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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-06-13 09:56:21 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-06-13 09:56:21 -0700 |
commit | 6c3297841472b4e53e22e53826eea9e483d993e5 (patch) | |
tree | 5093eddf48bab64350ea050cd50ad0292a817687 /fs | |
parent | df2fbf5bfa0e7fff8b4784507e4d68f200454318 (diff) | |
parent | a8478a602913dc89a7cd2060e613edecd07e1dbd (diff) | |
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Merge tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull notification queue from David Howells:
"This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
changing their attributes.
Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47
Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.
[ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
this one works first ]
LSM hooks are included:
- A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
"watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux & Smack]
- A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]
I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
hooks.
WHY
===
Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
cache changes.
However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
need to poll.
DESIGN DECISIONS
================
- The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:
pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&co from accessing
the pipe.
[?] Should this be done some other way? I'd rather not use up a new
O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
instead?
The pipe is then configured::
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);
Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().
- It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
holding pipe->mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
auditing.
- sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
pipes because of the pipe->mutex issue and also because they
sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.
- The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
to update the queue pointers.
- Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
they can be of varying size.
This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
sources.
- Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.
- Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
- and only those that are watching for it.
- When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
message at an appropriate point later.
- The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
to it, using one of:
keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);
where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
a tag between 0 and 255.
- Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.
Things I want to avoid:
- Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).
- Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
inaccessible inside a container.
- Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.
TESTING AND MANPAGES
====================
- The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
the main manpages repository instead.
If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
all be checked off to make sure they happened.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch
- A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"
* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
pipe: Add notification lossage handling
pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
Add sample notification program
watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
pipe: Add general notification queue support
pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
uapi: General notification queue definitions
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/pipe.c | 242 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/splice.c | 12 |
2 files changed, 178 insertions, 76 deletions
diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c index c7c4fb5f345f..60dbee457143 100644 --- a/fs/pipe.c +++ b/fs/pipe.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/fcntl.h> #include <linux/memcontrol.h> +#include <linux/watch_queue.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <asm/ioctls.h> @@ -259,14 +260,44 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to) unsigned int tail = pipe->tail; unsigned int mask = pipe->ring_size - 1; +#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE + if (pipe->note_loss) { + struct watch_notification n; + + if (total_len < 8) { + if (ret == 0) + ret = -ENOBUFS; + break; + } + + n.type = WATCH_TYPE_META; + n.subtype = WATCH_META_LOSS_NOTIFICATION; + n.info = watch_sizeof(n); + if (copy_to_iter(&n, sizeof(n), to) != sizeof(n)) { + if (ret == 0) + ret = -EFAULT; + break; + } + ret += sizeof(n); + total_len -= sizeof(n); + pipe->note_loss = false; + } +#endif + if (!pipe_empty(head, tail)) { struct pipe_buffer *buf = &pipe->bufs[tail & mask]; size_t chars = buf->len; size_t written; int error; - if (chars > total_len) + if (chars > total_len) { + if (buf->flags & PIPE_BUF_FLAG_WHOLE) { + if (ret == 0) + ret = -ENOBUFS; + break; + } chars = total_len; + } error = pipe_buf_confirm(pipe, buf); if (error) { @@ -294,6 +325,10 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to) if (!buf->len) { pipe_buf_release(pipe, buf); spin_lock_irq(&pipe->rd_wait.lock); +#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE + if (buf->flags & PIPE_BUF_FLAG_LOSS) + pipe->note_loss = true; +#endif tail++; pipe->tail = tail; spin_unlock_irq(&pipe->rd_wait.lock); @@ -405,6 +440,13 @@ pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from) goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE + if (pipe->watch_queue) { + ret = -EXDEV; + goto out; + } +#endif + /* * Only wake up if the pipe started out empty, since * otherwise there should be no readers waiting. @@ -574,22 +616,37 @@ static long pipe_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) int count, head, tail, mask; switch (cmd) { - case FIONREAD: - __pipe_lock(pipe); - count = 0; - head = pipe->head; - tail = pipe->tail; - mask = pipe->ring_size - 1; + case FIONREAD: + __pipe_lock(pipe); + count = 0; + head = pipe->head; + tail = pipe->tail; + mask = pipe->ring_size - 1; - while (tail != head) { - count += pipe->bufs[tail & mask].len; - tail++; - } - __pipe_unlock(pipe); + while (tail != head) { + count += pipe->bufs[tail & mask].len; + tail++; + } + __pipe_unlock(pipe); + + return put_user(count, (int __user *)arg); - return put_user(count, (int __user *)arg); - default: - return -ENOIOCTLCMD; +#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE + case IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE: { + int ret; + __pipe_lock(pipe); + ret = watch_queue_set_size(pipe, arg); + __pipe_unlock(pipe); + return ret; + } + + case IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER: + return watch_queue_set_filter( + pipe, (struct watch_notification_filter __user *)arg); +#endif + + default: + return -ENOIOCTLCMD; } } @@ -700,27 +757,27 @@ pipe_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) return retval; } -static unsigned long account_pipe_buffers(struct user_struct *user, - unsigned long old, unsigned long new) +unsigned long account_pipe_buffers(struct user_struct *user, + unsigned long old, unsigned long new) { return atomic_long_add_return(new - old, &user->pipe_bufs); } -static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(unsigned long user_bufs) +bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(unsigned long user_bufs) { unsigned long soft_limit = READ_ONCE(pipe_user_pages_soft); return soft_limit && user_bufs > soft_limit; } -static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs) +bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs) { unsigned long hard_limit = READ_ONCE(pipe_user_pages_hard); return hard_limit && user_bufs > hard_limit; } -static bool is_unprivileged_user(void) +bool pipe_is_unprivileged_user(void) { return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); } @@ -742,12 +799,12 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void) user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, 0, pipe_bufs); - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) { + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs) && pipe_is_unprivileged_user()) { user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(user, pipe_bufs, 1); pipe_bufs = 1; } - if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) && is_unprivileged_user()) + if (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) && pipe_is_unprivileged_user()) goto out_revert_acct; pipe->bufs = kcalloc(pipe_bufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer), @@ -759,6 +816,7 @@ struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void) pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1; pipe->max_usage = pipe_bufs; pipe->ring_size = pipe_bufs; + pipe->nr_accounted = pipe_bufs; pipe->user = user; mutex_init(&pipe->mutex); return pipe; @@ -776,7 +834,14 @@ void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe) { int i; - (void) account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->ring_size, 0); +#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE + if (pipe->watch_queue) { + watch_queue_clear(pipe->watch_queue); + put_watch_queue(pipe->watch_queue); + } +#endif + + (void) account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->nr_accounted, 0); free_uid(pipe->user); for (i = 0; i < pipe->ring_size; i++) { struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i; @@ -852,6 +917,17 @@ int create_pipe_files(struct file **res, int flags) if (!inode) return -ENFILE; + if (flags & O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE) { +#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE + if (watch_queue_init(inode->i_pipe) < 0) { + iput(inode); + return -ENOMEM; + } +#else + return -ENOPKG; +#endif + } + f = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, pipe_mnt, "", O_WRONLY | (flags & (O_NONBLOCK | O_DIRECT)), &pipefifo_fops); @@ -882,7 +958,7 @@ static int __do_pipe_flags(int *fd, struct file **files, int flags) int error; int fdw, fdr; - if (flags & ~(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK | O_DIRECT)) + if (flags & ~(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK | O_DIRECT | O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE)) return -EINVAL; error = create_pipe_files(files, flags); @@ -1130,42 +1206,12 @@ unsigned int round_pipe_size(unsigned long size) } /* - * Allocate a new array of pipe buffers and copy the info over. Returns the - * pipe size if successful, or return -ERROR on error. + * Resize the pipe ring to a number of slots. */ -static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg) +int pipe_resize_ring(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int nr_slots) { struct pipe_buffer *bufs; - unsigned int size, nr_slots, head, tail, mask, n; - unsigned long user_bufs; - long ret = 0; - - size = round_pipe_size(arg); - nr_slots = size >> PAGE_SHIFT; - - if (!nr_slots) - return -EINVAL; - - /* - * If trying to increase the pipe capacity, check that an - * unprivileged user is not trying to exceed various limits - * (soft limit check here, hard limit check just below). - * Decreasing the pipe capacity is always permitted, even - * if the user is currently over a limit. - */ - if (nr_slots > pipe->ring_size && - size > pipe_max_size && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) - return -EPERM; - - user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->ring_size, nr_slots); - - if (nr_slots > pipe->ring_size && - (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) || - too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) && - is_unprivileged_user()) { - ret = -EPERM; - goto out_revert_acct; - } + unsigned int head, tail, mask, n; /* * We can shrink the pipe, if arg is greater than the ring occupancy. @@ -1177,17 +1223,13 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg) head = pipe->head; tail = pipe->tail; n = pipe_occupancy(pipe->head, pipe->tail); - if (nr_slots < n) { - ret = -EBUSY; - goto out_revert_acct; - } + if (nr_slots < n) + return -EBUSY; bufs = kcalloc(nr_slots, sizeof(*bufs), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_NOWARN); - if (unlikely(!bufs)) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out_revert_acct; - } + if (unlikely(!bufs)) + return -ENOMEM; /* * The pipe array wraps around, so just start the new one at zero @@ -1215,16 +1257,68 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg) kfree(pipe->bufs); pipe->bufs = bufs; pipe->ring_size = nr_slots; - pipe->max_usage = nr_slots; + if (pipe->max_usage > nr_slots) + pipe->max_usage = nr_slots; pipe->tail = tail; pipe->head = head; /* This might have made more room for writers */ wake_up_interruptible(&pipe->wr_wait); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Allocate a new array of pipe buffers and copy the info over. Returns the + * pipe size if successful, or return -ERROR on error. + */ +static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long arg) +{ + unsigned long user_bufs; + unsigned int nr_slots, size; + long ret = 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE + if (pipe->watch_queue) + return -EBUSY; +#endif + + size = round_pipe_size(arg); + nr_slots = size >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + if (!nr_slots) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * If trying to increase the pipe capacity, check that an + * unprivileged user is not trying to exceed various limits + * (soft limit check here, hard limit check just below). + * Decreasing the pipe capacity is always permitted, even + * if the user is currently over a limit. + */ + if (nr_slots > pipe->max_usage && + size > pipe_max_size && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) + return -EPERM; + + user_bufs = account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, pipe->nr_accounted, nr_slots); + + if (nr_slots > pipe->max_usage && + (too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user_bufs) || + too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user_bufs)) && + pipe_is_unprivileged_user()) { + ret = -EPERM; + goto out_revert_acct; + } + + ret = pipe_resize_ring(pipe, nr_slots); + if (ret < 0) + goto out_revert_acct; + + pipe->max_usage = nr_slots; + pipe->nr_accounted = nr_slots; return pipe->max_usage * PAGE_SIZE; out_revert_acct: - (void) account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, nr_slots, pipe->ring_size); + (void) account_pipe_buffers(pipe->user, nr_slots, pipe->nr_accounted); return ret; } @@ -1233,9 +1327,17 @@ out_revert_acct: * location, so checking ->i_pipe is not enough to verify that this is a * pipe. */ -struct pipe_inode_info *get_pipe_info(struct file *file) +struct pipe_inode_info *get_pipe_info(struct file *file, bool for_splice) { - return file->f_op == &pipefifo_fops ? file->private_data : NULL; + struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = file->private_data; + + if (file->f_op != &pipefifo_fops || !pipe) + return NULL; +#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE + if (for_splice && pipe->watch_queue) + return NULL; +#endif + return pipe; } long pipe_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) @@ -1243,7 +1345,7 @@ long pipe_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) struct pipe_inode_info *pipe; long ret; - pipe = get_pipe_info(file); + pipe = get_pipe_info(file, false); if (!pipe) return -EBADF; diff --git a/fs/splice.c b/fs/splice.c index 6b3c9a018a8e..d7c8a7c4db07 100644 --- a/fs/splice.c +++ b/fs/splice.c @@ -1101,8 +1101,8 @@ long do_splice(struct file *in, loff_t __user *off_in, !(out->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))) return -EBADF; - ipipe = get_pipe_info(in); - opipe = get_pipe_info(out); + ipipe = get_pipe_info(in, true); + opipe = get_pipe_info(out, true); if (ipipe && opipe) { if (off_in || off_out) @@ -1252,7 +1252,7 @@ static int pipe_to_user(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf, static long vmsplice_to_user(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *iter, unsigned int flags) { - struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = get_pipe_info(file); + struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = get_pipe_info(file, true); struct splice_desc sd = { .total_len = iov_iter_count(iter), .flags = flags, @@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ static long vmsplice_to_pipe(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *iter, if (flags & SPLICE_F_GIFT) buf_flag = PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT; - pipe = get_pipe_info(file); + pipe = get_pipe_info(file, true); if (!pipe) return -EBADF; @@ -1733,8 +1733,8 @@ static int link_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe, */ long do_tee(struct file *in, struct file *out, size_t len, unsigned int flags) { - struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe = get_pipe_info(in); - struct pipe_inode_info *opipe = get_pipe_info(out); + struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe = get_pipe_info(in, true); + struct pipe_inode_info *opipe = get_pipe_info(out, true); int ret = -EINVAL; if (unlikely(!(in->f_mode & FMODE_READ) || |