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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-03 18:57:57 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-03 18:57:57 -0800 |
commit | 96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693 (patch) | |
tree | df03d142d405652392707b1b80c284d68d6ea6ab /arch/x86/um | |
parent | 135143b2cac43d2a1ec73b53033b9473fbbcce6d (diff) | |
download | linux-96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693.tar.gz linux-96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693.tar.bz2 linux-96d4f267e40f9509e8a66e2b39e8b95655617693.zip |
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/um')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/um/asm/checksum_32.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/um/signal.c | 6 |
2 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum_32.h b/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum_32.h index 83a75f8a1233..b9ac7c9eb72c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum_32.h +++ b/arch/x86/um/asm/checksum_32.h @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static __inline__ __wsum csum_and_copy_to_user(const void *src, void __user *dst, int len, __wsum sum, int *err_ptr) { - if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dst, len)) { + if (access_ok(dst, len)) { if (copy_to_user(dst, src, len)) { *err_ptr = -EFAULT; return (__force __wsum)-1; diff --git a/arch/x86/um/signal.c b/arch/x86/um/signal.c index 727ed442e0a5..8b4a71efe7ee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/um/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/um/signal.c @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ int setup_signal_stack_sc(unsigned long stack_top, struct ksignal *ksig, /* This is the same calculation as i386 - ((sp + 4) & 15) == 0 */ stack_top = ((stack_top + 4) & -16UL) - 4; frame = (struct sigframe __user *) stack_top - 1; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) return 1; restorer = frame->retcode; @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ int setup_signal_stack_si(unsigned long stack_top, struct ksignal *ksig, stack_top &= -8UL; frame = (struct rt_sigframe __user *) stack_top - 1; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) return 1; restorer = frame->retcode; @@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ int setup_signal_stack_si(unsigned long stack_top, struct ksignal *ksig, /* Subtract 128 for a red zone and 8 for proper alignment */ frame = (struct rt_sigframe __user *) ((unsigned long) frame - 128 - 8); - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, frame, sizeof(*frame))) + if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof(*frame))) goto out; if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO) { |