Merge branch 'dev-tools' into doc/4.9

Coalesce development-tool documents into a single directory and sphinxify
them.

10 files changed, 2377 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/coccinelle.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/coccinelle.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4a64b4c69d3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/coccinelle.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,491 @@
+.. Copyright 2010 Nicolas Palix <npalix@diku.dk>
+.. Copyright 2010 Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
+.. Copyright 2010 Gilles Muller <Gilles.Muller@lip6.fr>
+
+.. highlight:: none
+
+Coccinelle
+==========
+
+Coccinelle is a tool for pattern matching and text transformation that has
+many uses in kernel development, including the application of complex,
+tree-wide patches and detection of problematic programming patterns.
+
+Getting Coccinelle
+-------------------
+
+The semantic patches included in the kernel use features and options
+which are provided by Coccinelle version 1.0.0-rc11 and above.
+Using earlier versions will fail as the option names used by
+the Coccinelle files and coccicheck have been updated.
+
+Coccinelle is available through the package manager
+of many distributions, e.g. :
+
+ - Debian
+ - Fedora
+ - Ubuntu
+ - OpenSUSE
+ - Arch Linux
+ - NetBSD
+ - FreeBSD
+
+You can get the latest version released from the Coccinelle homepage at
+http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/
+
+Information and tips about Coccinelle are also provided on the wiki
+pages at http://cocci.ekstranet.diku.dk/wiki/doku.php
+
+Once you have it, run the following command::
+
+     	./configure
+        make
+
+as a regular user, and install it with::
+
+        sudo make install
+
+Supplemental documentation
+---------------------------
+
+For supplemental documentation refer to the wiki:
+
+https://bottest.wiki.kernel.org/coccicheck
+
+The wiki documentation always refers to the linux-next version of the script.
+
+Using Coccinelle on the Linux kernel
+------------------------------------
+
+A Coccinelle-specific target is defined in the top level
+Makefile. This target is named ``coccicheck`` and calls the ``coccicheck``
+front-end in the ``scripts`` directory.
+
+Four basic modes are defined: ``patch``, ``report``, ``context``, and
+``org``. The mode to use is specified by setting the MODE variable with
+``MODE=<mode>``.
+
+- ``patch`` proposes a fix, when possible.
+
+- ``report`` generates a list in the following format:
+  file:line:column-column: message
+
+- ``context`` highlights lines of interest and their context in a
+  diff-like style.Lines of interest are indicated with ``-``.
+
+- ``org`` generates a report in the Org mode format of Emacs.
+
+Note that not all semantic patches implement all modes. For easy use
+of Coccinelle, the default mode is "report".
+
+Two other modes provide some common combinations of these modes.
+
+- ``chain`` tries the previous modes in the order above until one succeeds.
+
+- ``rep+ctxt`` runs successively the report mode and the context mode.
+  It should be used with the C option (described later)
+  which checks the code on a file basis.
+
+Examples
+~~~~~~~~
+
+To make a report for every semantic patch, run the following command::
+
+		make coccicheck MODE=report
+
+To produce patches, run::
+
+		make coccicheck MODE=patch
+
+
+The coccicheck target applies every semantic patch available in the
+sub-directories of ``scripts/coccinelle`` to the entire Linux kernel.
+
+For each semantic patch, a commit message is proposed.  It gives a
+description of the problem being checked by the semantic patch, and
+includes a reference to Coccinelle.
+
+As any static code analyzer, Coccinelle produces false
+positives. Thus, reports must be carefully checked, and patches
+reviewed.
+
+To enable verbose messages set the V= variable, for example::
+
+   make coccicheck MODE=report V=1
+
+Coccinelle parallelization
+---------------------------
+
+By default, coccicheck tries to run as parallel as possible. To change
+the parallelism, set the J= variable. For example, to run across 4 CPUs::
+
+   make coccicheck MODE=report J=4
+
+As of Coccinelle 1.0.2 Coccinelle uses Ocaml parmap for parallelization,
+if support for this is detected you will benefit from parmap parallelization.
+
+When parmap is enabled coccicheck will enable dynamic load balancing by using
+``--chunksize 1`` argument, this ensures we keep feeding threads with work
+one by one, so that we avoid the situation where most work gets done by only
+a few threads. With dynamic load balancing, if a thread finishes early we keep
+feeding it more work.
+
+When parmap is enabled, if an error occurs in Coccinelle, this error
+value is propagated back, the return value of the ``make coccicheck``
+captures this return value.
+
+Using Coccinelle with a single semantic patch
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The optional make variable COCCI can be used to check a single
+semantic patch. In that case, the variable must be initialized with
+the name of the semantic patch to apply.
+
+For instance::
+
+	make coccicheck COCCI=<my_SP.cocci> MODE=patch
+
+or::
+
+	make coccicheck COCCI=<my_SP.cocci> MODE=report
+
+
+Controlling Which Files are Processed by Coccinelle
+---------------------------------------------------
+
+By default the entire kernel source tree is checked.
+
+To apply Coccinelle to a specific directory, ``M=`` can be used.
+For example, to check drivers/net/wireless/ one may write::
+
+    make coccicheck M=drivers/net/wireless/
+
+To apply Coccinelle on a file basis, instead of a directory basis, the
+following command may be used::
+
+    make C=1 CHECK="scripts/coccicheck"
+
+To check only newly edited code, use the value 2 for the C flag, i.e.::
+
+    make C=2 CHECK="scripts/coccicheck"
+
+In these modes, which works on a file basis, there is no information
+about semantic patches displayed, and no commit message proposed.
+
+This runs every semantic patch in scripts/coccinelle by default. The
+COCCI variable may additionally be used to only apply a single
+semantic patch as shown in the previous section.
+
+The "report" mode is the default. You can select another one with the
+MODE variable explained above.
+
+Debugging Coccinelle SmPL patches
+---------------------------------
+
+Using coccicheck is best as it provides in the spatch command line
+include options matching the options used when we compile the kernel.
+You can learn what these options are by using V=1, you could then
+manually run Coccinelle with debug options added.
+
+Alternatively you can debug running Coccinelle against SmPL patches
+by asking for stderr to be redirected to stderr, by default stderr
+is redirected to /dev/null, if you'd like to capture stderr you
+can specify the ``DEBUG_FILE="file.txt"`` option to coccicheck. For
+instance::
+
+    rm -f cocci.err
+    make coccicheck COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/free/kfree.cocci MODE=report DEBUG_FILE=cocci.err
+    cat cocci.err
+
+You can use SPFLAGS to add debugging flags, for instance you may want to
+add both --profile --show-trying to SPFLAGS when debugging. For instance
+you may want to use::
+
+    rm -f err.log
+    export COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/misc/irqf_oneshot.cocci
+    make coccicheck DEBUG_FILE="err.log" MODE=report SPFLAGS="--profile --show-trying" M=./drivers/mfd/arizona-irq.c
+
+err.log will now have the profiling information, while stdout will
+provide some progress information as Coccinelle moves forward with
+work.
+
+DEBUG_FILE support is only supported when using coccinelle >= 1.2.
+
+.cocciconfig support
+--------------------
+
+Coccinelle supports reading .cocciconfig for default Coccinelle options that
+should be used every time spatch is spawned, the order of precedence for
+variables for .cocciconfig is as follows:
+
+- Your current user's home directory is processed first
+- Your directory from which spatch is called is processed next
+- The directory provided with the --dir option is processed last, if used
+
+Since coccicheck runs through make, it naturally runs from the kernel
+proper dir, as such the second rule above would be implied for picking up a
+.cocciconfig when using ``make coccicheck``.
+
+``make coccicheck`` also supports using M= targets.If you do not supply
+any M= target, it is assumed you want to target the entire kernel.
+The kernel coccicheck script has::
+
+    if [ "$KBUILD_EXTMOD" = "" ] ; then
+        OPTIONS="--dir $srctree $COCCIINCLUDE"
+    else
+        OPTIONS="--dir $KBUILD_EXTMOD $COCCIINCLUDE"
+    fi
+
+KBUILD_EXTMOD is set when an explicit target with M= is used. For both cases
+the spatch --dir argument is used, as such third rule applies when whether M=
+is used or not, and when M= is used the target directory can have its own
+.cocciconfig file. When M= is not passed as an argument to coccicheck the
+target directory is the same as the directory from where spatch was called.
+
+If not using the kernel's coccicheck target, keep the above precedence
+order logic of .cocciconfig reading. If using the kernel's coccicheck target,
+override any of the kernel's .coccicheck's settings using SPFLAGS.
+
+We help Coccinelle when used against Linux with a set of sensible defaults
+options for Linux with our own Linux .cocciconfig. This hints to coccinelle
+git can be used for ``git grep`` queries over coccigrep. A timeout of 200
+seconds should suffice for now.
+
+The options picked up by coccinelle when reading a .cocciconfig do not appear
+as arguments to spatch processes running on your system, to confirm what
+options will be used by Coccinelle run::
+
+      spatch --print-options-only
+
+You can override with your own preferred index option by using SPFLAGS. Take
+note that when there are conflicting options Coccinelle takes precedence for
+the last options passed. Using .cocciconfig is possible to use idutils, however
+given the order of precedence followed by Coccinelle, since the kernel now
+carries its own .cocciconfig, you will need to use SPFLAGS to use idutils if
+desired. See below section "Additional flags" for more details on how to use
+idutils.
+
+Additional flags
+----------------
+
+Additional flags can be passed to spatch through the SPFLAGS
+variable. This works as Coccinelle respects the last flags
+given to it when options are in conflict. ::
+
+    make SPFLAGS=--use-glimpse coccicheck
+
+Coccinelle supports idutils as well but requires coccinelle >= 1.0.6.
+When no ID file is specified coccinelle assumes your ID database file
+is in the file .id-utils.index on the top level of the kernel, coccinelle
+carries a script scripts/idutils_index.sh which creates the database with::
+
+    mkid -i C --output .id-utils.index
+
+If you have another database filename you can also just symlink with this
+name. ::
+
+    make SPFLAGS=--use-idutils coccicheck
+
+Alternatively you can specify the database filename explicitly, for
+instance::
+
+    make SPFLAGS="--use-idutils /full-path/to/ID" coccicheck
+
+See ``spatch --help`` to learn more about spatch options.
+
+Note that the ``--use-glimpse`` and ``--use-idutils`` options
+require external tools for indexing the code. None of them is
+thus active by default. However, by indexing the code with
+one of these tools, and according to the cocci file used,
+spatch could proceed the entire code base more quickly.
+
+SmPL patch specific options
+---------------------------
+
+SmPL patches can have their own requirements for options passed
+to Coccinelle. SmPL patch specific options can be provided by
+providing them at the top of the SmPL patch, for instance::
+
+	// Options: --no-includes --include-headers
+
+SmPL patch Coccinelle requirements
+----------------------------------
+
+As Coccinelle features get added some more advanced SmPL patches
+may require newer versions of Coccinelle. If an SmPL patch requires
+at least a version of Coccinelle, this can be specified as follows,
+as an example if requiring at least Coccinelle >= 1.0.5::
+
+	// Requires: 1.0.5
+
+Proposing new semantic patches
+-------------------------------
+
+New semantic patches can be proposed and submitted by kernel
+developers. For sake of clarity, they should be organized in the
+sub-directories of ``scripts/coccinelle/``.
+
+
+Detailed description of the ``report`` mode
+-------------------------------------------
+
+``report`` generates a list in the following format::
+
+  file:line:column-column: message
+
+Example
+~~~~~~~
+
+Running::
+
+	make coccicheck MODE=report COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/api/err_cast.cocci
+
+will execute the following part of the SmPL script::
+
+   <smpl>
+   @r depends on !context && !patch && (org || report)@
+   expression x;
+   position p;
+   @@
+
+     ERR_PTR@p(PTR_ERR(x))
+
+   @script:python depends on report@
+   p << r.p;
+   x << r.x;
+   @@
+
+   msg="ERR_CAST can be used with %s" % (x)
+   coccilib.report.print_report(p[0], msg)
+   </smpl>
+
+This SmPL excerpt generates entries on the standard output, as
+illustrated below::
+
+    /home/user/linux/crypto/ctr.c:188:9-16: ERR_CAST can be used with alg
+    /home/user/linux/crypto/authenc.c:619:9-16: ERR_CAST can be used with auth
+    /home/user/linux/crypto/xts.c:227:9-16: ERR_CAST can be used with alg
+
+
+Detailed description of the ``patch`` mode
+------------------------------------------
+
+When the ``patch`` mode is available, it proposes a fix for each problem
+identified.
+
+Example
+~~~~~~~
+
+Running::
+
+	make coccicheck MODE=patch COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/api/err_cast.cocci
+
+will execute the following part of the SmPL script::
+
+    <smpl>
+    @ depends on !context && patch && !org && !report @
+    expression x;
+    @@
+
+    - ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(x))
+    + ERR_CAST(x)
+    </smpl>
+
+This SmPL excerpt generates patch hunks on the standard output, as
+illustrated below::
+
+    diff -u -p a/crypto/ctr.c b/crypto/ctr.c
+    --- a/crypto/ctr.c 2010-05-26 10:49:38.000000000 +0200
+    +++ b/crypto/ctr.c 2010-06-03 23:44:49.000000000 +0200
+    @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static struct crypto_instance *crypto_ct
+ 	alg = crypto_attr_alg(tb[1], CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+ 				  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+ 	if (IS_ERR(alg))
+    -		return ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(alg));
+    +		return ERR_CAST(alg);
+
+ 	/* Block size must be >= 4 bytes. */
+ 	err = -EINVAL;
+
+Detailed description of the ``context`` mode
+--------------------------------------------
+
+``context`` highlights lines of interest and their context
+in a diff-like style.
+
+      **NOTE**: The diff-like output generated is NOT an applicable patch. The
+      intent of the ``context`` mode is to highlight the important lines
+      (annotated with minus, ``-``) and gives some surrounding context
+      lines around. This output can be used with the diff mode of
+      Emacs to review the code.
+
+Example
+~~~~~~~
+
+Running::
+
+	make coccicheck MODE=context COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/api/err_cast.cocci
+
+will execute the following part of the SmPL script::
+
+    <smpl>
+    @ depends on context && !patch && !org && !report@
+    expression x;
+    @@
+
+    * ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(x))
+    </smpl>
+
+This SmPL excerpt generates diff hunks on the standard output, as
+illustrated below::
+
+    diff -u -p /home/user/linux/crypto/ctr.c /tmp/nothing
+    --- /home/user/linux/crypto/ctr.c	2010-05-26 10:49:38.000000000 +0200
+    +++ /tmp/nothing
+    @@ -185,7 +185,6 @@ static struct crypto_instance *crypto_ct
+ 	alg = crypto_attr_alg(tb[1], CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+ 				  CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
+ 	if (IS_ERR(alg))
+    -		return ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR(alg));
+
+ 	/* Block size must be >= 4 bytes. */
+ 	err = -EINVAL;
+
+Detailed description of the ``org`` mode
+----------------------------------------
+
+``org`` generates a report in the Org mode format of Emacs.
+
+Example
+~~~~~~~
+
+Running::
+
+	make coccicheck MODE=org COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/api/err_cast.cocci
+
+will execute the following part of the SmPL script::
+
+    <smpl>
+    @r depends on !context && !patch && (org || report)@
+    expression x;
+    position p;
+    @@
+
+      ERR_PTR@p(PTR_ERR(x))
+
+    @script:python depends on org@
+    p << r.p;
+    x << r.x;
+    @@
+
+    msg="ERR_CAST can be used with %s" % (x)
+    msg_safe=msg.replace("[","@(").replace("]",")")
+    coccilib.org.print_todo(p[0], msg_safe)
+    </smpl>
+
+This SmPL excerpt generates Org entries on the standard output, as
+illustrated below::
+
+    * TODO [[view:/home/user/linux/crypto/ctr.c::face=ovl-face1::linb=188::colb=9::cole=16][ERR_CAST can be used with alg]]
+    * TODO [[view:/home/user/linux/crypto/authenc.c::face=ovl-face1::linb=619::colb=9::cole=16][ERR_CAST can be used with auth]]
+    * TODO [[view:/home/user/linux/crypto/xts.c::face=ovl-face1::linb=227::colb=9::cole=16][ERR_CAST can be used with alg]]
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/gcov.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/gcov.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..19eedfea8800
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/gcov.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+Using gcov with the Linux kernel
+================================
+
+gcov profiling kernel support enables the use of GCC's coverage testing
+tool gcov_ with the Linux kernel. Coverage data of a running kernel
+is exported in gcov-compatible format via the "gcov" debugfs directory.
+To get coverage data for a specific file, change to the kernel build
+directory and use gcov with the ``-o`` option as follows (requires root)::
+
+    # cd /tmp/linux-out
+    # gcov -o /sys/kernel/debug/gcov/tmp/linux-out/kernel spinlock.c
+
+This will create source code files annotated with execution counts
+in the current directory. In addition, graphical gcov front-ends such
+as lcov_ can be used to automate the process of collecting data
+for the entire kernel and provide coverage overviews in HTML format.
+
+Possible uses:
+
+* debugging (has this line been reached at all?)
+* test improvement (how do I change my test to cover these lines?)
+* minimizing kernel configurations (do I need this option if the
+  associated code is never run?)
+
+.. _gcov: http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Gcov.html
+.. _lcov: http://ltp.sourceforge.net/coverage/lcov.php
+
+
+Preparation
+-----------
+
+Configure the kernel with::
+
+        CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
+        CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL=y
+
+select the gcc's gcov format, default is autodetect based on gcc version::
+
+        CONFIG_GCOV_FORMAT_AUTODETECT=y
+
+and to get coverage data for the entire kernel::
+
+        CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL=y
+
+Note that kernels compiled with profiling flags will be significantly
+larger and run slower. Also CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL may not be supported
+on all architectures.
+
+Profiling data will only become accessible once debugfs has been
+mounted::
+
+        mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug
+
+
+Customization
+-------------
+
+To enable profiling for specific files or directories, add a line
+similar to the following to the respective kernel Makefile:
+
+- For a single file (e.g. main.o)::
+
+	GCOV_PROFILE_main.o := y
+
+- For all files in one directory::
+
+	GCOV_PROFILE := y
+
+To exclude files from being profiled even when CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
+is specified, use::
+
+	GCOV_PROFILE_main.o := n
+
+and::
+
+	GCOV_PROFILE := n
+
+Only files which are linked to the main kernel image or are compiled as
+kernel modules are supported by this mechanism.
+
+
+Files
+-----
+
+The gcov kernel support creates the following files in debugfs:
+
+``/sys/kernel/debug/gcov``
+	Parent directory for all gcov-related files.
+
+``/sys/kernel/debug/gcov/reset``
+	Global reset file: resets all coverage data to zero when
+        written to.
+
+``/sys/kernel/debug/gcov/path/to/compile/dir/file.gcda``
+	The actual gcov data file as understood by the gcov
+        tool. Resets file coverage data to zero when written to.
+
+``/sys/kernel/debug/gcov/path/to/compile/dir/file.gcno``
+	Symbolic link to a static data file required by the gcov
+        tool. This file is generated by gcc when compiling with
+        option ``-ftest-coverage``.
+
+
+Modules
+-------
+
+Kernel modules may contain cleanup code which is only run during
+module unload time. The gcov mechanism provides a means to collect
+coverage data for such code by keeping a copy of the data associated
+with the unloaded module. This data remains available through debugfs.
+Once the module is loaded again, the associated coverage counters are
+initialized with the data from its previous instantiation.
+
+This behavior can be deactivated by specifying the gcov_persist kernel
+parameter::
+
+        gcov_persist=0
+
+At run-time, a user can also choose to discard data for an unloaded
+module by writing to its data file or the global reset file.
+
+
+Separated build and test machines
+---------------------------------
+
+The gcov kernel profiling infrastructure is designed to work out-of-the
+box for setups where kernels are built and run on the same machine. In
+cases where the kernel runs on a separate machine, special preparations
+must be made, depending on where the gcov tool is used:
+
+a) gcov is run on the TEST machine
+
+    The gcov tool version on the test machine must be compatible with the
+    gcc version used for kernel build. Also the following files need to be
+    copied from build to test machine:
+
+    from the source tree:
+      - all C source files + headers
+
+    from the build tree:
+      - all C source files + headers
+      - all .gcda and .gcno files
+      - all links to directories
+
+    It is important to note that these files need to be placed into the
+    exact same file system location on the test machine as on the build
+    machine. If any of the path components is symbolic link, the actual
+    directory needs to be used instead (due to make's CURDIR handling).
+
+b) gcov is run on the BUILD machine
+
+    The following files need to be copied after each test case from test
+    to build machine:
+
+    from the gcov directory in sysfs:
+      - all .gcda files
+      - all links to .gcno files
+
+    These files can be copied to any location on the build machine. gcov
+    must then be called with the -o option pointing to that directory.
+
+    Example directory setup on the build machine::
+
+      /tmp/linux:    kernel source tree
+      /tmp/out:      kernel build directory as specified by make O=
+      /tmp/coverage: location of the files copied from the test machine
+
+      [user@build] cd /tmp/out
+      [user@build] gcov -o /tmp/coverage/tmp/out/init main.c
+
+
+Troubleshooting
+---------------
+
+Problem
+    Compilation aborts during linker step.
+
+Cause
+    Profiling flags are specified for source files which are not
+    linked to the main kernel or which are linked by a custom
+    linker procedure.
+
+Solution
+    Exclude affected source files from profiling by specifying
+    ``GCOV_PROFILE := n`` or ``GCOV_PROFILE_basename.o := n`` in the
+    corresponding Makefile.
+
+Problem
+    Files copied from sysfs appear empty or incomplete.
+
+Cause
+    Due to the way seq_file works, some tools such as cp or tar
+    may not correctly copy files from sysfs.
+
+Solution
+    Use ``cat``' to read ``.gcda`` files and ``cp -d`` to copy links.
+    Alternatively use the mechanism shown in Appendix B.
+
+
+Appendix A: gather_on_build.sh
+------------------------------
+
+Sample script to gather coverage meta files on the build machine
+(see 6a)::
+
+    #!/bin/bash
+
+    KSRC=$1
+    KOBJ=$2
+    DEST=$3
+
+    if [ -z "$KSRC" ] || [ -z "$KOBJ" ] || [ -z "$DEST" ]; then
+      echo "Usage: $0 <ksrc directory> <kobj directory> <output.tar.gz>" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+
+    KSRC=$(cd $KSRC; printf "all:\n\t@echo \${CURDIR}\n" | make -f -)
+    KOBJ=$(cd $KOBJ; printf "all:\n\t@echo \${CURDIR}\n" | make -f -)
+
+    find $KSRC $KOBJ \( -name '*.gcno' -o -name '*.[ch]' -o -type l \) -a \
+                     -perm /u+r,g+r | tar cfz $DEST -P -T -
+
+    if [ $? -eq 0 ] ; then
+      echo "$DEST successfully created, copy to test system and unpack with:"
+      echo "  tar xfz $DEST -P"
+    else
+      echo "Could not create file $DEST"
+    fi
+
+
+Appendix B: gather_on_test.sh
+-----------------------------
+
+Sample script to gather coverage data files on the test machine
+(see 6b)::
+
+    #!/bin/bash -e
+
+    DEST=$1
+    GCDA=/sys/kernel/debug/gcov
+
+    if [ -z "$DEST" ] ; then
+      echo "Usage: $0 <output.tar.gz>" >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+
+    TEMPDIR=$(mktemp -d)
+    echo Collecting data..
+    find $GCDA -type d -exec mkdir -p $TEMPDIR/\{\} \;
+    find $GCDA -name '*.gcda' -exec sh -c 'cat < $0 > '$TEMPDIR'/$0' {} \;
+    find $GCDA -name '*.gcno' -exec sh -c 'cp -d $0 '$TEMPDIR'/$0' {} \;
+    tar czf $DEST -C $TEMPDIR sys
+    rm -rf $TEMPDIR
+
+    echo "$DEST successfully created, copy to build system and unpack with:"
+    echo "  tar xfz $DEST"
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5e93c9bc6619
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/gdb-kernel-debugging.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+.. highlight:: none
+
+Debugging kernel and modules via gdb
+====================================
+
+The kernel debugger kgdb, hypervisors like QEMU or JTAG-based hardware
+interfaces allow to debug the Linux kernel and its modules during runtime
+using gdb. Gdb comes with a powerful scripting interface for python. The
+kernel provides a collection of helper scripts that can simplify typical
+kernel debugging steps. This is a short tutorial about how to enable and use
+them. It focuses on QEMU/KVM virtual machines as target, but the examples can
+be transferred to the other gdb stubs as well.
+
+
+Requirements
+------------
+
+- gdb 7.2+ (recommended: 7.4+) with python support enabled (typically true
+  for distributions)
+
+
+Setup
+-----
+
+- Create a virtual Linux machine for QEMU/KVM (see www.linux-kvm.org and
+  www.qemu.org for more details). For cross-development,
+  http://landley.net/aboriginal/bin keeps a pool of machine images and
+  toolchains that can be helpful to start from.
+
+- Build the kernel with CONFIG_GDB_SCRIPTS enabled, but leave
+  CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED off. If your architecture supports
+  CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER, keep it enabled.
+
+- Install that kernel on the guest.
+  Alternatively, QEMU allows to boot the kernel directly using -kernel,
+  -append, -initrd command line switches. This is generally only useful if
+  you do not depend on modules. See QEMU documentation for more details on
+  this mode.
+
+- Enable the gdb stub of QEMU/KVM, either
+
+    - at VM startup time by appending "-s" to the QEMU command line
+
+  or
+
+    - during runtime by issuing "gdbserver" from the QEMU monitor
+      console
+
+- cd /path/to/linux-build
+
+- Start gdb: gdb vmlinux
+
+  Note: Some distros may restrict auto-loading of gdb scripts to known safe
+  directories. In case gdb reports to refuse loading vmlinux-gdb.py, add::
+
+    add-auto-load-safe-path /path/to/linux-build
+
+  to ~/.gdbinit. See gdb help for more details.
+
+- Attach to the booted guest::
+
+    (gdb) target remote :1234
+
+
+Examples of using the Linux-provided gdb helpers
+------------------------------------------------
+
+- Load module (and main kernel) symbols::
+
+    (gdb) lx-symbols
+    loading vmlinux
+    scanning for modules in /home/user/linux/build
+    loading @0xffffffffa0020000: /home/user/linux/build/net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.ko
+    loading @0xffffffffa0016000: /home/user/linux/build/net/netfilter/xt_pkttype.ko
+    loading @0xffffffffa0002000: /home/user/linux/build/net/netfilter/xt_limit.ko
+    loading @0xffffffffa00ca000: /home/user/linux/build/net/packet/af_packet.ko
+    loading @0xffffffffa003c000: /home/user/linux/build/fs/fuse/fuse.ko
+    ...
+    loading @0xffffffffa0000000: /home/user/linux/build/drivers/ata/ata_generic.ko
+
+- Set a breakpoint on some not yet loaded module function, e.g.::
+
+    (gdb) b btrfs_init_sysfs
+    Function "btrfs_init_sysfs" not defined.
+    Make breakpoint pending on future shared library load? (y or [n]) y
+    Breakpoint 1 (btrfs_init_sysfs) pending.
+
+- Continue the target::
+
+    (gdb) c
+
+- Load the module on the target and watch the symbols being loaded as well as
+  the breakpoint hit::
+
+    loading @0xffffffffa0034000: /home/user/linux/build/lib/libcrc32c.ko
+    loading @0xffffffffa0050000: /home/user/linux/build/lib/lzo/lzo_compress.ko
+    loading @0xffffffffa006e000: /home/user/linux/build/lib/zlib_deflate/zlib_deflate.ko
+    loading @0xffffffffa01b1000: /home/user/linux/build/fs/btrfs/btrfs.ko
+
+    Breakpoint 1, btrfs_init_sysfs () at /home/user/linux/fs/btrfs/sysfs.c:36
+    36              btrfs_kset = kset_create_and_add("btrfs", NULL, fs_kobj);
+
+- Dump the log buffer of the target kernel::
+
+    (gdb) lx-dmesg
+    [     0.000000] Initializing cgroup subsys cpuset
+    [     0.000000] Initializing cgroup subsys cpu
+    [     0.000000] Linux version 3.8.0-rc4-dbg+ (...
+    [     0.000000] Command line: root=/dev/sda2 resume=/dev/sda1 vga=0x314
+    [     0.000000] e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
+    [     0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009fbff] usable
+    [     0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009fc00-0x000000000009ffff] reserved
+    ....
+
+- Examine fields of the current task struct::
+
+    (gdb) p $lx_current().pid
+    $1 = 4998
+    (gdb) p $lx_current().comm
+    $2 = "modprobe\000\000\000\000\000\000\000"
+
+- Make use of the per-cpu function for the current or a specified CPU::
+
+    (gdb) p $lx_per_cpu("runqueues").nr_running
+    $3 = 1
+    (gdb) p $lx_per_cpu("runqueues", 2).nr_running
+    $4 = 0
+
+- Dig into hrtimers using the container_of helper::
+
+    (gdb) set $next = $lx_per_cpu("hrtimer_bases").clock_base[0].active.next
+    (gdb) p *$container_of($next, "struct hrtimer", "node")
+    $5 = {
+      node = {
+        node = {
+          __rb_parent_color = 18446612133355256072,
+          rb_right = 0x0 <irq_stack_union>,
+          rb_left = 0x0 <irq_stack_union>
+        },
+        expires = {
+          tv64 = 1835268000000
+        }
+      },
+      _softexpires = {
+        tv64 = 1835268000000
+      },
+      function = 0xffffffff81078232 <tick_sched_timer>,
+      base = 0xffff88003fd0d6f0,
+      state = 1,
+      start_pid = 0,
+      start_site = 0xffffffff81055c1f <hrtimer_start_range_ns+20>,
+      start_comm = "swapper/2\000\000\000\000\000\000"
+    }
+
+
+List of commands and functions
+------------------------------
+
+The number of commands and convenience functions may evolve over the time,
+this is just a snapshot of the initial version::
+
+ (gdb) apropos lx
+ function lx_current -- Return current task
+ function lx_module -- Find module by name and return the module variable
+ function lx_per_cpu -- Return per-cpu variable
+ function lx_task_by_pid -- Find Linux task by PID and return the task_struct variable
+ function lx_thread_info -- Calculate Linux thread_info from task variable
+ lx-dmesg -- Print Linux kernel log buffer
+ lx-lsmod -- List currently loaded modules
+ lx-symbols -- (Re-)load symbols of Linux kernel and currently loaded modules
+
+Detailed help can be obtained via "help <command-name>" for commands and "help
+function <function-name>" for convenience functions.
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f7a18f274357
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+The Kernel Address Sanitizer (KASAN)
+====================================
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+KernelAddressSANitizer (KASAN) is a dynamic memory error detector. It provides
+a fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and out-of-bounds
+bugs.
+
+KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
+therefore you will need a GCC version 4.9.2 or later. GCC 5.0 or later is
+required for detection of out-of-bounds accesses to stack or global variables.
+
+Currently KASAN is supported only for the x86_64 and arm64 architectures.
+
+Usage
+-----
+
+To enable KASAN configure kernel with::
+
+	  CONFIG_KASAN = y
+
+and choose between CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE and CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE. Outline and
+inline are compiler instrumentation types. The former produces smaller binary
+the latter is 1.1 - 2 times faster. Inline instrumentation requires a GCC
+version 5.0 or later.
+
+KASAN works with both SLUB and SLAB memory allocators.
+For better bug detection and nicer reporting, enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE.
+
+To disable instrumentation for specific files or directories, add a line
+similar to the following to the respective kernel Makefile:
+
+- For a single file (e.g. main.o)::
+
+    KASAN_SANITIZE_main.o := n
+
+- For all files in one directory::
+
+    KASAN_SANITIZE := n
+
+Error reports
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+A typical out of bounds access report looks like this::
+
+    ==================================================================
+    BUG: AddressSanitizer: out of bounds access in kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan] at addr ffff8800693bc5d3
+    Write of size 1 by task modprobe/1689
+    =============================================================================
+    BUG kmalloc-128 (Not tainted): kasan error
+    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
+    INFO: Allocated in kmalloc_oob_right+0x3d/0x75 [test_kasan] age=0 cpu=0 pid=1689
+     __slab_alloc+0x4b4/0x4f0
+     kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x10b/0x190
+     kmalloc_oob_right+0x3d/0x75 [test_kasan]
+     init_module+0x9/0x47 [test_kasan]
+     do_one_initcall+0x99/0x200
+     load_module+0x2cb3/0x3b20
+     SyS_finit_module+0x76/0x80
+     system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
+    INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001a4ef00 objects=17 used=7 fp=0xffff8800693bd728 flags=0x100000000004080
+    INFO: Object 0xffff8800693bc558 @offset=1368 fp=0xffff8800693bc720
+
+    Bytes b4 ffff8800693bc548: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a  ........ZZZZZZZZ
+    Object ffff8800693bc558: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
+    Object ffff8800693bc568: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
+    Object ffff8800693bc578: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
+    Object ffff8800693bc588: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
+    Object ffff8800693bc598: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
+    Object ffff8800693bc5a8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
+    Object ffff8800693bc5b8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
+    Object ffff8800693bc5c8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk.
+    Redzone ffff8800693bc5d8: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc                          ........
+    Padding ffff8800693bc718: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a                          ZZZZZZZZ
+    CPU: 0 PID: 1689 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G    B          3.18.0-rc1-mm1+ #98
+    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.7.5-0-ge51488c-20140602_164612-nilsson.home.kraxel.org 04/01/2014
+     ffff8800693bc000 0000000000000000 ffff8800693bc558 ffff88006923bb78
+     ffffffff81cc68ae 00000000000000f3 ffff88006d407600 ffff88006923bba8
+     ffffffff811fd848 ffff88006d407600 ffffea0001a4ef00 ffff8800693bc558
+    Call Trace:
+     [<ffffffff81cc68ae>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58
+     [<ffffffff811fd848>] print_trailer+0xf8/0x160
+     [<ffffffffa00026a7>] ? kmem_cache_oob+0xc3/0xc3 [test_kasan]
+     [<ffffffff811ff0f5>] object_err+0x35/0x40
+     [<ffffffffa0002065>] ? kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan]
+     [<ffffffff8120b9fa>] kasan_report_error+0x38a/0x3f0
+     [<ffffffff8120a79f>] ? kasan_poison_shadow+0x2f/0x40
+     [<ffffffff8120b344>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x14/0x40
+     [<ffffffff8120a79f>] ? kasan_poison_shadow+0x2f/0x40
+     [<ffffffffa00026a7>] ? kmem_cache_oob+0xc3/0xc3 [test_kasan]
+     [<ffffffff8120a995>] __asan_store1+0x75/0xb0
+     [<ffffffffa0002601>] ? kmem_cache_oob+0x1d/0xc3 [test_kasan]
+     [<ffffffffa0002065>] ? kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan]
+     [<ffffffffa0002065>] kmalloc_oob_right+0x65/0x75 [test_kasan]
+     [<ffffffffa00026b0>] init_module+0x9/0x47 [test_kasan]
+     [<ffffffff810002d9>] do_one_initcall+0x99/0x200
+     [<ffffffff811e4e5c>] ? __vunmap+0xec/0x160
+     [<ffffffff81114f63>] load_module+0x2cb3/0x3b20
+     [<ffffffff8110fd70>] ? m_show+0x240/0x240
+     [<ffffffff81115f06>] SyS_finit_module+0x76/0x80
+     [<ffffffff81cd3129>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17
+    Memory state around the buggy address:
+     ffff8800693bc300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
+     ffff8800693bc380: fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc
+     ffff8800693bc400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
+     ffff8800693bc480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
+     ffff8800693bc500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00
+    >ffff8800693bc580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 fc fc fc fc fc
+                                                 ^
+     ffff8800693bc600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
+     ffff8800693bc680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
+     ffff8800693bc700: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
+     ffff8800693bc780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
+     ffff8800693bc800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
+    ==================================================================
+
+The header of the report discribe what kind of bug happened and what kind of
+access caused it. It's followed by the description of the accessed slub object
+(see 'SLUB Debug output' section in Documentation/vm/slub.txt for details) and
+the description of the accessed memory page.
+
+In the last section the report shows memory state around the accessed address.
+Reading this part requires some understanding of how KASAN works.
+
+The state of each 8 aligned bytes of memory is encoded in one shadow byte.
+Those 8 bytes can be accessible, partially accessible, freed or be a redzone.
+We use the following encoding for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
+of the corresponding memory region are accessible; number N (1 <= N <= 7) means
+that the first N bytes are accessible, and other (8 - N) bytes are not;
+any negative value indicates that the entire 8-byte word is inaccessible.
+We use different negative values to distinguish between different kinds of
+inaccessible memory like redzones or freed memory (see mm/kasan/kasan.h).
+
+In the report above the arrows point to the shadow byte 03, which means that
+the accessed address is partially accessible.
+
+
+Implementation details
+----------------------
+
+From a high level, our approach to memory error detection is similar to that
+of kmemcheck: use shadow memory to record whether each byte of memory is safe
+to access, and use compile-time instrumentation to check shadow memory on each
+memory access.
+
+AddressSanitizer dedicates 1/8 of kernel memory to its shadow memory
+(e.g. 16TB to cover 128TB on x86_64) and uses direct mapping with a scale and
+offset to translate a memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
+
+Here is the function which translates an address to its corresponding shadow
+address::
+
+    static inline void *kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr)
+    {
+	return ((unsigned long)addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT)
+		+ KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
+    }
+
+where ``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3``.
+
+Compile-time instrumentation used for checking memory accesses. Compiler inserts
+function calls (__asan_load*(addr), __asan_store*(addr)) before each memory
+access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16. These functions check whether memory access is
+valid or not by checking corresponding shadow memory.
+
+GCC 5.0 has possibility to perform inline instrumentation. Instead of making
+function calls GCC directly inserts the code to check the shadow memory.
+This option significantly enlarges kernel but it gives x1.1-x2 performance
+boost over outline instrumented kernel.
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kcov.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kcov.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..aca0e27ca197
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kcov.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+kcov: code coverage for fuzzing
+===============================
+
+kcov exposes kernel code coverage information in a form suitable for coverage-
+guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage data of a running kernel is
+exported via the "kcov" debugfs file. Coverage collection is enabled on a task
+basis, and thus it can capture precise coverage of a single system call.
+
+Note that kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims
+to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
+To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts
+and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic parts of kernel is
+disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
+
+Usage
+-----
+
+Configure the kernel with::
+
+        CONFIG_KCOV=y
+
+CONFIG_KCOV requires gcc built on revision 231296 or later.
+Profiling data will only become accessible once debugfs has been mounted::
+
+        mount -t debugfs none /sys/kernel/debug
+
+The following program demonstrates kcov usage from within a test program::
+
+    #include <stdio.h>
+    #include <stddef.h>
+    #include <stdint.h>
+    #include <stdlib.h>
+    #include <sys/types.h>
+    #include <sys/stat.h>
+    #include <sys/ioctl.h>
+    #include <sys/mman.h>
+    #include <unistd.h>
+    #include <fcntl.h>
+
+    #define KCOV_INIT_TRACE			_IOR('c', 1, unsigned long)
+    #define KCOV_ENABLE			_IO('c', 100)
+    #define KCOV_DISABLE			_IO('c', 101)
+    #define COVER_SIZE			(64<<10)
+
+    int main(int argc, char **argv)
+    {
+	int fd;
+	unsigned long *cover, n, i;
+
+	/* A single fd descriptor allows coverage collection on a single
+	 * thread.
+	 */
+	fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR);
+	if (fd == -1)
+		perror("open"), exit(1);
+	/* Setup trace mode and trace size. */
+	if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_INIT_TRACE, COVER_SIZE))
+		perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
+	/* Mmap buffer shared between kernel- and user-space. */
+	cover = (unsigned long*)mmap(NULL, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long),
+				     PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+	if ((void*)cover == MAP_FAILED)
+		perror("mmap"), exit(1);
+	/* Enable coverage collection on the current thread. */
+	if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_ENABLE, 0))
+		perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
+	/* Reset coverage from the tail of the ioctl() call. */
+	__atomic_store_n(&cover[0], 0, __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
+	/* That's the target syscal call. */
+	read(-1, NULL, 0);
+	/* Read number of PCs collected. */
+	n = __atomic_load_n(&cover[0], __ATOMIC_RELAXED);
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+		printf("0x%lx\n", cover[i + 1]);
+	/* Disable coverage collection for the current thread. After this call
+	 * coverage can be enabled for a different thread.
+	 */
+	if (ioctl(fd, KCOV_DISABLE, 0))
+		perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
+	/* Free resources. */
+	if (munmap(cover, COVER_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long)))
+		perror("munmap"), exit(1);
+	if (close(fd))
+		perror("close"), exit(1);
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+After piping through addr2line output of the program looks as follows::
+
+    SyS_read
+    fs/read_write.c:562
+    __fdget_pos
+    fs/file.c:774
+    __fget_light
+    fs/file.c:746
+    __fget_light
+    fs/file.c:750
+    __fget_light
+    fs/file.c:760
+    __fdget_pos
+    fs/file.c:784
+    SyS_read
+    fs/read_write.c:562
+
+If a program needs to collect coverage from several threads (independently),
+it needs to open /sys/kernel/debug/kcov in each thread separately.
+
+The interface is fine-grained to allow efficient forking of test processes.
+That is, a parent process opens /sys/kernel/debug/kcov, enables trace mode,
+mmaps coverage buffer and then forks child processes in a loop. Child processes
+only need to enable coverage (disable happens automatically on thread end).
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kmemcheck.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kmemcheck.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7f3d1985de74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kmemcheck.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,733 @@
+Getting started with kmemcheck
+==============================
+
+Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no>
+
+
+Introduction
+------------
+
+kmemcheck is a debugging feature for the Linux Kernel. More specifically, it
+is a dynamic checker that detects and warns about some uses of uninitialized
+memory.
+
+Userspace programmers might be familiar with Valgrind's memcheck. The main
+difference between memcheck and kmemcheck is that memcheck works for userspace
+programs only, and kmemcheck works for the kernel only. The implementations
+are of course vastly different. Because of this, kmemcheck is not as accurate
+as memcheck, but it turns out to be good enough in practice to discover real
+programmer errors that the compiler is not able to find through static
+analysis.
+
+Enabling kmemcheck on a kernel will probably slow it down to the extent that
+the machine will not be usable for normal workloads such as e.g. an
+interactive desktop. kmemcheck will also cause the kernel to use about twice
+as much memory as normal. For this reason, kmemcheck is strictly a debugging
+feature.
+
+
+Downloading
+-----------
+
+As of version 2.6.31-rc1, kmemcheck is included in the mainline kernel.
+
+
+Configuring and compiling
+-------------------------
+
+kmemcheck only works for the x86 (both 32- and 64-bit) platform. A number of
+configuration variables must have specific settings in order for the kmemcheck
+menu to even appear in "menuconfig". These are:
+
+- ``CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE=n``
+	This option is located under "General setup" / "Optimize for size".
+
+	Without this, gcc will use certain optimizations that usually lead to
+	false positive warnings from kmemcheck. An example of this is a 16-bit
+	field in a struct, where gcc may load 32 bits, then discard the upper
+	16 bits. kmemcheck sees only the 32-bit load, and may trigger a
+	warning for the upper 16 bits (if they're uninitialized).
+
+- ``CONFIG_SLAB=y`` or ``CONFIG_SLUB=y``
+	This option is located under "General setup" / "Choose SLAB
+	allocator".
+
+- ``CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER=n``
+	This option is located under "Kernel hacking" / "Tracers" / "Kernel
+	Function Tracer"
+
+	When function tracing is compiled in, gcc emits a call to another
+	function at the beginning of every function. This means that when the
+	page fault handler is called, the ftrace framework will be called
+	before kmemcheck has had a chance to handle the fault. If ftrace then
+	modifies memory that was tracked by kmemcheck, the result is an
+	endless recursive page fault.
+
+- ``CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=n``
+	This option is located under "Kernel hacking" / "Memory Debugging"
+	/ "Debug page memory allocations".
+
+In addition, I highly recommend turning on ``CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y``. This is also
+located under "Kernel hacking". With this, you will be able to get line number
+information from the kmemcheck warnings, which is extremely valuable in
+debugging a problem. This option is not mandatory, however, because it slows
+down the compilation process and produces a much bigger kernel image.
+
+Now the kmemcheck menu should be visible (under "Kernel hacking" / "Memory
+Debugging" / "kmemcheck: trap use of uninitialized memory"). Here follows
+a description of the kmemcheck configuration variables:
+
+- ``CONFIG_KMEMCHECK``
+	This must be enabled in order to use kmemcheck at all...
+
+- ``CONFIG_KMEMCHECK_``[``DISABLED`` | ``ENABLED`` | ``ONESHOT``]``_BY_DEFAULT``
+	This option controls the status of kmemcheck at boot-time. "Enabled"
+	will enable kmemcheck right from the start, "disabled" will boot the
+	kernel as normal (but with the kmemcheck code compiled in, so it can
+	be enabled at run-time after the kernel has booted), and "one-shot" is
+	a special mode which will turn kmemcheck off automatically after
+	detecting the first use of uninitialized memory.
+
+	If you are using kmemcheck to actively debug a problem, then you
+	probably want to choose "enabled" here.
+
+	The one-shot mode is mostly useful in automated test setups because it
+	can prevent floods of warnings and increase the chances of the machine
+	surviving in case something is really wrong. In other cases, the one-
+	shot mode could actually be counter-productive because it would turn
+	itself off at the very first error -- in the case of a false positive
+	too -- and this would come in the way of debugging the specific
+	problem you were interested in.
+
+	If you would like to use your kernel as normal, but with a chance to
+	enable kmemcheck in case of some problem, it might be a good idea to
+	choose "disabled" here. When kmemcheck is disabled, most of the run-
+	time overhead is not incurred, and the kernel will be almost as fast
+	as normal.
+
+- ``CONFIG_KMEMCHECK_QUEUE_SIZE``
+	Select the maximum number of error reports to store in an internal
+	(fixed-size) buffer. Since errors can occur virtually anywhere and in
+	any context, we need a temporary storage area which is guaranteed not
+	to generate any other page faults when accessed. The queue will be
+	emptied as soon as a tasklet may be scheduled. If the queue is full,
+	new error reports will be lost.
+
+	The default value of 64 is probably fine. If some code produces more
+	than 64 errors within an irqs-off section, then the code is likely to
+	produce many, many more, too, and these additional reports seldom give
+	any more information (the first report is usually the most valuable
+	anyway).
+
+	This number might have to be adjusted if you are not using serial
+	console or similar to capture the kernel log. If you are using the
+	"dmesg" command to save the log, then getting a lot of kmemcheck
+	warnings might overflow the kernel log itself, and the earlier reports
+	will get lost in that way instead. Try setting this to 10 or so on
+	such a setup.
+
+- ``CONFIG_KMEMCHECK_SHADOW_COPY_SHIFT``
+	Select the number of shadow bytes to save along with each entry of the
+	error-report queue. These bytes indicate what parts of an allocation
+	are initialized, uninitialized, etc. and will be displayed when an
+	error is detected to help the debugging of a particular problem.
+
+	The number entered here is actually the logarithm of the number of
+	bytes that will be saved. So if you pick for example 5 here, kmemcheck
+	will save 2^5 = 32 bytes.
+
+	The default value should be fine for debugging most problems. It also
+	fits nicely within 80 columns.
+
+- ``CONFIG_KMEMCHECK_PARTIAL_OK``
+	This option (when enabled) works around certain GCC optimizations that
+	produce 32-bit reads from 16-bit variables where the upper 16 bits are
+	thrown away afterwards.
+
+	The default value (enabled) is recommended. This may of course hide
+	some real errors, but disabling it would probably produce a lot of
+	false positives.
+
+- ``CONFIG_KMEMCHECK_BITOPS_OK``
+	This option silences warnings that would be generated for bit-field
+	accesses where not all the bits are initialized at the same time. This
+	may also hide some real bugs.
+
+	This option is probably obsolete, or it should be replaced with
+	the kmemcheck-/bitfield-annotations for the code in question. The
+	default value is therefore fine.
+
+Now compile the kernel as usual.
+
+
+How to use
+----------
+
+Booting
+~~~~~~~
+
+First some information about the command-line options. There is only one
+option specific to kmemcheck, and this is called "kmemcheck". It can be used
+to override the default mode as chosen by the ``CONFIG_KMEMCHECK_*_BY_DEFAULT``
+option. Its possible settings are:
+
+- ``kmemcheck=0`` (disabled)
+- ``kmemcheck=1`` (enabled)
+- ``kmemcheck=2`` (one-shot mode)
+
+If SLUB debugging has been enabled in the kernel, it may take precedence over
+kmemcheck in such a way that the slab caches which are under SLUB debugging
+will not be tracked by kmemcheck. In order to ensure that this doesn't happen
+(even though it shouldn't by default), use SLUB's boot option ``slub_debug``,
+like this: ``slub_debug=-``
+
+In fact, this option may also be used for fine-grained control over SLUB vs.
+kmemcheck. For example, if the command line includes
+``kmemcheck=1 slub_debug=,dentry``, then SLUB debugging will be used only
+for the "dentry" slab cache, and with kmemcheck tracking all the other
+caches. This is advanced usage, however, and is not generally recommended.
+
+
+Run-time enable/disable
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+When the kernel has booted, it is possible to enable or disable kmemcheck at
+run-time. WARNING: This feature is still experimental and may cause false
+positive warnings to appear. Therefore, try not to use this. If you find that
+it doesn't work properly (e.g. you see an unreasonable amount of warnings), I
+will be happy to take bug reports.
+
+Use the file ``/proc/sys/kernel/kmemcheck`` for this purpose, e.g.::
+
+	$ echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/kmemcheck # disables kmemcheck
+
+The numbers are the same as for the ``kmemcheck=`` command-line option.
+
+
+Debugging
+~~~~~~~~~
+
+A typical report will look something like this::
+
+    WARNING: kmemcheck: Caught 32-bit read from uninitialized memory (ffff88003e4a2024)
+    80000000000000000000000000000000000000000088ffff0000000000000000
+     i i i i u u u u i i i i i i i i u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
+             ^
+
+    Pid: 1856, comm: ntpdate Not tainted 2.6.29-rc5 #264 945P-A
+    RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8104ede8>]  [<ffffffff8104ede8>] __dequeue_signal+0xc8/0x190
+    RSP: 0018:ffff88003cdf7d98  EFLAGS: 00210002
+    RAX: 0000000000000030 RBX: ffff88003d4ea968 RCX: 0000000000000009
+    RDX: ffff88003e5d6018 RSI: ffff88003e5d6024 RDI: ffff88003cdf7e84
+    RBP: ffff88003cdf7db8 R08: ffff88003e5d6000 R09: 0000000000000000
+    R10: 0000000000000080 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000000e
+    R13: ffff88003cdf7e78 R14: ffff88003d530710 R15: ffff88003d5a98c8
+    FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880001982000(0063) knlGS:00000
+    CS:  0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033
+    CR2: ffff88003f806ea0 CR3: 000000003c036000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
+    DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
+    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff4ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
+     [<ffffffff8104f04e>] dequeue_signal+0x8e/0x170
+     [<ffffffff81050bd8>] get_signal_to_deliver+0x98/0x390
+     [<ffffffff8100b87d>] do_notify_resume+0xad/0x7d0
+     [<ffffffff8100c7b5>] int_signal+0x12/0x17
+     [<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
+
+The single most valuable information in this report is the RIP (or EIP on 32-
+bit) value. This will help us pinpoint exactly which instruction that caused
+the warning.
+
+If your kernel was compiled with ``CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y``, then all we have to do
+is give this address to the addr2line program, like this::
+
+	$ addr2line -e vmlinux -i ffffffff8104ede8
+	arch/x86/include/asm/string_64.h:12
+	include/asm-generic/siginfo.h:287
+	kernel/signal.c:380
+	kernel/signal.c:410
+
+The "``-e vmlinux``" tells addr2line which file to look in. **IMPORTANT:**
+This must be the vmlinux of the kernel that produced the warning in the
+first place! If not, the line number information will almost certainly be
+wrong.
+
+The "``-i``" tells addr2line to also print the line numbers of inlined
+functions.  In this case, the flag was very important, because otherwise,
+it would only have printed the first line, which is just a call to
+``memcpy()``, which could be called from a thousand places in the kernel, and
+is therefore not very useful.  These inlined functions would not show up in
+the stack trace above, simply because the kernel doesn't load the extra
+debugging information. This technique can of course be used with ordinary
+kernel oopses as well.
+
+In this case, it's the caller of ``memcpy()`` that is interesting, and it can be
+found in ``include/asm-generic/siginfo.h``, line 287::
+
+    281 static inline void copy_siginfo(struct siginfo *to, struct siginfo *from)
+    282 {
+    283         if (from->si_code < 0)
+    284                 memcpy(to, from, sizeof(*to));
+    285         else
+    286                 /* _sigchld is currently the largest know union member */
+    287                 memcpy(to, from, __ARCH_SI_PREAMBLE_SIZE + sizeof(from->_sifields._sigchld));
+    288 }
+
+Since this was a read (kmemcheck usually warns about reads only, though it can
+warn about writes to unallocated or freed memory as well), it was probably the
+"from" argument which contained some uninitialized bytes. Following the chain
+of calls, we move upwards to see where "from" was allocated or initialized,
+``kernel/signal.c``, line 380::
+
+    359 static void collect_signal(int sig, struct sigpending *list, siginfo_t *info)
+    360 {
+    ...
+    367         list_for_each_entry(q, &list->list, list) {
+    368                 if (q->info.si_signo == sig) {
+    369                         if (first)
+    370                                 goto still_pending;
+    371                         first = q;
+    ...
+    377         if (first) {
+    378 still_pending:
+    379                 list_del_init(&first->list);
+    380                 copy_siginfo(info, &first->info);
+    381                 __sigqueue_free(first);
+    ...
+    392         }
+    393 }
+
+Here, it is ``&first->info`` that is being passed on to ``copy_siginfo()``. The
+variable ``first`` was found on a list -- passed in as the second argument to
+``collect_signal()``. We  continue our journey through the stack, to figure out
+where the item on "list" was allocated or initialized. We move to line 410::
+
+    395 static int __dequeue_signal(struct sigpending *pending, sigset_t *mask,
+    396                         siginfo_t *info)
+    397 {
+    ...
+    410                 collect_signal(sig, pending, info);
+    ...
+    414 }
+
+Now we need to follow the ``pending`` pointer, since that is being passed on to
+``collect_signal()`` as ``list``. At this point, we've run out of lines from the
+"addr2line" output. Not to worry, we just paste the next addresses from the
+kmemcheck stack dump, i.e.::
+
+     [<ffffffff8104f04e>] dequeue_signal+0x8e/0x170
+     [<ffffffff81050bd8>] get_signal_to_deliver+0x98/0x390
+     [<ffffffff8100b87d>] do_notify_resume+0xad/0x7d0
+     [<ffffffff8100c7b5>] int_signal+0x12/0x17
+
+	$ addr2line -e vmlinux -i ffffffff8104f04e ffffffff81050bd8 \
+		ffffffff8100b87d ffffffff8100c7b5
+	kernel/signal.c:446
+	kernel/signal.c:1806
+	arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:805
+	arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:871
+	arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:694
+
+Remember that since these addresses were found on the stack and not as the
+RIP value, they actually point to the _next_ instruction (they are return
+addresses). This becomes obvious when we look at the code for line 446::
+
+    422 int dequeue_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *mask, siginfo_t *info)
+    423 {
+    ...
+    431                 signr = __dequeue_signal(&tsk->signal->shared_pending,
+    432						 mask, info);
+    433			/*
+    434			 * itimer signal ?
+    435			 *
+    436			 * itimers are process shared and we restart periodic
+    437			 * itimers in the signal delivery path to prevent DoS
+    438			 * attacks in the high resolution timer case. This is
+    439			 * compliant with the old way of self restarting
+    440			 * itimers, as the SIGALRM is a legacy signal and only
+    441			 * queued once. Changing the restart behaviour to
+    442			 * restart the timer in the signal dequeue path is
+    443			 * reducing the timer noise on heavy loaded !highres
+    444			 * systems too.
+    445			 */
+    446			if (unlikely(signr == SIGALRM)) {
+    ...
+    489 }
+
+So instead of looking at 446, we should be looking at 431, which is the line
+that executes just before 446. Here we see that what we are looking for is
+``&tsk->signal->shared_pending``.
+
+Our next task is now to figure out which function that puts items on this
+``shared_pending`` list. A crude, but efficient tool, is ``git grep``::
+
+	$ git grep -n 'shared_pending' kernel/
+	...
+	kernel/signal.c:828:	pending = group ? &t->signal->shared_pending : &t->pending;
+	kernel/signal.c:1339:	pending = group ? &t->signal->shared_pending : &t->pending;
+	...
+
+There were more results, but none of them were related to list operations,
+and these were the only assignments. We inspect the line numbers more closely
+and find that this is indeed where items are being added to the list::
+
+    816 static int send_signal(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t,
+    817				int group)
+    818 {
+    ...
+    828		pending = group ? &t->signal->shared_pending : &t->pending;
+    ...
+    851		q = __sigqueue_alloc(t, GFP_ATOMIC, (sig < SIGRTMIN &&
+    852						     (is_si_special(info) ||
+    853						      info->si_code >= 0)));
+    854		if (q) {
+    855			list_add_tail(&q->list, &pending->list);
+    ...
+    890 }
+
+and::
+
+    1309 int send_sigqueue(struct sigqueue *q, struct task_struct *t, int group)
+    1310 {
+    ....
+    1339	 pending = group ? &t->signal->shared_pending : &t->pending;
+    1340	 list_add_tail(&q->list, &pending->list);
+    ....
+    1347 }
+
+In the first case, the list element we are looking for, ``q``, is being
+returned from the function ``__sigqueue_alloc()``, which looks like an
+allocation function.  Let's take a look at it::
+
+    187 static struct sigqueue *__sigqueue_alloc(struct task_struct *t, gfp_t flags,
+    188						 int override_rlimit)
+    189 {
+    190		struct sigqueue *q = NULL;
+    191		struct user_struct *user;
+    192
+    193		/*
+    194		 * We won't get problems with the target's UID changing under us
+    195		 * because changing it requires RCU be used, and if t != current, the
+    196		 * caller must be holding the RCU readlock (by way of a spinlock) and
+    197		 * we use RCU protection here
+    198		 */
+    199		user = get_uid(__task_cred(t)->user);
+    200		atomic_inc(&user->sigpending);
+    201		if (override_rlimit ||
+    202		    atomic_read(&user->sigpending) <=
+    203				t->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_SIGPENDING].rlim_cur)
+    204			q = kmem_cache_alloc(sigqueue_cachep, flags);
+    205		if (unlikely(q == NULL)) {
+    206			atomic_dec(&user->sigpending);
+    207			free_uid(user);
+    208		} else {
+    209			INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->list);
+    210			q->flags = 0;
+    211			q->user = user;
+    212		}
+    213
+    214		return q;
+    215 }
+
+We see that this function initializes ``q->list``, ``q->flags``, and
+``q->user``. It seems that now is the time to look at the definition of
+``struct sigqueue``, e.g.::
+
+    14 struct sigqueue {
+    15	       struct list_head list;
+    16	       int flags;
+    17	       siginfo_t info;
+    18	       struct user_struct *user;
+    19 };
+
+And, you might remember, it was a ``memcpy()`` on ``&first->info`` that
+caused the warning, so this makes perfect sense. It also seems reasonable
+to assume that it is the caller of ``__sigqueue_alloc()`` that has the
+responsibility of filling out (initializing) this member.
+
+But just which fields of the struct were uninitialized? Let's look at
+kmemcheck's report again::
+
+    WARNING: kmemcheck: Caught 32-bit read from uninitialized memory (ffff88003e4a2024)
+    80000000000000000000000000000000000000000088ffff0000000000000000
+     i i i i u u u u i i i i i i i i u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
+	     ^
+
+These first two lines are the memory dump of the memory object itself, and
+the shadow bytemap, respectively. The memory object itself is in this case
+``&first->info``. Just beware that the start of this dump is NOT the start
+of the object itself! The position of the caret (^) corresponds with the
+address of the read (ffff88003e4a2024).
+
+The shadow bytemap dump legend is as follows:
+
+- i: initialized
+- u: uninitialized
+- a: unallocated (memory has been allocated by the slab layer, but has not
+  yet been handed off to anybody)
+- f: freed (memory has been allocated by the slab layer, but has been freed
+  by the previous owner)
+
+In order to figure out where (relative to the start of the object) the
+uninitialized memory was located, we have to look at the disassembly. For
+that, we'll need the RIP address again::
+
+    RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8104ede8>]  [<ffffffff8104ede8>] __dequeue_signal+0xc8/0x190
+
+	$ objdump -d --no-show-raw-insn vmlinux | grep -C 8 ffffffff8104ede8:
+	ffffffff8104edc8:	mov    %r8,0x8(%r8)
+	ffffffff8104edcc:	test   %r10d,%r10d
+	ffffffff8104edcf:	js     ffffffff8104ee88 <__dequeue_signal+0x168>
+	ffffffff8104edd5:	mov    %rax,%rdx
+	ffffffff8104edd8:	mov    $0xc,%ecx
+	ffffffff8104eddd:	mov    %r13,%rdi
+	ffffffff8104ede0:	mov    $0x30,%eax
+	ffffffff8104ede5:	mov    %rdx,%rsi
+	ffffffff8104ede8:	rep movsl %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi)
+	ffffffff8104edea:	test   $0x2,%al
+	ffffffff8104edec:	je     ffffffff8104edf0 <__dequeue_signal+0xd0>
+	ffffffff8104edee:	movsw  %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi)
+	ffffffff8104edf0:	test   $0x1,%al
+	ffffffff8104edf2:	je     ffffffff8104edf5 <__dequeue_signal+0xd5>
+	ffffffff8104edf4:	movsb  %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi)
+	ffffffff8104edf5:	mov    %r8,%rdi
+	ffffffff8104edf8:	callq  ffffffff8104de60 <__sigqueue_free>
+
+As expected, it's the "``rep movsl``" instruction from the ``memcpy()``
+that causes the warning. We know about ``REP MOVSL`` that it uses the register
+``RCX`` to count the number of remaining iterations. By taking a look at the
+register dump again (from the kmemcheck report), we can figure out how many
+bytes were left to copy::
+
+    RAX: 0000000000000030 RBX: ffff88003d4ea968 RCX: 0000000000000009
+
+By looking at the disassembly, we also see that ``%ecx`` is being loaded
+with the value ``$0xc`` just before (ffffffff8104edd8), so we are very
+lucky. Keep in mind that this is the number of iterations, not bytes. And
+since this is a "long" operation, we need to multiply by 4 to get the
+number of bytes. So this means that the uninitialized value was encountered
+at 4 * (0xc - 0x9) = 12 bytes from the start of the object.
+
+We can now try to figure out which field of the "``struct siginfo``" that
+was not initialized. This is the beginning of the struct::
+
+    40 typedef struct siginfo {
+    41	       int si_signo;
+    42	       int si_errno;
+    43	       int si_code;
+    44
+    45	       union {
+    ..
+    92	       } _sifields;
+    93 } siginfo_t;
+
+On 64-bit, the int is 4 bytes long, so it must the union member that has
+not been initialized. We can verify this using gdb::
+
+	$ gdb vmlinux
+	...
+	(gdb) p &((struct siginfo *) 0)->_sifields
+	$1 = (union {...} *) 0x10
+
+Actually, it seems that the union member is located at offset 0x10 -- which
+means that gcc has inserted 4 bytes of padding between the members ``si_code``
+and ``_sifields``. We can now get a fuller picture of the memory dump::
+
+		 _----------------------------=> si_code
+		/	 _--------------------=> (padding)
+	       |	/	 _------------=> _sifields(._kill._pid)
+	       |       |	/	 _----=> _sifields(._kill._uid)
+	       |       |       |	/
+	-------|-------|-------|-------|
+	80000000000000000000000000000000000000000088ffff0000000000000000
+	 i i i i u u u u i i i i i i i i u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
+
+This allows us to realize another important fact: ``si_code`` contains the
+value 0x80. Remember that x86 is little endian, so the first 4 bytes
+"80000000" are really the number 0x00000080. With a bit of research, we
+find that this is actually the constant ``SI_KERNEL`` defined in
+``include/asm-generic/siginfo.h``::
+
+    144 #define SI_KERNEL	0x80		/* sent by the kernel from somewhere	 */
+
+This macro is used in exactly one place in the x86 kernel: In ``send_signal()``
+in ``kernel/signal.c``::
+
+    816 static int send_signal(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t,
+    817				int group)
+    818 {
+    ...
+    828		pending = group ? &t->signal->shared_pending : &t->pending;
+    ...
+    851		q = __sigqueue_alloc(t, GFP_ATOMIC, (sig < SIGRTMIN &&
+    852						     (is_si_special(info) ||
+    853						      info->si_code >= 0)));
+    854		if (q) {
+    855			list_add_tail(&q->list, &pending->list);
+    856			switch ((unsigned long) info) {
+    ...
+    865			case (unsigned long) SEND_SIG_PRIV:
+    866				q->info.si_signo = sig;
+    867				q->info.si_errno = 0;
+    868				q->info.si_code = SI_KERNEL;
+    869				q->info.si_pid = 0;
+    870				q->info.si_uid = 0;
+    871				break;
+    ...
+    890 }
+
+Not only does this match with the ``.si_code`` member, it also matches the place
+we found earlier when looking for where siginfo_t objects are enqueued on the
+``shared_pending`` list.
+
+So to sum up: It seems that it is the padding introduced by the compiler
+between two struct fields that is uninitialized, and this gets reported when
+we do a ``memcpy()`` on the struct. This means that we have identified a false
+positive warning.
+
+Normally, kmemcheck will not report uninitialized accesses in ``memcpy()`` calls
+when both the source and destination addresses are tracked. (Instead, we copy
+the shadow bytemap as well). In this case, the destination address clearly
+was not tracked. We can dig a little deeper into the stack trace from above::
+
+	arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:805
+	arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:871
+	arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:694
+
+And we clearly see that the destination siginfo object is located on the
+stack::
+
+    782 static void do_signal(struct pt_regs *regs)
+    783 {
+    784		struct k_sigaction ka;
+    785		siginfo_t info;
+    ...
+    804		signr = get_signal_to_deliver(&info, &ka, regs, NULL);
+    ...
+    854 }
+
+And this ``&info`` is what eventually gets passed to ``copy_siginfo()`` as the
+destination argument.
+
+Now, even though we didn't find an actual error here, the example is still a
+good one, because it shows how one would go about to find out what the report
+was all about.
+
+
+Annotating false positives
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+There are a few different ways to make annotations in the source code that
+will keep kmemcheck from checking and reporting certain allocations. Here
+they are:
+
+- ``__GFP_NOTRACK_FALSE_POSITIVE``
+	This flag can be passed to ``kmalloc()`` or ``kmem_cache_alloc()``
+	(therefore also to other functions that end up calling one of
+	these) to indicate that the allocation should not be tracked
+	because it would lead to a false positive report. This is a "big
+	hammer" way of silencing kmemcheck; after all, even if the false
+	positive pertains to particular field in a struct, for example, we
+	will now lose the ability to find (real) errors in other parts of
+	the same struct.
+
+	Example::
+
+	    /* No warnings will ever trigger on accessing any part of x */
+	    x = kmalloc(sizeof *x, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK_FALSE_POSITIVE);
+
+- ``kmemcheck_bitfield_begin(name)``/``kmemcheck_bitfield_end(name)`` and
+	``kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield(ptr, name)``
+	The first two of these three macros can be used inside struct
+	definitions to signal, respectively, the beginning and end of a
+	bitfield. Additionally, this will assign the bitfield a name, which
+	is given as an argument to the macros.
+
+	Having used these markers, one can later use
+	kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield() at the point of allocation, to indicate
+	which parts of the allocation is part of a bitfield.
+
+	Example::
+
+	    struct foo {
+		int x;
+
+		kmemcheck_bitfield_begin(flags);
+		int flag_a:1;
+		int flag_b:1;
+		kmemcheck_bitfield_end(flags);
+
+		int y;
+	    };
+
+	    struct foo *x = kmalloc(sizeof *x);
+
+	    /* No warnings will trigger on accessing the bitfield of x */
+	    kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield(x, flags);
+
+	Note that ``kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield()`` can be used even before the
+	return value of ``kmalloc()`` is checked -- in other words, passing NULL
+	as the first argument is legal (and will do nothing).
+
+
+Reporting errors
+----------------
+
+As we have seen, kmemcheck will produce false positive reports. Therefore, it
+is not very wise to blindly post kmemcheck warnings to mailing lists and
+maintainers. Instead, I encourage maintainers and developers to find errors
+in their own code. If you get a warning, you can try to work around it, try
+to figure out if it's a real error or not, or simply ignore it. Most
+developers know their own code and will quickly and efficiently determine the
+root cause of a kmemcheck report. This is therefore also the most efficient
+way to work with kmemcheck.
+
+That said, we (the kmemcheck maintainers) will always be on the lookout for
+false positives that we can annotate and silence. So whatever you find,
+please drop us a note privately! Kernel configs and steps to reproduce (if
+available) are of course a great help too.
+
+Happy hacking!
+
+
+Technical description
+---------------------
+
+kmemcheck works by marking memory pages non-present. This means that whenever
+somebody attempts to access the page, a page fault is generated. The page
+fault handler notices that the page was in fact only hidden, and so it calls
+on the kmemcheck code to make further investigations.
+
+When the investigations are completed, kmemcheck "shows" the page by marking
+it present (as it would be under normal circumstances). This way, the
+interrupted code can continue as usual.
+
+But after the instruction has been executed, we should hide the page again, so
+that we can catch the next access too! Now kmemcheck makes use of a debugging
+feature of the processor, namely single-stepping. When the processor has
+finished the one instruction that generated the memory access, a debug
+exception is raised. From here, we simply hide the page again and continue
+execution, this time with the single-stepping feature turned off.
+
+kmemcheck requires some assistance from the memory allocator in order to work.
+The memory allocator needs to
+
+  1. Tell kmemcheck about newly allocated pages and pages that are about to
+     be freed. This allows kmemcheck to set up and tear down the shadow memory
+     for the pages in question. The shadow memory stores the status of each
+     byte in the allocation proper, e.g. whether it is initialized or
+     uninitialized.
+
+  2. Tell kmemcheck which parts of memory should be marked uninitialized.
+     There are actually a few more states, such as "not yet allocated" and
+     "recently freed".
+
+If a slab cache is set up using the SLAB_NOTRACK flag, it will never return
+memory that can take page faults because of kmemcheck.
+
+If a slab cache is NOT set up using the SLAB_NOTRACK flag, callers can still
+request memory with the __GFP_NOTRACK or __GFP_NOTRACK_FALSE_POSITIVE flags.
+This does not prevent the page faults from occurring, however, but marks the
+object in question as being initialized so that no warnings will ever be
+produced for this object.
+
+Currently, the SLAB and SLUB allocators are supported by kmemcheck.
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kmemleak.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kmemleak.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1788722d5495
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kmemleak.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+Kernel Memory Leak Detector
+===========================
+
+Kmemleak provides a way of detecting possible kernel memory leaks in a
+way similar to a tracing garbage collector
+(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garbage_collection_%28computer_science%29#Tracing_garbage_collectors),
+with the difference that the orphan objects are not freed but only
+reported via /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak. A similar method is used by the
+Valgrind tool (``memcheck --leak-check``) to detect the memory leaks in
+user-space applications.
+Kmemleak is supported on x86, arm, powerpc, sparc, sh, microblaze, ppc, mips, s390, metag and tile.
+
+Usage
+-----
+
+CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK in "Kernel hacking" has to be enabled. A kernel
+thread scans the memory every 10 minutes (by default) and prints the
+number of new unreferenced objects found. To display the details of all
+the possible memory leaks::
+
+  # mount -t debugfs nodev /sys/kernel/debug/
+  # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
+
+To trigger an intermediate memory scan::
+
+  # echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
+
+To clear the list of all current possible memory leaks::
+
+  # echo clear > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
+
+New leaks will then come up upon reading ``/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak``
+again.
+
+Note that the orphan objects are listed in the order they were allocated
+and one object at the beginning of the list may cause other subsequent
+objects to be reported as orphan.
+
+Memory scanning parameters can be modified at run-time by writing to the
+``/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak`` file. The following parameters are supported:
+
+- off
+    disable kmemleak (irreversible)
+- stack=on
+    enable the task stacks scanning (default)
+- stack=off
+    disable the tasks stacks scanning
+- scan=on
+    start the automatic memory scanning thread (default)
+- scan=off
+    stop the automatic memory scanning thread
+- scan=<secs>
+    set the automatic memory scanning period in seconds
+    (default 600, 0 to stop the automatic scanning)
+- scan
+    trigger a memory scan
+- clear
+    clear list of current memory leak suspects, done by
+    marking all current reported unreferenced objects grey,
+    or free all kmemleak objects if kmemleak has been disabled.
+- dump=<addr>
+    dump information about the object found at <addr>
+
+Kmemleak can also be disabled at boot-time by passing ``kmemleak=off`` on
+the kernel command line.
+
+Memory may be allocated or freed before kmemleak is initialised and
+these actions are stored in an early log buffer. The size of this buffer
+is configured via the CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_EARLY_LOG_SIZE option.
+
+If CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF are enabled, the kmemleak is
+disabled by default. Passing ``kmemleak=on`` on the kernel command
+line enables the function. 
+
+Basic Algorithm
+---------------
+
+The memory allocations via :c:func:`kmalloc`, :c:func:`vmalloc`,
+:c:func:`kmem_cache_alloc` and
+friends are traced and the pointers, together with additional
+information like size and stack trace, are stored in a rbtree.
+The corresponding freeing function calls are tracked and the pointers
+removed from the kmemleak data structures.
+
+An allocated block of memory is considered orphan if no pointer to its
+start address or to any location inside the block can be found by
+scanning the memory (including saved registers). This means that there
+might be no way for the kernel to pass the address of the allocated
+block to a freeing function and therefore the block is considered a
+memory leak.
+
+The scanning algorithm steps:
+
+  1. mark all objects as white (remaining white objects will later be
+     considered orphan)
+  2. scan the memory starting with the data section and stacks, checking
+     the values against the addresses stored in the rbtree. If
+     a pointer to a white object is found, the object is added to the
+     gray list
+  3. scan the gray objects for matching addresses (some white objects
+     can become gray and added at the end of the gray list) until the
+     gray set is finished
+  4. the remaining white objects are considered orphan and reported via
+     /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
+
+Some allocated memory blocks have pointers stored in the kernel's
+internal data structures and they cannot be detected as orphans. To
+avoid this, kmemleak can also store the number of values pointing to an
+address inside the block address range that need to be found so that the
+block is not considered a leak. One example is __vmalloc().
+
+Testing specific sections with kmemleak
+---------------------------------------
+
+Upon initial bootup your /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak output page may be
+quite extensive. This can also be the case if you have very buggy code
+when doing development. To work around these situations you can use the
+'clear' command to clear all reported unreferenced objects from the
+/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak output. By issuing a 'scan' after a 'clear'
+you can find new unreferenced objects; this should help with testing
+specific sections of code.
+
+To test a critical section on demand with a clean kmemleak do::
+
+  # echo clear > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
+  ... test your kernel or modules ...
+  # echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
+
+Then as usual to get your report with::
+
+  # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
+
+Freeing kmemleak internal objects
+---------------------------------
+
+To allow access to previously found memory leaks after kmemleak has been
+disabled by the user or due to an fatal error, internal kmemleak objects
+won't be freed when kmemleak is disabled, and those objects may occupy
+a large part of physical memory.
+
+In this situation, you may reclaim memory with::
+
+  # echo clear > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
+
+Kmemleak API
+------------
+
+See the include/linux/kmemleak.h header for the functions prototype.
+
+- ``kmemleak_init``		 - initialize kmemleak
+- ``kmemleak_alloc``		 - notify of a memory block allocation
+- ``kmemleak_alloc_percpu``	 - notify of a percpu memory block allocation
+- ``kmemleak_free``		 - notify of a memory block freeing
+- ``kmemleak_free_part``	 - notify of a partial memory block freeing
+- ``kmemleak_free_percpu``	 - notify of a percpu memory block freeing
+- ``kmemleak_update_trace``	 - update object allocation stack trace
+- ``kmemleak_not_leak``	 - mark an object as not a leak
+- ``kmemleak_ignore``		 - do not scan or report an object as leak
+- ``kmemleak_scan_area``	 - add scan areas inside a memory block
+- ``kmemleak_no_scan``	 - do not scan a memory block
+- ``kmemleak_erase``		 - erase an old value in a pointer variable
+- ``kmemleak_alloc_recursive`` - as kmemleak_alloc but checks the recursiveness
+- ``kmemleak_free_recursive``	 - as kmemleak_free but checks the recursiveness
+
+Dealing with false positives/negatives
+--------------------------------------
+
+The false negatives are real memory leaks (orphan objects) but not
+reported by kmemleak because values found during the memory scanning
+point to such objects. To reduce the number of false negatives, kmemleak
+provides the kmemleak_ignore, kmemleak_scan_area, kmemleak_no_scan and
+kmemleak_erase functions (see above). The task stacks also increase the
+amount of false negatives and their scanning is not enabled by default.
+
+The false positives are objects wrongly reported as being memory leaks
+(orphan). For objects known not to be leaks, kmemleak provides the
+kmemleak_not_leak function. The kmemleak_ignore could also be used if
+the memory block is known not to contain other pointers and it will no
+longer be scanned.
+
+Some of the reported leaks are only transient, especially on SMP
+systems, because of pointers temporarily stored in CPU registers or
+stacks. Kmemleak defines MSECS_MIN_AGE (defaulting to 1000) representing
+the minimum age of an object to be reported as a memory leak.
+
+Limitations and Drawbacks
+-------------------------
+
+The main drawback is the reduced performance of memory allocation and
+freeing. To avoid other penalties, the memory scanning is only performed
+when the /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak file is read. Anyway, this tool is
+intended for debugging purposes where the performance might not be the
+most important requirement.
+
+To keep the algorithm simple, kmemleak scans for values pointing to any
+address inside a block's address range. This may lead to an increased
+number of false negatives. However, it is likely that a real memory leak
+will eventually become visible.
+
+Another source of false negatives is the data stored in non-pointer
+values. In a future version, kmemleak could only scan the pointer
+members in the allocated structures. This feature would solve many of
+the false negative cases described above.
+
+The tool can report false positives. These are cases where an allocated
+block doesn't need to be freed (some cases in the init_call functions),
+the pointer is calculated by other methods than the usual container_of
+macro or the pointer is stored in a location not scanned by kmemleak.
+
+Page allocations and ioremap are not tracked.
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/sparse.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/sparse.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8c250e8a2105
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/sparse.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+.. Copyright 2004 Linus Torvalds
+.. Copyright 2004 Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
+.. Copyright 2006 Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com>
+
+Sparse
+======
+
+Sparse is a semantic checker for C programs; it can be used to find a
+number of potential problems with kernel code.  See
+https://lwn.net/Articles/689907/ for an overview of sparse; this document
+contains some kernel-specific sparse information.
+
+
+Using sparse for typechecking
+-----------------------------
+
+"__bitwise" is a type attribute, so you have to do something like this::
+
+        typedef int __bitwise pm_request_t;
+
+        enum pm_request {
+                PM_SUSPEND = (__force pm_request_t) 1,
+                PM_RESUME = (__force pm_request_t) 2
+        };
+
+which makes PM_SUSPEND and PM_RESUME "bitwise" integers (the "__force" is
+there because sparse will complain about casting to/from a bitwise type,
+but in this case we really _do_ want to force the conversion). And because
+the enum values are all the same type, now "enum pm_request" will be that
+type too.
+
+And with gcc, all the "__bitwise"/"__force stuff" goes away, and it all
+ends up looking just like integers to gcc.
+
+Quite frankly, you don't need the enum there. The above all really just
+boils down to one special "int __bitwise" type.
+
+So the simpler way is to just do::
+
+        typedef int __bitwise pm_request_t;
+
+        #define PM_SUSPEND ((__force pm_request_t) 1)
+        #define PM_RESUME ((__force pm_request_t) 2)
+
+and you now have all the infrastructure needed for strict typechecking.
+
+One small note: the constant integer "0" is special. You can use a
+constant zero as a bitwise integer type without sparse ever complaining.
+This is because "bitwise" (as the name implies) was designed for making
+sure that bitwise types don't get mixed up (little-endian vs big-endian
+vs cpu-endian vs whatever), and there the constant "0" really _is_
+special.
+
+__bitwise__ - to be used for relatively compact stuff (gfp_t, etc.) that
+is mostly warning-free and is supposed to stay that way.  Warnings will
+be generated without __CHECK_ENDIAN__.
+
+__bitwise - noisy stuff; in particular, __le*/__be* are that.  We really
+don't want to drown in noise unless we'd explicitly asked for it.
+
+Using sparse for lock checking
+------------------------------
+
+The following macros are undefined for gcc and defined during a sparse
+run to use the "context" tracking feature of sparse, applied to
+locking.  These annotations tell sparse when a lock is held, with
+regard to the annotated function's entry and exit.
+
+__must_hold - The specified lock is held on function entry and exit.
+
+__acquires - The specified lock is held on function exit, but not entry.
+
+__releases - The specified lock is held on function entry, but not exit.
+
+If the function enters and exits without the lock held, acquiring and
+releasing the lock inside the function in a balanced way, no
+annotation is needed.  The tree annotations above are for cases where
+sparse would otherwise report a context imbalance.
+
+Getting sparse
+--------------
+
+You can get latest released versions from the Sparse homepage at
+https://sparse.wiki.kernel.org/index.php/Main_Page
+
+Alternatively, you can get snapshots of the latest development version
+of sparse using git to clone::
+
+        git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/devel/sparse/sparse.git
+
+DaveJ has hourly generated tarballs of the git tree available at::
+
+        http://www.codemonkey.org.uk/projects/git-snapshots/sparse/
+
+
+Once you have it, just do::
+
+        make
+        make install
+
+as a regular user, and it will install sparse in your ~/bin directory.
+
+Using sparse
+------------
+
+Do a kernel make with "make C=1" to run sparse on all the C files that get
+recompiled, or use "make C=2" to run sparse on the files whether they need to
+be recompiled or not.  The latter is a fast way to check the whole tree if you
+have already built it.
+
+The optional make variable CF can be used to pass arguments to sparse.  The
+build system passes -Wbitwise to sparse automatically.  To perform endianness
+checks, you may define __CHECK_ENDIAN__::
+
+        make C=2 CF="-D__CHECK_ENDIAN__"
+
+These checks are disabled by default as they generate a host of warnings.
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/tools.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/tools.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..824ae8e54dd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/tools.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+================================
+Development tools for the kernel
+================================
+
+This document is a collection of documents about development tools that can
+be used to work on the kernel.  For now, the documents have been pulled
+together without any significant effot to integrate them into a coherent
+whole; patches welcome!
+
+.. class:: toc-title
+
+	   Table of contents
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 2
+
+   coccinelle
+   sparse
+   kcov
+   gcov
+   kasan
+   ubsan
+   kmemleak
+   kmemcheck
+   gdb-kernel-debugging
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/ubsan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/ubsan.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..655e6b63c227
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/ubsan.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+The Undefined Behavior Sanitizer - UBSAN
+========================================
+
+UBSAN is a runtime undefined behaviour checker.
+
+UBSAN uses compile-time instrumentation to catch undefined behavior (UB).
+Compiler inserts code that perform certain kinds of checks before operations
+that may cause UB. If check fails (i.e. UB detected) __ubsan_handle_*
+function called to print error message.
+
+GCC has that feature since 4.9.x [1_] (see ``-fsanitize=undefined`` option and
+its suboptions). GCC 5.x has more checkers implemented [2_].
+
+Report example
+--------------
+
+::
+
+	 ================================================================================
+	 UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in ../include/linux/bitops.h:110:33
+	 shift exponent 32 is to large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int'
+	 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.4.0-rc1+ #26
+	  0000000000000000 ffffffff82403cc8 ffffffff815e6cd6 0000000000000001
+	  ffffffff82403cf8 ffffffff82403ce0 ffffffff8163a5ed 0000000000000020
+	  ffffffff82403d78 ffffffff8163ac2b ffffffff815f0001 0000000000000002
+	 Call Trace:
+	  [<ffffffff815e6cd6>] dump_stack+0x45/0x5f
+	  [<ffffffff8163a5ed>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x40
+	  [<ffffffff8163ac2b>] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0xeb/0x130
+	  [<ffffffff815f0001>] ? radix_tree_gang_lookup_slot+0x51/0x150
+	  [<ffffffff8173c586>] _mix_pool_bytes+0x1e6/0x480
+	  [<ffffffff83105653>] ? dmi_walk_early+0x48/0x5c
+	  [<ffffffff8173c881>] add_device_randomness+0x61/0x130
+	  [<ffffffff83105b35>] ? dmi_save_one_device+0xaa/0xaa
+	  [<ffffffff83105653>] dmi_walk_early+0x48/0x5c
+	  [<ffffffff831066ae>] dmi_scan_machine+0x278/0x4b4
+	  [<ffffffff8111d58a>] ? vprintk_default+0x1a/0x20
+	  [<ffffffff830ad120>] ? early_idt_handler_array+0x120/0x120
+	  [<ffffffff830b2240>] setup_arch+0x405/0xc2c
+	  [<ffffffff830ad120>] ? early_idt_handler_array+0x120/0x120
+	  [<ffffffff830ae053>] start_kernel+0x83/0x49a
+	  [<ffffffff830ad120>] ? early_idt_handler_array+0x120/0x120
+	  [<ffffffff830ad386>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
+	  [<ffffffff830ad4f3>] x86_64_start_kernel+0x16b/0x17a
+	 ================================================================================
+
+Usage
+-----
+
+To enable UBSAN configure kernel with::
+
+	CONFIG_UBSAN=y
+
+and to check the entire kernel::
+
+        CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL=y
+
+To enable instrumentation for specific files or directories, add a line
+similar to the following to the respective kernel Makefile:
+
+- For a single file (e.g. main.o)::
+
+    UBSAN_SANITIZE_main.o := y
+
+- For all files in one directory::
+
+    UBSAN_SANITIZE := y
+
+To exclude files from being instrumented even if
+``CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL=y``, use::
+
+  UBSAN_SANITIZE_main.o := n
+
+and::
+
+  UBSAN_SANITIZE := n
+
+Detection of unaligned accesses controlled through the separate option -
+CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT. It's off by default on architectures that support
+unaligned accesses (CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS=y). One could
+still enable it in config, just note that it will produce a lot of UBSAN
+reports.
+
+References
+----------
+
+.. _1: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.0/gcc/Debugging-Options.html
+.. _2: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Debugging-Options.html