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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-10-19 16:25:56 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-10-19 16:25:56 -0700
commitab074ade9c33b3585da86d62e87bcb3e897a3f54 (patch)
tree142b42182889c64813af997b8701707a3397e834 /kernel/auditfilter.c
parent61ed53deb1c6a4386d8710dbbfcee8779c381931 (diff)
parent2991dd2b0117e864f394c826af6df144206ce0db (diff)
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Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit
Pull audit updates from Eric Paris: "So this change across a whole bunch of arches really solves one basic problem. We want to audit when seccomp is killing a process. seccomp hooks in before the audit syscall entry code. audit_syscall_entry took as an argument the arch of the given syscall. Since the arch is part of what makes a syscall number meaningful it's an important part of the record, but it isn't available when seccomp shoots the syscall... For most arch's we have a better way to get the arch (syscall_get_arch) So the solution was two fold: Implement syscall_get_arch() everywhere there is audit which didn't have it. Use syscall_get_arch() in the seccomp audit code. Having syscall_get_arch() everywhere meant it was a useless flag on the stack and we could get rid of it for the typical syscall entry. The other changes inside the audit system aren't grand, fixed some records that had invalid spaces. Better locking around the task comm field. Removing some dead functions and structs. Make some things static. Really minor stuff" * git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (31 commits) audit: rename audit_log_remove_rule to disambiguate for trees audit: cull redundancy in audit_rule_change audit: WARN if audit_rule_change called illegally audit: put rule existence check in canonical order next: openrisc: Fix build audit: get comm using lock to avoid race in string printing audit: remove open_arg() function that is never used audit: correct AUDIT_GET_FEATURE return message type audit: set nlmsg_len for multicast messages. audit: use union for audit_field values since they are mutually exclusive audit: invalid op= values for rules audit: use atomic_t to simplify audit_serial() kernel/audit.c: use ARRAY_SIZE instead of sizeof/sizeof[0] audit: reduce scope of audit_log_fcaps audit: reduce scope of audit_net_id audit: arm64: Remove the audit arch argument to audit_syscall_entry arm64: audit: Add audit hook in syscall_trace_enter/exit() audit: x86: drop arch from __audit_syscall_entry() interface sparc: implement is_32bit_task sparc: properly conditionalize use of TIF_32BIT ...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditfilter.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditfilter.c56
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index c447cd9848d1..3598e13f2a65 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -71,6 +71,24 @@ static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
+static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
+{
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ kfree(f->lsm_str);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
+ }
+}
+
static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
{
int i;
@@ -80,11 +98,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
if (erule->watch)
audit_put_watch(erule->watch);
if (erule->fields)
- for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++) {
- struct audit_field *f = &erule->fields[i];
- kfree(f->lsm_str);
- security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++)
+ audit_free_lsm_field(&erule->fields[i]);
kfree(erule->fields);
kfree(erule->filterkey);
kfree(e);
@@ -148,7 +163,7 @@ static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule,
struct audit_field *f)
{
if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
- krule->watch || krule->inode_f || krule->tree ||
+ krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree ||
(f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -422,10 +437,6 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
f->type = data->fields[i];
f->val = data->values[i];
- f->uid = INVALID_UID;
- f->gid = INVALID_GID;
- f->lsm_str = NULL;
- f->lsm_rule = NULL;
/* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
@@ -1053,30 +1064,27 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data,
int err = 0;
struct audit_entry *entry;
+ entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry))
+ return PTR_ERR(entry);
+
switch (type) {
case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
- entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
- if (IS_ERR(entry))
- return PTR_ERR(entry);
-
err = audit_add_rule(entry);
- audit_log_rule_change("add rule", &entry->rule, !err);
- if (err)
- audit_free_rule(entry);
+ audit_log_rule_change("add_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
break;
case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
- entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
- if (IS_ERR(entry))
- return PTR_ERR(entry);
-
err = audit_del_rule(entry);
- audit_log_rule_change("remove rule", &entry->rule, !err);
- audit_free_rule(entry);
+ audit_log_rule_change("remove_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
break;
default:
- return -EINVAL;
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ WARN_ON(1);
}
+ if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE)
+ audit_free_rule(entry);
+
return err;
}