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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2012-07-31 01:14:12 -0700
committerEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2012-11-19 05:59:17 -0800
commita85fb273c94648cbf20a5f9bcf8bbbb075f271ad (patch)
treebdfe3d662dd4a42673620067f21c7b6fedd04d27 /fs/open.c
parent50804fe3737ca6a5942fdc2057a18a8141d00141 (diff)
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vfs: Allow chroot if you have CAP_SYS_CHROOT in your user namespace
Once you are confined to a user namespace applications can not gain privilege and escape the user namespace so there is no longer a reason to restrict chroot. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/open.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/open.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 59071f55bf7f..182d8667b7bd 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
goto dput_and_out;
error = -EPERM;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
+ if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
goto dput_and_out;
error = security_path_chroot(&path);
if (error)