Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security

* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
  capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
  security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
  ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
  capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
  capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
  capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
  capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
  capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
  capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
  capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
  capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
  capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
  selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
  selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
  selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
  selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
  selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
  selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
  SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()

Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():

 - the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove
   the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")

 - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add
   userspace configuration API")

causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.

4 files changed, 60 insertions, 40 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2c1d6ab7106e..57e3f5107937 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -601,13 +601,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
 	case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
 	case AUDIT_TRIM:
 	case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
-		if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+		if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
 			err = -EPERM;
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_USER:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
 	case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
-		if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+		if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
 			err = -EPERM;
 		break;
 	default:  /* bad msg */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index b463871a4e69..0fcf1c14a297 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -287,74 +287,84 @@ error:
 }
 
 /**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
+ * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
  * @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
  *
  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
  */
-bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
+		       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 {
-	int ret = security_real_capable(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+	int ret;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return (ret == 0);
 }
 
 /**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
+ * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
  * @t: The task in question
- * @ns: target user namespace
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
  *
  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
  */
-bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
-		       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 {
-	int ret = security_real_capable(t, ns, cap);
-
-	return (ret == 0);
+	return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
 }
 
 /**
- * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * in a specific user ns.
  * @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
  * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not.  Don't write an
- * audit message for the check.
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ * Do not write an audit message for the check.
  *
  * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
  */
-bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+			       struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 {
-	int ret = security_real_capable_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+	int ret;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return (ret == 0);
 }
 
 /**
- * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
+ * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the
+ * initial user ns
+ * @t: The task in question
  * @cap: The capability to be tested for
  *
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
- * available for use, false if not.
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not.  Don't write an
+ * audit message for the check.
  *
- * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
- * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
  */
-bool capable(int cap)
+bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
 {
-	return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
+	return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
 
 /**
  * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
@@ -374,7 +384,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 		BUG();
 	}
 
-	if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
+	if (has_ns_capability(current, ns, cap)) {
 		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
 		return true;
 	}
@@ -383,18 +393,20 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
 
 /**
- * task_ns_capable - Determine whether current task has a superior
- * capability targeted at a specific task's user namespace.
- * @t: The task whose user namespace is targeted.
- * @cap: The capability in question.
+ * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
  *
- *  Return true if it does, false otherwise.
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
  */
-bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool capable(int cap)
 {
-	return ns_capable(task_cred_xxx(t, user)->user_ns, cap);
+	return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_ns_capable);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
 
 /**
  * nsown_capable - Check superior capability to one's own user_ns
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 78ab24a7b0e4..00ab2ca5ed11 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -172,6 +172,14 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
+{
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
+		return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+	else
+		return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+}
+
 int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
@@ -198,7 +206,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 	     cred->gid == tcred->sgid &&
 	     cred->gid == tcred->gid))
 		goto ok;
-	if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+	if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user->user_ns, mode))
 		goto ok;
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return -EPERM;
@@ -207,7 +215,7 @@ ok:
 	smp_rmb();
 	if (task->mm)
 		dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
-	if (!dumpable && !task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+	if (!dumpable  && !ptrace_has_cap(task_user_ns(task), mode))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
@@ -277,7 +285,7 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
 	task->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
 	if (seize)
 		task->ptrace |= PT_SEIZED;
-	if (task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+	if (ns_capable(task_user_ns(task), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
 
 	__ptrace_link(task, current);
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index fd7b25e90079..df00cb09263e 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -4330,7 +4330,7 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *in_mask)
 		goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
 	}
 	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (!check_same_owner(p) && !task_ns_capable(p, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+	if (!check_same_owner(p) && !ns_capable(task_user_ns(p), CAP_SYS_NICE))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);