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author | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> | 2008-08-07 13:00:20 -0400 |
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committer | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> | 2008-09-29 17:56:56 -0400 |
commit | 04716e6621ff4abb422d64ba7b48718f52716a3e (patch) | |
tree | 742e2e7b6d4c7cf3a39f504000a49e57fe0b538b /fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | |
parent | 5dd248f6f1ffe1f691fd66749e2a3dc8f8eb7b5e (diff) | |
download | linux-04716e6621ff4abb422d64ba7b48718f52716a3e.tar.gz linux-04716e6621ff4abb422d64ba7b48718f52716a3e.tar.bz2 linux-04716e6621ff4abb422d64ba7b48718f52716a3e.zip |
nfsd: permit unauthenticated stat of export root
RFC 2623 section 2.3.2 permits the server to bypass gss authentication
checks for certain operations that a client may perform when mounting.
In the case of a client that doesn't have some form of credentials
available to it on boot, this allows it to perform the mount unattended.
(Presumably real file access won't be needed until a user with
credentials logs in.)
Being slightly more lenient allows lots of old clients to access
krb5-only exports, with the only loss being a small amount of
information leaked about the root directory of the export.
This affects only v2 and v3; v4 still requires authentication for all
access.
Thanks to Peter Staubach testing against a Solaris client, which
suggesting addition of v3 getattr, to the list, and to Trond for noting
that doing so exposes no additional information.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Peter Staubach <staubach@redhat.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c | 30 |
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c index ea37c96f0445..cd25d91895a1 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c @@ -302,17 +302,27 @@ fh_verify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, int access) if (error) goto out; - if (!(access & NFSD_MAY_LOCK)) { - /* - * pseudoflavor restrictions are not enforced on NLM, - * which clients virtually always use auth_sys for, - * even while using RPCSEC_GSS for NFS. - */ - error = check_nfsd_access(exp, rqstp); - if (error) - goto out; - } + /* + * pseudoflavor restrictions are not enforced on NLM, + * which clients virtually always use auth_sys for, + * even while using RPCSEC_GSS for NFS. + */ + if (access & NFSD_MAY_LOCK) + goto skip_pseudoflavor_check; + /* + * Clients may expect to be able to use auth_sys during mount, + * even if they use gss for everything else; see section 2.3.2 + * of rfc 2623. + */ + if (access & NFSD_MAY_BYPASS_GSS_ON_ROOT + && exp->ex_path.dentry == dentry) + goto skip_pseudoflavor_check; + + error = check_nfsd_access(exp, rqstp); + if (error) + goto out; +skip_pseudoflavor_check: /* Finally, check access permissions. */ error = nfsd_permission(rqstp, exp, dentry, access); |