summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>2017-12-04 15:07:29 +0100
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2017-12-17 14:27:52 +0100
commitc482feefe1aeb150156248ba0fd3e029bc886605 (patch)
tree41e3c0c88f477adacb911da988925c87dc4e3a89 /arch/x86/kernel/process.c
parent0f9a48100fba3f189724ae88a450c2261bf91c80 (diff)
downloadlinux-c482feefe1aeb150156248ba0fd3e029bc886605.tar.gz
linux-c482feefe1aeb150156248ba0fd3e029bc886605.tar.bz2
linux-c482feefe1aeb150156248ba0fd3e029bc886605.zip
x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only
The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it read-only on x86_64. On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations without double fault handling. [ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for confirmation. ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/process.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/process.c6
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 6a04287f222b..517415978409 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
* section. Since TSS's are completely CPU-local, we want them
* on exact cacheline boundaries, to eliminate cacheline ping-pong.
*/
-__visible DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss) = {
+__visible DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss_rw) = {
.x86_tss = {
/*
* .sp0 is only used when entering ring 0 from a lower
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ __visible DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tss_struct, cpu_tss) = {
.io_bitmap = { [0 ... IO_BITMAP_LONGS] = ~0 },
#endif
};
-EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_tss);
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_tss_rw);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, __tss_limit_invalid);
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(__tss_limit_invalid);
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
struct fpu *fpu = &t->fpu;
if (bp) {
- struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss, get_cpu());
+ struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, get_cpu());
t->io_bitmap_ptr = NULL;
clear_thread_flag(TIF_IO_BITMAP);