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author | Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> | 2017-02-17 07:57:00 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> | 2017-03-06 10:43:47 +1100 |
commit | 791ec491c372f49cea3ea7a7143454a9023ac9d4 (patch) | |
tree | 61ebe35fe137240666588ae13723c3ae971558ac /kernel/sys.c | |
parent | c1ae3cfa0e89fa1a7ecc4c99031f5e9ae99d9201 (diff) | |
download | linux-791ec491c372f49cea3ea7a7143454a9023ac9d4.tar.gz linux-791ec491c372f49cea3ea7a7143454a9023ac9d4.tar.bz2 linux-791ec491c372f49cea3ea7a7143454a9023ac9d4.zip |
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/sys.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/sys.c | 30 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 7ff6d1b10cec..196c7134bee6 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1432,25 +1432,26 @@ out: } /* rcu lock must be held */ -static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task) +static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned int flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; + bool id_match; if (current == task) return 0; tcred = __task_cred(task); - if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) && - uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && - uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) && - gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) && - gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) && - gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid)) - return 0; - if (ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) - return 0; + id_match = (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) && + uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && + uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) && + gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) && + gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) && + gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid)); + if (!id_match && !ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) + return -EPERM; - return -EPERM; + return security_task_prlimit(cred, tcred, flags); } SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource, @@ -1460,12 +1461,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit64 old64, new64; struct rlimit old, new; struct task_struct *tsk; + unsigned int checkflags = 0; int ret; + if (old_rlim) + checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_READ; + if (new_rlim) { if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64))) return -EFAULT; rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new); + checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE; } rcu_read_lock(); @@ -1474,7 +1480,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource, rcu_read_unlock(); return -ESRCH; } - ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk); + ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk, checkflags); if (ret) { rcu_read_unlock(); return ret; |