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author | Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> | 2010-01-14 17:28:10 -0500 |
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committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2010-01-18 09:54:26 +1100 |
commit | 19439d05b88dafc4e55d9ffce84ccc27cf8b2bcc (patch) | |
tree | e529e1bbba49f30684c3b88a67df1d62ba3e11b1 /fs/ext2/dir.c | |
parent | 8d9525048c74786205b99f3fcd05a839721edfb7 (diff) | |
download | linux-19439d05b88dafc4e55d9ffce84ccc27cf8b2bcc.tar.gz linux-19439d05b88dafc4e55d9ffce84ccc27cf8b2bcc.tar.bz2 linux-19439d05b88dafc4e55d9ffce84ccc27cf8b2bcc.zip |
selinux: change the handling of unknown classes
If allow_unknown==deny, SELinux treats an undefined kernel security
class as an error condition rather than as a typical permission denial
and thus does not allow permissions on undefined classes even when in
permissive mode. Change the SELinux logic so that this case is handled
as a typical permission denial, subject to the usual permissive mode and
permissive domain handling.
Also drop the 'requested' argument from security_compute_av() and
helpers as it is a legacy of the original security server interface and
is unused.
Changes:
- Handle permissive domains consistently by moving up the test for a
permissive domain.
- Make security_compute_av_user() consistent with security_compute_av();
the only difference now is that security_compute_av() performs mapping
between the kernel-private class and permission indices and the policy
values. In the userspace case, this mapping is handled by libselinux.
- Moved avd_init inside the policy lock.
Based in part on a patch by Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>.
Reported-by: Andrew Worsley <amworsley@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ext2/dir.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions