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author | Florian Zumbiehl <florz@florz.de> | 2007-04-20 16:58:14 -0700 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net> | 2007-04-25 22:29:20 -0700 |
commit | 202a03acf9994076055df40ae093a5c5474ad0bd (patch) | |
tree | 293b06b3c8789cf9df053d6ab1da70dcdecd1f75 /drivers/net/pppoe.c | |
parent | 74b885cf86def9bc836772e3c1788c00b72a35c9 (diff) | |
download | linux-202a03acf9994076055df40ae093a5c5474ad0bd.tar.gz linux-202a03acf9994076055df40ae093a5c5474ad0bd.tar.bz2 linux-202a03acf9994076055df40ae093a5c5474ad0bd.zip |
[PPPOE]: memory leak when socket is release()d before PPPIOCGCHAN has been called on it
below you find a patch that fixes a memory leak when a PPPoE socket is
release()d after it has been connect()ed, but before the PPPIOCGCHAN ioctl
ever has been called on it.
This is somewhat of a security problem, too, since PPPoE sockets can be
created by any user, so any user can easily allocate all the machine's
RAM to non-swappable address space and thus DoS the system.
Is there any specific reason for PPPoE sockets being available to any
unprivileged process, BTW? After all, you need a packet socket for the
discovery stage anyway, so it's unlikely that any unprivileged process
will ever need to create a PPPoE socket, no? Allocating all session IDs
for a known AC is a kind of DoS, too, after all - with Juniper ERXes,
this is really easy, actually, since they don't ever assign session ids
above 8000 ...
Signed-off-by: Florian Zumbiehl <florz@florz.de>
Acked-by: Michal Ostrowski <mostrows@earthlink.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/pppoe.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions