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author | Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> | 2008-10-15 22:01:41 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-10-16 11:21:31 -0700 |
commit | 25ddbb18aae33ad255eb9f35aacebe3af01e1e9c (patch) | |
tree | 8df1f840a226ed640c2096710b7d0f1f4d1b88aa /kernel/sysctl.c | |
parent | 889d51a10712b6fd6175196626de2116858394f4 (diff) | |
download | linux-25ddbb18aae33ad255eb9f35aacebe3af01e1e9c.tar.gz linux-25ddbb18aae33ad255eb9f35aacebe3af01e1e9c.tar.bz2 linux-25ddbb18aae33ad255eb9f35aacebe3af01e1e9c.zip |
Make the taint flags reliable
It's somewhat unlikely that it happens, but right now a race window
between interrupts or machine checks or oopses could corrupt the tainted
bitmap because it is modified in a non atomic fashion.
Convert the taint variable to an unsigned long and use only atomic bit
operations on it.
Unfortunately this means the intvec sysctl functions cannot be used on it
anymore.
It turned out the taint sysctl handler could actually be simplified a bit
(since it only increases capabilities) so this patch actually removes
code.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded include]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/sysctl.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/sysctl.c | 67 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 39 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index cfc5295f1e82..ec88fcc9a0d2 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ extern int max_lock_depth; #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL static int proc_do_cad_pid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); -static int proc_dointvec_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, +static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); #endif @@ -379,10 +379,9 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL { .procname = "tainted", - .data = &tainted, - .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .maxlen = sizeof(long), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_taint, + .proc_handler = &proc_taint, }, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_LATENCYTOP @@ -2228,49 +2227,39 @@ int proc_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, NULL,NULL); } -#define OP_SET 0 -#define OP_AND 1 -#define OP_OR 2 - -static int do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv(int *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, - int *valp, - int write, void *data) -{ - int op = *(int *)data; - if (write) { - int val = *negp ? -*lvalp : *lvalp; - switch(op) { - case OP_SET: *valp = val; break; - case OP_AND: *valp &= val; break; - case OP_OR: *valp |= val; break; - } - } else { - int val = *valp; - if (val < 0) { - *negp = -1; - *lvalp = (unsigned long)-val; - } else { - *negp = 0; - *lvalp = (unsigned long)val; - } - } - return 0; -} - /* - * Taint values can only be increased + * Taint values can only be increased + * This means we can safely use a temporary. */ -static int proc_dointvec_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, +static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { - int op; + struct ctl_table t; + unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint(); + int err; if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - op = OP_OR; - return do_proc_dointvec(table,write,filp,buffer,lenp,ppos, - do_proc_dointvec_bset_conv,&op); + t = *table; + t.data = &tmptaint; + err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, filp, buffer, lenp, ppos); + if (err < 0) + return err; + + if (write) { + /* + * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive + * to everyone's atomic.h for this + */ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) { + if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1) + add_taint(i); + } + } + + return err; } struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param { |