kernel: add kcov code coverage

kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing).  Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system.  A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/).  However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.

kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible.  It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g.  scheduler, locking).

Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes.  Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch).  I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.

This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side.  The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.

We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:

  https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs

We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation".  For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.

Why not gcov.  Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat.  A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g.  an invalid
input).  In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M).  Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges.  On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.

kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure.  But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.

Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

7 files changed, 301 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index baa55e50a315..f0c40bf49d9f 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -18,6 +18,17 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_irq_work.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 endif
 
+# Prevents flicker of uninteresting __do_softirq()/__local_bh_disable_ip()
+# in coverage traces.
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_softirq.o := n
+# These are called from save_stack_trace() on slub debug path,
+# and produce insane amounts of uninteresting coverage.
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_module.o := n
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_extable.o := n
+# Don't self-instrument.
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_kcov.o := n
+KASAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
+
 # cond_syscall is currently not LTO compatible
 CFLAGS_sys_ni.o = $(DISABLE_LTO)
 
@@ -68,6 +79,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL) += auditsc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_WATCH) += audit_watch.o audit_fsnotify.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE) += audit_tree.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL) += gcov/
+obj-$(CONFIG_KCOV) += kcov.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KGDB) += debug/
 obj-$(CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK) += hung_task.o
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 10e088237fed..953d1a1c0387 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <linux/oom.h>
 #include <linux/writeback.h>
 #include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/kcov.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -655,6 +656,7 @@ void do_exit(long code)
 	TASKS_RCU(int tasks_rcu_i);
 
 	profile_task_exit(tsk);
+	kcov_task_exit(tsk);
 
 	WARN_ON(blk_needs_flush_plug(tsk));
 
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 5b8d1e7ceeea..d277e83ed3e0 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
 #include <linux/aio.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/kcov.h>
 
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -392,6 +393,8 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig)
 
 	account_kernel_stack(ti, 1);
 
+	kcov_task_init(tsk);
+
 	return tsk;
 
 free_ti:
diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3efbee0834a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/kcov.c
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kcov: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kcov.h>
+
+/*
+ * kcov descriptor (one per opened debugfs file).
+ * State transitions of the descriptor:
+ *  - initial state after open()
+ *  - then there must be a single ioctl(KCOV_INIT_TRACE) call
+ *  - then, mmap() call (several calls are allowed but not useful)
+ *  - then, repeated enable/disable for a task (only one task a time allowed)
+ */
+struct kcov {
+	/*
+	 * Reference counter. We keep one for:
+	 *  - opened file descriptor
+	 *  - task with enabled coverage (we can't unwire it from another task)
+	 */
+	atomic_t		refcount;
+	/* The lock protects mode, size, area and t. */
+	spinlock_t		lock;
+	enum kcov_mode		mode;
+	/* Size of arena (in long's for KCOV_MODE_TRACE). */
+	unsigned		size;
+	/* Coverage buffer shared with user space. */
+	void			*area;
+	/* Task for which we collect coverage, or NULL. */
+	struct task_struct	*t;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Entry point from instrumented code.
+ * This is called once per basic-block/edge.
+ */
+void __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
+{
+	struct task_struct *t;
+	enum kcov_mode mode;
+
+	t = current;
+	/*
+	 * We are interested in code coverage as a function of a syscall inputs,
+	 * so we ignore code executed in interrupts.
+	 */
+	if (!t || in_interrupt())
+		return;
+	mode = READ_ONCE(t->kcov_mode);
+	if (mode == KCOV_MODE_TRACE) {
+		unsigned long *area;
+		unsigned long pos;
+
+		/*
+		 * There is some code that runs in interrupts but for which
+		 * in_interrupt() returns false (e.g. preempt_schedule_irq()).
+		 * READ_ONCE()/barrier() effectively provides load-acquire wrt
+		 * interrupts, there are paired barrier()/WRITE_ONCE() in
+		 * kcov_ioctl_locked().
+		 */
+		barrier();
+		area = t->kcov_area;
+		/* The first word is number of subsequent PCs. */
+		pos = READ_ONCE(area[0]) + 1;
+		if (likely(pos < t->kcov_size)) {
+			area[pos] = _RET_IP_;
+			WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);
+		}
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc);
+
+static void kcov_get(struct kcov *kcov)
+{
+	atomic_inc(&kcov->refcount);
+}
+
+static void kcov_put(struct kcov *kcov)
+{
+	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&kcov->refcount)) {
+		vfree(kcov->area);
+		kfree(kcov);
+	}
+}
+
+void kcov_task_init(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+	t->kcov_mode = KCOV_MODE_DISABLED;
+	t->kcov_size = 0;
+	t->kcov_area = NULL;
+	t->kcov = NULL;
+}
+
+void kcov_task_exit(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+	struct kcov *kcov;
+
+	kcov = t->kcov;
+	if (kcov == NULL)
+		return;
+	spin_lock(&kcov->lock);
+	if (WARN_ON(kcov->t != t)) {
+		spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* Just to not leave dangling references behind. */
+	kcov_task_init(t);
+	kcov->t = NULL;
+	spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
+	kcov_put(kcov);
+}
+
+static int kcov_mmap(struct file *filep, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	int res = 0;
+	void *area;
+	struct kcov *kcov = vma->vm_file->private_data;
+	unsigned long size, off;
+	struct page *page;
+
+	area = vmalloc_user(vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start);
+	if (!area)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	spin_lock(&kcov->lock);
+	size = kcov->size * sizeof(unsigned long);
+	if (kcov->mode == KCOV_MODE_DISABLED || vma->vm_pgoff != 0 ||
+	    vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != size) {
+		res = -EINVAL;
+		goto exit;
+	}
+	if (!kcov->area) {
+		kcov->area = area;
+		vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTEXPAND;
+		spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
+		for (off = 0; off < size; off += PAGE_SIZE) {
+			page = vmalloc_to_page(kcov->area + off);
+			if (vm_insert_page(vma, vma->vm_start + off, page))
+				WARN_ONCE(1, "vm_insert_page() failed");
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+exit:
+	spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
+	vfree(area);
+	return res;
+}
+
+static int kcov_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filep)
+{
+	struct kcov *kcov;
+
+	kcov = kzalloc(sizeof(*kcov), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!kcov)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	atomic_set(&kcov->refcount, 1);
+	spin_lock_init(&kcov->lock);
+	filep->private_data = kcov;
+	return nonseekable_open(inode, filep);
+}
+
+static int kcov_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filep)
+{
+	kcov_put(filep->private_data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int kcov_ioctl_locked(struct kcov *kcov, unsigned int cmd,
+			     unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct task_struct *t;
+	unsigned long size, unused;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case KCOV_INIT_TRACE:
+		/*
+		 * Enable kcov in trace mode and setup buffer size.
+		 * Must happen before anything else.
+		 */
+		if (kcov->mode != KCOV_MODE_DISABLED)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		/*
+		 * Size must be at least 2 to hold current position and one PC.
+		 * Later we allocate size * sizeof(unsigned long) memory,
+		 * that must not overflow.
+		 */
+		size = arg;
+		if (size < 2 || size > INT_MAX / sizeof(unsigned long))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		kcov->size = size;
+		kcov->mode = KCOV_MODE_TRACE;
+		return 0;
+	case KCOV_ENABLE:
+		/*
+		 * Enable coverage for the current task.
+		 * At this point user must have been enabled trace mode,
+		 * and mmapped the file. Coverage collection is disabled only
+		 * at task exit or voluntary by KCOV_DISABLE. After that it can
+		 * be enabled for another task.
+		 */
+		unused = arg;
+		if (unused != 0 || kcov->mode == KCOV_MODE_DISABLED ||
+		    kcov->area == NULL)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (kcov->t != NULL)
+			return -EBUSY;
+		t = current;
+		/* Cache in task struct for performance. */
+		t->kcov_size = kcov->size;
+		t->kcov_area = kcov->area;
+		/* See comment in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(). */
+		barrier();
+		WRITE_ONCE(t->kcov_mode, kcov->mode);
+		t->kcov = kcov;
+		kcov->t = t;
+		/* This is put either in kcov_task_exit() or in KCOV_DISABLE. */
+		kcov_get(kcov);
+		return 0;
+	case KCOV_DISABLE:
+		/* Disable coverage for the current task. */
+		unused = arg;
+		if (unused != 0 || current->kcov != kcov)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		t = current;
+		if (WARN_ON(kcov->t != t))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		kcov_task_init(t);
+		kcov->t = NULL;
+		kcov_put(kcov);
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -ENOTTY;
+	}
+}
+
+static long kcov_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct kcov *kcov;
+	int res;
+
+	kcov = filep->private_data;
+	spin_lock(&kcov->lock);
+	res = kcov_ioctl_locked(kcov, cmd, arg);
+	spin_unlock(&kcov->lock);
+	return res;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations kcov_fops = {
+	.open		= kcov_open,
+	.unlocked_ioctl	= kcov_ioctl,
+	.mmap		= kcov_mmap,
+	.release        = kcov_close,
+};
+
+static int __init kcov_init(void)
+{
+	if (!debugfs_create_file("kcov", 0600, NULL, NULL, &kcov_fops)) {
+		pr_err("failed to create kcov in debugfs\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+device_initcall(kcov_init);
diff --git a/kernel/locking/Makefile b/kernel/locking/Makefile
index 8e96f6cc2a4a..31322a4275cd 100644
--- a/kernel/locking/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/locking/Makefile
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+# Any varying coverage in these files is non-deterministic
+# and is generally not a function of system call inputs.
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT		:= n
 
 obj-y += mutex.o semaphore.o rwsem.o percpu-rwsem.o
 
diff --git a/kernel/rcu/Makefile b/kernel/rcu/Makefile
index 61a16569ffbf..032b2c015beb 100644
--- a/kernel/rcu/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/rcu/Makefile
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+# Any varying coverage in these files is non-deterministic
+# and is generally not a function of system call inputs.
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
+
 obj-y += update.o sync.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SRCU) += srcu.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_RCU_TORTURE_TEST) += rcutorture.o
diff --git a/kernel/sched/Makefile b/kernel/sched/Makefile
index 302d6ebd64f7..414d9c16da42 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/sched/Makefile
@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_clock.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
 endif
 
+# These files are disabled because they produce non-interesting flaky coverage
+# that is not a function of syscall inputs. E.g. involuntary context switches.
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
+
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_SCHED_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER),y)
 # According to Alan Modra <alan@linuxcare.com.au>, the -fno-omit-frame-pointer is
 # needed for x86 only.  Why this used to be enabled for all architectures is beyond