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author | Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> | 2017-12-18 20:11:59 -0800 |
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committer | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2017-12-21 02:15:41 +0100 |
commit | 179d1c5602997fef5a940c6ddcf31212cbfebd14 (patch) | |
tree | 67a91e768530270c4ba22747afde33fc23b40cf1 /kernel | |
parent | a5ec6ae161d72f01411169a938fa5f8baea16e8f (diff) | |
download | linux-179d1c5602997fef5a940c6ddcf31212cbfebd14.tar.gz linux-179d1c5602997fef5a940c6ddcf31212cbfebd14.tar.bz2 linux-179d1c5602997fef5a940c6ddcf31212cbfebd14.zip |
bpf: don't prune branches when a scalar is replaced with a pointer
This could be made safe by passing through a reference to env and checking
for env->allow_ptr_leaks, but it would only work one way and is probably
not worth the hassle - not doing it will not directly lead to program
rejection.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 102c519836f6..982bd9ec721a 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -3467,15 +3467,14 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, return range_within(rold, rcur) && tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); } else { - /* if we knew anything about the old value, we're not - * equal, because we can't know anything about the - * scalar value of the pointer in the new value. + /* We're trying to use a pointer in place of a scalar. + * Even if the scalar was unbounded, this could lead to + * pointer leaks because scalars are allowed to leak + * while pointers are not. We could make this safe in + * special cases if root is calling us, but it's + * probably not worth the hassle. */ - return rold->umin_value == 0 && - rold->umax_value == U64_MAX && - rold->smin_value == S64_MIN && - rold->smax_value == S64_MAX && - tnum_is_unknown(rold->var_off); + return false; } case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: /* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and |