.path = p;
 }
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
 					    struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 400a5d5cde61..9831a39c11f6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 	struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
 
 	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -425,10 +425,13 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 {
 	struct superblock_smack *sbp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct path path;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, mnt->mnt_root);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
+	path.dentry = mnt->mnt_root;
+	path.mnt = mnt;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
 
 	sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
 	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -563,7 +566,7 @@ static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
 
 	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
@@ -592,7 +595,7 @@ static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	/*
@@ -623,7 +626,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	/*
@@ -663,7 +666,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
 	char *isp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
 
 	isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
@@ -700,7 +703,7 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned flags)
 	/* May be droppable after audit */
 	if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
 		return -ECHILD;
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
 }
@@ -720,7 +723,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 	 */
 	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
 		return 0;
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -736,10 +739,13 @@ static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct path path;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(&ad, mnt);
+	path.dentry = dentry;
+	path.mnt = mnt;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -784,7 +790,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	if (rc == 0)
@@ -845,7 +851,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 
 	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
@@ -877,7 +883,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 	} else
 		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -1047,7 +1053,7 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 
 	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
@@ -1070,8 +1076,8 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, file->f_path.dentry);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -1089,7 +1095,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
-	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS);
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
 
 	switch (cmd) {
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index 7556315c1978..a0d09e56874b 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -108,10 +108,9 @@ static bool tomoyo_flush(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 			head->read_user_buf += len;
 			w += len;
 		}
-		if (*w) {
-			head->r.w[0] = w;
+		head->r.w[0] = w;
+		if (*w)
 			return false;
-		}
 		/* Add '\0' for query. */
 		if (head->poll) {
 			if (!head->read_user_buf_avail ||
@@ -459,8 +458,16 @@ static int tomoyo_write_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 	if (profile == &tomoyo_default_profile)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (!strcmp(data, "COMMENT")) {
-		const struct tomoyo_path_info *old_comment = profile->comment;
-		profile->comment = tomoyo_get_name(cp);
+		static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+		const struct tomoyo_path_info *new_comment
+			= tomoyo_get_name(cp);
+		const struct tomoyo_path_info *old_comment;
+		if (!new_comment)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		spin_lock(&lock);
+		old_comment = profile->comment;
+		profile->comment = new_comment;
+		spin_unlock(&lock);
 		tomoyo_put_name(old_comment);
 		return 0;
 	}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c
index cb09f1fce910..d64e8ecb6fb3 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/file.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c
@@ -1011,7 +1011,6 @@ int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path)
 		break;
 	case TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR:
 	case TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT:
-	case TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT:
 		tomoyo_add_slash(&buf);
 		break;
 	}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/memory.c b/security/tomoyo/memory.c
index 297612669c74..42a7b1ba8cbf 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/memory.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/memory.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size)
 		memset(data, 0, size);
 		return ptr;
 	}
+	kfree(ptr);
 	return NULL;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
index 82bf8c2390bc..162a864dba24 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name,
 			goto out;
 		}
 		requested_dev_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path);
+		path_put(&path);
 		if (!requested_dev_name) {
 			error = -ENOENT;
 			goto out;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c
index 9bfc1ee8222d..6d5393204d95 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/util.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ bool tomoyo_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname)
 		if (!cp)
 			break;
 		if (*domainname != '/' ||
-		    !tomoyo_correct_word2(domainname, cp - domainname - 1))
+		    !tomoyo_correct_word2(domainname, cp - domainname))
 			goto out;
 		domainname = cp + 1;
 	}