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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2011-10-25 09:45:31 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2011-10-25 09:45:31 +0200
commit36b8d186e6cc8e32cb5227f5645a58e1bc0af190 (patch)
tree1000ad26e189e6ff2c53fb7eeff605f59c7ad94e /Documentation/ABI
parentcd85b557414fe4cd44ea6608825e96612a5fe2b2 (diff)
parentc45ed235abf1b0b6666417e3c394f18717976acd (diff)
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Merge branch 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security
* 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits) TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek. Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option. Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access Smack: compilation fix Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte Smack: domain transition protections (v3) Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) Smack: Clean up comments Smack: Repair processing of fcntl Smack: Rule list lookup performance Smack: check permissions from user space (v2) TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector. TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock. TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning. TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock. TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector. TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings. target: check hex2bin result encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result ...
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+What: security/evm
+Date: March 2011
+Contact: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+Description:
+ EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs)
+ against integrity attacks. The initial method maintains an
+ HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the
+ value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
+
+ EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it
+ with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation.
+ The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl. Until
+ EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully
+ loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM
+ can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but
+ returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading the key and signaling EVM
+ should be done as early as possible. Normally this is done
+ in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part
+ of the trusted boot. For more information on creating and
+ loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
+ Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. (A sample dracut
+ patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables
+ EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)