diff options
author | Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> | 2007-04-19 10:28:21 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2007-05-11 05:38:26 -0400 |
commit | 0a4ff8c2598b72f2fa9d50aae9e1809e684dbf41 (patch) | |
tree | 309f2b2b5874692302862534cd9052a1d96018ba /kernel/auditsc.c | |
parent | 5712e88f2b0f626a4857c24128810bbf8ce09537 (diff) | |
download | linux-0a4ff8c2598b72f2fa9d50aae9e1809e684dbf41.tar.gz linux-0a4ff8c2598b72f2fa9d50aae9e1809e684dbf41.tar.bz2 linux-0a4ff8c2598b72f2fa9d50aae9e1809e684dbf41.zip |
[PATCH] Abnormal End of Processes
Hi,
I have been working on some code that detects abnormal events based on audit
system events. One kind of event that we currently have no visibility for is
when a program terminates due to segfault - which should never happen on a
production machine. And if it did, you'd want to investigate it. Attached is a
patch that collects these events and sends them into the audit system.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditsc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 39 |
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 5276b7ef05f1..e36481ed61b4 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2037,3 +2037,42 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) return 0; } + +/** + * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally + * @sig: signal value + * + * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we + * should record the event for investigation. + */ +void audit_core_dumps(long signr) +{ + struct audit_buffer *ab; + u32 sid; + + if (!audit_enabled) + return; + + if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ + return; + + ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); + audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u", + audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context), + current->uid, current->gid); + selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid); + if (sid) { + char *ctx = NULL; + u32 len; + + if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) + audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid); + else + audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); + kfree(ctx); + } + audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); + audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); + audit_log_end(ab); +} |