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author | Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> | 2011-03-23 16:43:17 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-03-23 19:47:02 -0700 |
commit | 3486740a4f32a6a466f5ac931654d154790ba648 (patch) | |
tree | ac5d968a66057fa84933b8f89fd3e916270dffed /include/linux/cred.h | |
parent | 59607db367c57f515183cb203642291bb14d9c40 (diff) | |
download | linux-3486740a4f32a6a466f5ac931654d154790ba648.tar.gz linux-3486740a4f32a6a466f5ac931654d154790ba648.tar.bz2 linux-3486740a4f32a6a466f5ac931654d154790ba648.zip |
userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespace
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we
were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
he was the creator. Reverse those checks.
12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
it! Fix the check in cap_capable().
02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
fixing a compile failure.
02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some
couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add
a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations
together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
kernel-doc format.
02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.
(Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version
acked by him)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/cred.h')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/cred.h | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index 4aaeab376446..9aeeb0ba2003 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -354,9 +354,11 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred) #define current_fsgid() (current_cred_xxx(fsgid)) #define current_cap() (current_cred_xxx(cap_effective)) #define current_user() (current_cred_xxx(user)) -#define current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user)->user_ns) +#define _current_user_ns() (current_cred_xxx(user)->user_ns) #define current_security() (current_cred_xxx(security)) +extern struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void); + #define current_uid_gid(_uid, _gid) \ do { \ const struct cred *__cred; \ |