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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-12-11 14:27:06 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2014-12-11 14:27:06 -0800
commit70e71ca0af244f48a5dcf56dc435243792e3a495 (patch)
treef7d9c4c4d9a857a00043e9bf6aa2d6f533a34778 /kernel/bpf/verifier.c
parentbae41e45b7400496b9bf0c70c6004419d9987819 (diff)
parent00c83b01d58068dfeb2e1351cca6fccf2a83fa8f (diff)
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Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller: 1) New offloading infrastructure and example 'rocker' driver for offloading of switching and routing to hardware. This work was done by a large group of dedicated individuals, not limited to: Scott Feldman, Jiri Pirko, Thomas Graf, John Fastabend, Jamal Hadi Salim, Andy Gospodarek, Florian Fainelli, Roopa Prabhu 2) Start making the networking operate on IOV iterators instead of modifying iov objects in-situ during transfers. Thanks to Al Viro and Herbert Xu. 3) A set of new netlink interfaces for the TIPC stack, from Richard Alpe. 4) Remove unnecessary looping during ipv6 routing lookups, from Martin KaFai Lau. 5) Add PAUSE frame generation support to gianfar driver, from Matei Pavaluca. 6) Allow for larger reordering levels in TCP, which are easily achievable in the real world right now, from Eric Dumazet. 7) Add a variable of napi_schedule that doesn't need to disable cpu interrupts, from Eric Dumazet. 8) Use a doubly linked list to optimize neigh_parms_release(), from Nicolas Dichtel. 9) Various enhancements to the kernel BPF verifier, and allow eBPF programs to actually be attached to sockets. From Alexei Starovoitov. 10) Support TSO/LSO in sunvnet driver, from David L Stevens. 11) Allow controlling ECN usage via routing metrics, from Florian Westphal. 12) Remote checksum offload, from Tom Herbert. 13) Add split-header receive, BQL, and xmit_more support to amd-xgbe driver, from Thomas Lendacky. 14) Add MPLS support to openvswitch, from Simon Horman. 15) Support wildcard tunnel endpoints in ipv6 tunnels, from Steffen Klassert. 16) Do gro flushes on a per-device basis using a timer, from Eric Dumazet. This tries to resolve the conflicting goals between the desired handling of bulk vs. RPC-like traffic. 17) Allow userspace to ask for the CPU upon what a packet was received/steered, via SO_INCOMING_CPU. From Eric Dumazet. 18) Limit GSO packets to half the current congestion window, from Eric Dumazet. 19) Add a generic helper so that all drivers set their RSS keys in a consistent way, from Eric Dumazet. 20) Add xmit_more support to enic driver, from Govindarajulu Varadarajan. 21) Add VLAN packet scheduler action, from Jiri Pirko. 22) Support configurable RSS hash functions via ethtool, from Eyal Perry. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1820 commits) Fix race condition between vxlan_sock_add and vxlan_sock_release net/macb: fix compilation warning for print_hex_dump() called with skb->mac_header net/mlx4: Add support for A0 steering net/mlx4: Refactor QUERY_PORT net/mlx4_core: Add explicit error message when rule doesn't meet configuration net/mlx4: Add A0 hybrid steering net/mlx4: Add mlx4_bitmap zone allocator net/mlx4: Add a check if there are too many reserved QPs net/mlx4: Change QP allocation scheme net/mlx4_core: Use tasklet for user-space CQ completion events net/mlx4_core: Mask out host side virtualization features for guests net/mlx4_en: Set csum level for encapsulated packets be2net: Export tunnel offloads only when a VxLAN tunnel is created gianfar: Fix dma check map error when DMA_API_DEBUG is enabled cxgb4/csiostor: Don't use MASTER_MUST for fw_hello call net: fec: only enable mdio interrupt before phy device link up net: fec: clear all interrupt events to support i.MX6SX net: fec: reset fep link status in suspend function net: sock: fix access via invalid file descriptor net: introduce helper macro for_each_cmsghdr ...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c171
1 files changed, 125 insertions, 46 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 9f81818f2941..a28e09c7825d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -153,22 +153,19 @@ struct reg_state {
enum bpf_stack_slot_type {
STACK_INVALID, /* nothing was stored in this stack slot */
- STACK_SPILL, /* 1st byte of register spilled into stack */
- STACK_SPILL_PART, /* other 7 bytes of register spill */
+ STACK_SPILL, /* register spilled into stack */
STACK_MISC /* BPF program wrote some data into this slot */
};
-struct bpf_stack_slot {
- enum bpf_stack_slot_type stype;
- struct reg_state reg_st;
-};
+#define BPF_REG_SIZE 8 /* size of eBPF register in bytes */
/* state of the program:
* type of all registers and stack info
*/
struct verifier_state {
struct reg_state regs[MAX_BPF_REG];
- struct bpf_stack_slot stack[MAX_BPF_STACK];
+ u8 stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK];
+ struct reg_state spilled_regs[MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE];
};
/* linked list of verifier states used to prune search */
@@ -259,10 +256,10 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct verifier_env *env)
env->cur_state.regs[i].map_ptr->key_size,
env->cur_state.regs[i].map_ptr->value_size);
}
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i++) {
- if (env->cur_state.stack[i].stype == STACK_SPILL)
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
+ if (env->cur_state.stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_SPILL)
verbose(" fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i,
- reg_type_str[env->cur_state.stack[i].reg_st.type]);
+ reg_type_str[env->cur_state.spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE].type]);
}
verbose("\n");
}
@@ -539,8 +536,10 @@ static int bpf_size_to_bytes(int bpf_size)
static int check_stack_write(struct verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
int value_regno)
{
- struct bpf_stack_slot *slot;
int i;
+ /* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
+ * so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
+ */
if (value_regno >= 0 &&
(state->regs[value_regno].type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
@@ -548,30 +547,24 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
state->regs[value_regno].type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
/* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
- if (size != 8) {
+ if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
return -EACCES;
}
- slot = &state->stack[MAX_BPF_STACK + off];
- slot->stype = STACK_SPILL;
/* save register state */
- slot->reg_st = state->regs[value_regno];
- for (i = 1; i < 8; i++) {
- slot = &state->stack[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i];
- slot->stype = STACK_SPILL_PART;
- slot->reg_st.type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
- slot->reg_st.map_ptr = NULL;
- }
- } else {
+ state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
+ state->regs[value_regno];
+ for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
+ state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_SPILL;
+ } else {
/* regular write of data into stack */
- for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- slot = &state->stack[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i];
- slot->stype = STACK_MISC;
- slot->reg_st.type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
- slot->reg_st.map_ptr = NULL;
- }
+ state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE] =
+ (struct reg_state) {};
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
+ state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_MISC;
}
return 0;
}
@@ -579,19 +572,18 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
static int check_stack_read(struct verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
int value_regno)
{
+ u8 *slot_type;
int i;
- struct bpf_stack_slot *slot;
- slot = &state->stack[MAX_BPF_STACK + off];
+ slot_type = &state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off];
- if (slot->stype == STACK_SPILL) {
- if (size != 8) {
+ if (slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
+ if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
verbose("invalid size of register spill\n");
return -EACCES;
}
- for (i = 1; i < 8; i++) {
- if (state->stack[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i].stype !=
- STACK_SPILL_PART) {
+ for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
+ if (slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) {
verbose("corrupted spill memory\n");
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -599,12 +591,12 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
if (value_regno >= 0)
/* restore register state from stack */
- state->regs[value_regno] = slot->reg_st;
+ state->regs[value_regno] =
+ state->spilled_regs[(MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE];
return 0;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- if (state->stack[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i].stype !=
- STACK_MISC) {
+ if (slot_type[i] != STACK_MISC) {
verbose("invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, size);
return -EACCES;
@@ -747,7 +739,7 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct verifier_env *env,
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
- if (state->stack[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i].stype != STACK_MISC) {
+ if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) {
verbose("invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
@@ -1180,6 +1172,70 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
return 0;
}
+/* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions:
+ * - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb
+ * - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers,
+ * preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0
+ *
+ * Implicit input:
+ * ctx == skb == R6 == CTX
+ *
+ * Explicit input:
+ * SRC == any register
+ * IMM == 32-bit immediate
+ *
+ * Output:
+ * R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness
+ */
+static int check_ld_abs(struct verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
+{
+ struct reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
+ u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
+ struct reg_state *reg;
+ int i, err;
+
+ if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) {
+ verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
+ (mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
+ verbose("BPF_LD_ABS uses reserved fields\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
+ err = check_reg_arg(regs, BPF_REG_6, SRC_OP);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
+ verbose("at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == BPF_IND) {
+ /* check explicit source operand */
+ err = check_reg_arg(regs, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
+ for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
+ reg = regs + caller_saved[i];
+ reg->type = NOT_INIT;
+ reg->imm = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
+ * the value fetched from the packet
+ */
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* non-recursive DFS pseudo code
* 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v):
* 2 label v as discovered
@@ -1417,12 +1473,33 @@ static bool states_equal(struct verifier_state *old, struct verifier_state *cur)
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i++) {
- if (memcmp(&old->stack[i], &cur->stack[i],
- sizeof(old->stack[0])) != 0) {
- if (old->stack[i].stype == STACK_INVALID)
- continue;
+ if (old->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID)
+ continue;
+ if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != cur->stack_slot_type[i])
+ /* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
+ * this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC ->
+ * this verifier states are not equivalent,
+ * return false to continue verification of this path
+ */
return false;
- }
+ if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
+ continue;
+ if (memcmp(&old->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
+ &cur->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
+ sizeof(old->spilled_regs[0])))
+ /* when explored and current stack slot types are
+ * the same, check that stored pointers types
+ * are the same as well.
+ * Ex: explored safe path could have stored
+ * (struct reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .imm = -8}
+ * but current path has stored:
+ * (struct reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .imm = -16}
+ * such verifier states are not equivalent.
+ * return false to continue verification of this path
+ */
+ return false;
+ else
+ continue;
}
return true;
}
@@ -1664,8 +1741,10 @@ process_bpf_exit:
u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
- verbose("LD_ABS is not supported yet\n");
- return -EINVAL;
+ err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
} else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
if (err)