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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-03 18:57:57 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-03 18:57:57 -0800 |
commit | 96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693 (patch) | |
tree | df03d142d405652392707b1b80c284d68d6ea6ab /arch/hexagon | |
parent | 135143b2cac43d2a1ec73b53033b9473fbbcce6d (diff) | |
download | linux-96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693.tar.gz linux-96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693.tar.bz2 linux-96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693.zip |
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/hexagon')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/hexagon/include/asm/futex.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/hexagon/kernel/signal.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/hexagon/mm/uaccess.c | 2 |
4 files changed, 4 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/futex.h b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/futex.h index c889f5993ecd..cb635216a732 100644 --- a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/futex.h +++ b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/futex.h @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval, u32 __user *uaddr, u32 oldval, int prev; int ret; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uaddr, sizeof(u32))) + if (!access_ok(uaddr, sizeof(u32))) return -EFAULT; __asm__ __volatile__ ( diff --git a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h index 458b69886b34..a30e58d5f351 100644 --- a/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/hexagon/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ /* * access_ok: - Checks if a user space pointer is valid - * @type: Type of access: %VERIFY_READ or %VERIFY_WRITE. Note that - * %VERIFY_WRITE is a superset of %VERIFY_READ - if it is safe - * to write to a block, it is always safe to read from it. * @addr: User space pointer to start of block to check * @size: Size of block to check * diff --git a/arch/hexagon/kernel/signal.c b/arch/hexagon/kernel/signal.c index 78aa7304a5c9..31e2cf95f189 100644 --- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/signal.c @@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set, frame = get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sizeof(struct rt_sigframe)); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(struct rt_sigframe))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(struct rt_sigframe))) return -EFAULT; if (copy_siginfo_to_user(&frame->info, &ksig->info)) @@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ asmlinkage int sys_rt_sigreturn(void) current->restart_block.fn = do_no_restart_syscall; frame = (struct rt_sigframe __user *)pt_psp(regs); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) goto badframe; if (__copy_from_user(&blocked, &frame->uc.uc_sigmask, sizeof(blocked))) goto badframe; diff --git a/arch/hexagon/mm/uaccess.c b/arch/hexagon/mm/uaccess.c index c599eb126c9e..6f9c4697552c 100644 --- a/arch/hexagon/mm/uaccess.c +++ b/arch/hexagon/mm/uaccess.c @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ __kernel_size_t __clear_user_hexagon(void __user *dest, unsigned long count) unsigned long clear_user_hexagon(void __user *dest, unsigned long count) { - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dest, count)) + if (!access_ok(dest, count)) return count; else return __clear_user_hexagon(dest, count); |