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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-23 18:43:04 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-23 18:43:04 +0100 |
| commit | d82924c3b8d0607094b94fab290a33c5ad7d586c (patch) | |
| tree | 2afbc9066262b5987c8568a09f80db5198025689 /arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | |
| parent | d7197a5ad8528642cb70f1d27d4d5c7332a2b395 (diff) | |
| parent | bb4b3b7762735cdaba5a40fd94c9303d9ffa147a (diff) | |
| download | linux-d82924c3b8d0607094b94fab290a33c5ad7d586c.tar.gz linux-d82924c3b8d0607094b94fab290a33c5ad7d586c.tar.bz2 linux-d82924c3b8d0607094b94fab290a33c5ad7d586c.zip | |
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 pti updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes:
- Make the IBPB barrier more strict and add STIBP support (Jiri
Kosina)
- Micro-optimize and clean up the entry code (Andy Lutomirski)
- ... plus misc other fixes"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs
x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation
x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak
x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant
x86/CPU: Fix unused variable warning when !CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
x86/pti/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 entry trampoline
x86/entry/64: Use the TSS sp2 slot for SYSCALL/SYSRET scratch space
x86/entry/64: Document idtentry
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/traps.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index 16c95cb90496..5bd0a997d81e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -383,6 +383,10 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) * we won't enable interupts or schedule before we invoke * general_protection, so nothing will clobber the stack * frame we just set up. + * + * We will enter general_protection with kernel GSBASE, + * which is what the stub expects, given that the faulting + * RIP will be the IRET instruction. */ regs->ip = (unsigned long)general_protection; regs->sp = (unsigned long)&gpregs->orig_ax; |