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author | Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> | 2008-02-23 15:24:04 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org> | 2008-02-23 17:13:24 -0800 |
commit | bcdca225bfa016100985e5fc7e51cdc1d68beaa6 (patch) | |
tree | 4af588f69c754a6380dae17b00de20b0f2f3b149 | |
parent | 43627582799db317e966ecb0002c2c3c9805ec0f (diff) | |
download | linux-bcdca225bfa016100985e5fc7e51cdc1d68beaa6.tar.gz linux-bcdca225bfa016100985e5fc7e51cdc1d68beaa6.tar.bz2 linux-bcdca225bfa016100985e5fc7e51cdc1d68beaa6.zip |
Smack: update for file capabilities
Update the Smack LSM to allow the registration of the capability "module"
as a secondary LSM. Integrate the new hooks required for file based
capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 87 |
1 files changed, 74 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 25cbfa3f71f4..770eb067e165 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -584,14 +584,20 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || - strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) - return -EPERM; - } + int rc = 0; - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) { + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + rc = -EPERM; + } else + rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); + + return rc; } /** @@ -658,10 +664,20 @@ static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name) */ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name) { - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 && !capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; + int rc = 0; - return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) { + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + rc = -EPERM; + } else + rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); + + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE); + + return rc; } /** @@ -1016,7 +1032,12 @@ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) */ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return rc; } /** @@ -1028,7 +1049,12 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) */ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return rc; } /** @@ -1053,7 +1079,12 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp) { - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); + if (rc == 0) + rc = smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); + return rc; } /** @@ -1093,6 +1124,11 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid) { + int rc; + + rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; /* * Special cases where signals really ought to go through * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may @@ -1778,6 +1814,27 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag) return smk_curacc(isp, may); } +/* module stacking operations */ + +/** + * smack_register_security - stack capability module + * @name: module name + * @ops: module operations - ignored + * + * Allow the capability module to register. + */ +static int smack_register_security(const char *name, + struct security_operations *ops) +{ + if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n", + __func__, name); + + return 0; +} + /** * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode * @opt_dentry: unused @@ -2412,6 +2469,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ops = { .inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr, .inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr, .inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr, + .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv, + .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv, .inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity, .inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity, .inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity, @@ -2471,6 +2530,8 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ops = { .netlink_send = cap_netlink_send, .netlink_recv = cap_netlink_recv, + .register_security = smack_register_security, + .d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate, .getprocattr = smack_getprocattr, |