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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-11-01 11:46:27 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-11-01 11:46:27 -0700 |
| commit | 2d6bb6adb714b133db92ccd4bfc9c20f75f71f3f (patch) | |
| tree | aef040a1ee4b8b6edc5a4fa2b3c6a2c48219f27a /arch/Kconfig | |
| parent | 7c6c54b505b8aea1782ce6a6e8f3b8297d179937 (diff) | |
| parent | 6fcde90466738b84a073e4f4d18c50015ee29fb2 (diff) | |
| download | linux-2d6bb6adb714b133db92ccd4bfc9c20f75f71f3f.tar.gz linux-2d6bb6adb714b133db92ccd4bfc9c20f75f71f3f.tar.bz2 linux-2d6bb6adb714b133db92ccd4bfc9c20f75f71f3f.zip | |
Merge tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull stackleak gcc plugin from Kees Cook:
"Please pull this new GCC plugin, stackleak, for v4.20-rc1. This plugin
was ported from grsecurity by Alexander Popov. It provides efficient
stack content poisoning at syscall exit. This creates a defense
against at least two classes of flaws:
- Uninitialized stack usage. (We continue to work on improving the
compiler to do this in other ways: e.g. unconditional zero init was
proposed to GCC and Clang, and more plugin work has started too).
- Stack content exposure. By greatly reducing the lifetime of valid
stack contents, exposures via either direct read bugs or unknown
cache side-channels become much more difficult to exploit. This
complements the existing buddy and heap poisoning options, but
provides the coverage for stacks.
The x86 hooks are included in this series (which have been reviewed by
Ingo, Dave Hansen, and Thomas Gleixner). The arm64 hooks have already
been merged through the arm64 tree (written by Laura Abbott and
reviewed by Mark Rutland and Will Deacon).
With VLAs having been removed this release, there is no need for
alloca() protection, so it has been removed from the plugin"
* tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
arm64: Drop unneeded stackleak_check_alloca()
stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/Kconfig | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index ed27fd262627..e1e540ffa979 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -429,6 +429,13 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER See Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst for details. +config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK + bool + help + An architecture should select this if it has the code which + fills the used part of the kernel stack with the STACKLEAK_POISON + value before returning from system calls. + config HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR bool help |