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author | Emil Velikov <emil.velikov@collabora.com> | 2020-03-19 17:29:29 +0000 |
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committer | Emil Velikov <emil.l.velikov@gmail.com> | 2020-03-30 12:20:32 +0100 |
commit | 45bc3d26c95a8fc63a7d8668ca9e57ef0883351c (patch) | |
tree | 2b8b7a32df9762d6a9025fd4ab6d9d6f7c920358 /drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c | |
parent | c7ccc1b783681722638ec0c432908f69d197303a (diff) | |
download | linux-45bc3d26c95a8fc63a7d8668ca9e57ef0883351c.tar.gz linux-45bc3d26c95a8fc63a7d8668ca9e57ef0883351c.tar.bz2 linux-45bc3d26c95a8fc63a7d8668ca9e57ef0883351c.zip |
drm: rework SET_MASTER and DROP_MASTER perm handling
This commit reworks the permission handling of the two ioctls. In
particular it enforced the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check only, if:
- we're issuing the ioctl from process other than the one which opened
the node, and
- we are, or were master in the past
This ensures that we:
- do not regress the systemd-logind style of DRM_MASTER arbitrator
- allow applications which do not use systemd-logind to drop their
master capabilities (and regain them at later point) ... w/o running as
root.
See the comment above drm_master_check_perm() for more details.
v1:
- Tweak wording, fixup all checks, add igt test
v2:
- Add a few more comments, grammar nitpicks.
Cc: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Pekka Paalanen <ppaalanen@gmail.com>
Testcase: igt/core_setmaster/master-drop-set-user
Signed-off-by: Emil Velikov <emil.velikov@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200319172930.230583-1-emil.l.velikov@gmail.com
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c | 67 |
1 files changed, 67 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c index 531b876d0ed8..93c57f08bd93 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_auth.c @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ static int drm_set_master(struct drm_device *dev, struct drm_file *fpriv, } } + fpriv->was_master = (ret == 0); return ret; } @@ -174,12 +175,72 @@ out_err: return ret; } +/* + * In the olden days the SET/DROP_MASTER ioctls used to return EACCES when + * CAP_SYS_ADMIN was not set. This was used to prevent rogue applications + * from becoming master and/or failing to release it. + * + * At the same time, the first client (for a given VT) is _always_ master. + * Thus in order for the ioctls to succeed, one had to _explicitly_ run the + * application as root or flip the setuid bit. + * + * If the CAP_SYS_ADMIN was missing, no other client could become master... + * EVER :-( Leading to a) the graphics session dying badly or b) a completely + * locked session. + * + * + * As some point systemd-logind was introduced to orchestrate and delegate + * master as applicable. It does so by opening the fd and passing it to users + * while in itself logind a) does the set/drop master per users' request and + * b) * implicitly drops master on VT switch. + * + * Even though logind looks like the future, there are a few issues: + * - some platforms don't have equivalent (Android, CrOS, some BSDs) so + * root is required _solely_ for SET/DROP MASTER. + * - applications may not be updated to use it, + * - any client which fails to drop master* can DoS the application using + * logind, to a varying degree. + * + * * Either due missing CAP_SYS_ADMIN or simply not calling DROP_MASTER. + * + * + * Here we implement the next best thing: + * - ensure the logind style of fd passing works unchanged, and + * - allow a client to drop/set master, iff it is/was master at a given point + * in time. + * + * Note: DROP_MASTER cannot be free for all, as an arbitrator user could: + * - DoS/crash the arbitrator - details would be implementation specific + * - open the node, become master implicitly and cause issues + * + * As a result this fixes the following when using root-less build w/o logind + * - startx + * - weston + * - various compositors based on wlroots + */ +static int +drm_master_check_perm(struct drm_device *dev, struct drm_file *file_priv) +{ + if (file_priv->pid == task_pid(current) && file_priv->was_master) + return 0; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EACCES; + + return 0; +} + int drm_setmaster_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, struct drm_file *file_priv) { int ret = 0; mutex_lock(&dev->master_mutex); + + ret = drm_master_check_perm(dev, file_priv); + if (ret) + goto out_unlock; + if (drm_is_current_master(file_priv)) goto out_unlock; @@ -224,6 +285,12 @@ int drm_dropmaster_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, int ret = -EINVAL; mutex_lock(&dev->master_mutex); + + ret = drm_master_check_perm(dev, file_priv); + if (ret) + goto out_unlock; + + ret = -EINVAL; if (!drm_is_current_master(file_priv)) goto out_unlock; |