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authorTyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2009-03-13 13:51:59 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2009-03-14 11:57:22 -0700
commit84814d642a4f1f294bd675ab11aae1ca54c6cedb (patch)
tree4ae91cce54c8d9578dc3217b6454a921b91833a3 /fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
parent15e7b8767605dc0cb9bd4594caabfec392385210 (diff)
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eCryptfs: don't encrypt file key with filename key
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the FNEK. This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK from being encrypted with a FNEK. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c2
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
index f6caeb1d1106..bdca1f4b3a3e 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
@@ -946,6 +946,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(
list_for_each_entry(global_auth_tok,
&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list,
mount_crypt_stat_list) {
+ if (global_auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK)
+ continue;
rc = ecryptfs_add_keysig(crypt_stat, global_auth_tok->sig);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error adding keysig; rc = [%d]\n", rc);