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author | Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> | 2022-12-03 10:46:02 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2022-12-04 12:52:40 -0800 |
commit | fca1aa75518c03b04c3c249e9a9134faf9ca18c5 (patch) | |
tree | 5981ba7fb846f4f58f1210a03cee3058bb86354c /kernel/bpf | |
parent | 706819495921ddad6b3780140b9d9e9293b6dedc (diff) | |
download | linux-fca1aa75518c03b04c3c249e9a9134faf9ca18c5.tar.gz linux-fca1aa75518c03b04c3c249e9a9134faf9ca18c5.tar.bz2 linux-fca1aa75518c03b04c3c249e9a9134faf9ca18c5.zip |
bpf: Handle MEM_RCU type properly
Commit 9bb00b2895cb ("bpf: Add kfunc bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock()")
introduced MEM_RCU and bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() support. In that
commit, a rcu pointer is tagged with both MEM_RCU and PTR_TRUSTED
so that it can be passed into kfuncs or helpers as an argument.
Martin raised a good question in [1] such that the rcu pointer,
although being able to accessing the object, might have reference
count of 0. This might cause a problem if the rcu pointer is passed
to a kfunc which expects trusted arguments where ref count should
be greater than 0.
This patch makes the following changes related to MEM_RCU pointer:
- MEM_RCU pointer might be NULL (PTR_MAYBE_NULL).
- Introduce KF_RCU so MEM_RCU ptr can be acquired with
a KF_RCU tagged kfunc which assumes ref count of rcu ptr
could be zero.
- For mem access 'b = ptr->a', say 'ptr' is a MEM_RCU ptr, and
'a' is tagged with __rcu as well. Let us mark 'b' as
MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ac70f574-4023-664e-b711-e0d3b18117fd@linux.dev/
Fixes: 9bb00b2895cb ("bpf: Add kfunc bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock()")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221203184602.477272-1-yhs@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 45 |
2 files changed, 46 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c index a5a511430f2a..cca642358e80 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c @@ -1838,6 +1838,19 @@ struct task_struct *bpf_task_acquire(struct task_struct *p) } /** + * bpf_task_acquire_not_zero - Acquire a reference to a rcu task object. A task + * acquired by this kfunc which is not stored in a map as a kptr, must be + * released by calling bpf_task_release(). + * @p: The task on which a reference is being acquired. + */ +struct task_struct *bpf_task_acquire_not_zero(struct task_struct *p) +{ + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->rcu_users)) + return NULL; + return p; +} + +/** * bpf_task_kptr_get - Acquire a reference on a struct task_struct kptr. A task * kptr acquired by this kfunc which is not subsequently stored in a map, must * be released by calling bpf_task_release(). @@ -2013,6 +2026,7 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_list_push_back) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_list_pop_front, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RET_NULL) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_list_pop_back, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RET_NULL) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_acquire, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS) +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_acquire_not_zero, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RCU | KF_RET_NULL) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_kptr_get, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_KPTR_GET | KF_RET_NULL) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_release, KF_RELEASE) #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index b0db9c10567b..66b82f52b5bc 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4275,7 +4275,7 @@ static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) return true; /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the - * MEM_ALLOC, MEM_RCU or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the + * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are * not. @@ -4287,6 +4287,11 @@ static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type); } +static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) +{ + return reg->type & MEM_RCU; +} + static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, int size, bool strict) @@ -4785,14 +4790,16 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (flag & MEM_RCU) { /* Mark value register as MEM_RCU only if it is protected by - * bpf_rcu_read_lock() and the ptr reg is trusted. MEM_RCU + * bpf_rcu_read_lock() and the ptr reg is rcu or trusted. MEM_RCU * itself can already indicate trustedness inside the rcu - * read lock region. Also mark it as PTR_TRUSTED. + * read lock region. Also mark rcu pointer as PTR_MAYBE_NULL since + * it could be null in some cases. */ - if (!env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || !is_trusted_reg(reg)) + if (!env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || + !(is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg))) flag &= ~MEM_RCU; else - flag |= PTR_TRUSTED; + flag |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; } else if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { /* ptr (reg) is marked as MEM_RCU, but the struct field is not tagged * with __rcu. Mark the flag as PTR_UNTRUSTED conservatively. @@ -5957,7 +5964,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_BTF_ID, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, - PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU | PTR_TRUSTED, + PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU, }, }; static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = { @@ -6136,7 +6143,7 @@ int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: - case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU | PTR_TRUSTED: + case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED: /* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function, * it's fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset @@ -8038,6 +8045,11 @@ static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE; } +static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) +{ + return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU; +} + static bool is_kfunc_arg_kptr_get(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg) { return arg == 0 && (meta->kfunc_flags & KF_KPTR_GET); @@ -8722,13 +8734,20 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ switch (kf_arg_type) { case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: - if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta)) + if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) break; if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) { - verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); - return -EINVAL; + if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) { + verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) { + verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno); + return -EINVAL; + } } + fallthrough; case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: /* Trusted arguments have the same offset checks as release arguments */ @@ -8839,7 +8858,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */ if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || - bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type)) && + (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) && !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) { verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n", @@ -8954,7 +8973,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, } else if (rcu_unlock) { bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { - reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_TRUSTED); + reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL); reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED; } })); @@ -11294,7 +11313,7 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, bool is_null) { if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id && - !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id)) { + (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) { /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't |