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| author | Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> | 2019-04-03 23:22:39 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2019-04-05 16:50:07 +0200 |
| commit | 088ec26d9c2da9d879ab73e3f4117f9df6c566ee (patch) | |
| tree | c7965d3ac5707279af5d842e99d37e474a4e8d73 /kernel/bpf | |
| parent | f68a5b44647bce6c34b10d5560c5b2c0aff31afc (diff) | |
| download | linux-088ec26d9c2da9d879ab73e3f4117f9df6c566ee.tar.gz linux-088ec26d9c2da9d879ab73e3f4117f9df6c566ee.tar.bz2 linux-088ec26d9c2da9d879ab73e3f4117f9df6c566ee.zip | |
bpf: Reject indirect var_off stack access in unpriv mode
Proper support of indirect stack access with variable offset in
unprivileged mode (!root) requires corresponding support in Spectre
masking for stack ALU in retrieve_ptr_limit().
There are no use-case for variable offset in unprivileged mode though so
make verifier reject such accesses for simplicity.
Pointer arithmetics is one (and only?) way to cause variable offset and
it's already rejected in unpriv mode so that verifier won't even get to
helper function whose argument contains variable offset, e.g.:
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0
1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
2: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +0)
3: (57) r2 &= 4
4: (17) r2 -= 16
5: (0f) r2 += r10
variable stack access var_off=(0xfffffffffffffff0; 0x4) off=-16 size=1R2
stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, prohibited for !root
Still it looks like a good idea to reject variable offset indirect stack
access for unprivileged mode in check_stack_boundary() explicitly.
Fixes: 2011fccfb61b ("bpf: Support variable offset stack access from helpers")
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 16 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 0f12fda35626..8400c1f33cd4 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2226,6 +2226,19 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, if (err) return err; } else { + /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for + * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in + * Spectre masking for stack ALU. + * See also retrieve_ptr_limit(). + */ + if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { + char tn_buf[48]; + + tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off); + verbose(env, "R%d indirect variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n", + regno, tn_buf); + return -EACCES; + } /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on @@ -3339,6 +3352,9 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, switch (ptr_reg->type) { case PTR_TO_STACK: + /* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in + * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here. + */ off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value; if (mask_to_left) *ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off; |