Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net

Several conflicts, seemingly all over the place.

I used Stephen Rothwell's sample resolutions for many of these, if not
just to double check my own work, so definitely the credit largely
goes to him.

The NFP conflict consisted of a bug fix (moving operations
past the rhashtable operation) while chaning the initial
argument in the function call in the moved code.

The net/dsa/master.c conflict had to do with a bug fix intermixing of
making dsa_master_set_mtu() static with the fixing of the tagging
attribute location.

cls_flower had a conflict because the dup reject fix from Or
overlapped with the addition of port range classifiction.

__set_phy_supported()'s conflict was relatively easy to resolve
because Andrew fixed it in both trees, so it was just a matter
of taking the net-next copy.  Or at least I think it was :-)

Joe Stringer's fix to the handling of netns id 0 in bpf_sk_lookup()
intermixed with changes on how the sdif and caller_net are calculated
in these code paths in net-next.

The remaining BPF conflicts were largely about the addition of the
__bpf_md_ptr stuff in 'net' overlapping with adjustments and additions
to the relevant data structure where the MD pointer macros are used.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 60 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 19f4423e70d9..aefd358a5ca3 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -856,7 +856,8 @@
 			causing system reset or hang due to sending
 			INIT from AP to BSP.
 
-	disable_counter_freezing [HW]
+	perf_v4_pmi=	[X86,INTEL]
+			Format: <bool>
 			Disable Intel PMU counter freezing feature.
 			The feature only exists starting from
 			Arch Perfmon v4 (Skylake and newer).
@@ -3504,6 +3505,10 @@
 			before loading.
 			See Documentation/blockdev/ramdisk.txt.
 
+	psi=		[KNL] Enable or disable pressure stall information
+			tracking.
+			Format: <bool>
+
 	psmouse.proto=	[HW,MOUSE] Highest PS2 mouse protocol extension to
 			probe for; one of (bare|imps|exps|lifebook|any).
 	psmouse.rate=	[HW,MOUSE] Set desired mouse report rate, in reports
@@ -4194,9 +4199,13 @@
 
 	spectre_v2=	[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+			The default operation protects the kernel from
+			user space attacks.
 
-			on   - unconditionally enable
-			off  - unconditionally disable
+			on   - unconditionally enable, implies
+			       spectre_v2_user=on
+			off  - unconditionally disable, implies
+			       spectre_v2_user=off
 			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
 			       vulnerable
 
@@ -4206,6 +4215,12 @@
 			CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
 			compiler with which the kernel was built.
 
+			Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+			against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+			Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+			the user space protections.
+
 			Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
 
 			retpoline	  - replace indirect branches
@@ -4215,6 +4230,48 @@
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.
 
+	spectre_v2_user=
+			[X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+		        (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+		        user space tasks
+
+			on	- Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+				  enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+			off     - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+				  enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+			prctl   - Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+				  but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+				  per thread.  The mitigation control state
+				  is inherited on fork.
+
+			prctl,ibpb
+				- Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+				  always when switching between different user
+				  space processes.
+
+			seccomp
+				- Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+				  threads will enable the mitigation unless
+				  they explicitly opt out.
+
+			seccomp,ibpb
+				- Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+				  controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+				  always when switching between different
+				  user space processes.
+
+			auto    - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+				  the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+			Default mitigation:
+			If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
 	spec_store_bypass_disable=
 			[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
 			(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)