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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-02-10 17:53:55 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2011-02-10 17:53:55 -0800 |
commit | ee24aebffb75a7f940cf52c8cf6910947b3130c0 (patch) | |
tree | ed1eafa8b1a30b078c9fa680aafbb49632921a0d /kernel | |
parent | 67d019528e5c2693145217cf18a507689980d2a4 (diff) | |
download | linux-ee24aebffb75a7f940cf52c8cf6910947b3130c0.tar.gz linux-ee24aebffb75a7f940cf52c8cf6910947b3130c0.tar.bz2 linux-ee24aebffb75a7f940cf52c8cf6910947b3130c0.zip |
cap_syslog: accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN for now
In commit ce6ada35bdf7 ("security: Define CAP_SYSLOG") Serge Hallyn
introduced CAP_SYSLOG, but broke backwards compatibility by no longer
accepting CAP_SYS_ADMIN as an override (it would cause a warning and
then reject the operation).
Re-instate CAP_SYS_ADMIN - but keeping the warning - as an acceptable
capability until any legacy applications have been updated. There are
apparently applications out there that drop all capabilities except for
CAP_SYS_ADMIN in order to access the syslog.
(This is a re-implementation of a patch by Serge, cleaning the logic up
and making the code more readable)
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/printk.c | 54 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/printk.c b/kernel/printk.c index 2ddbdc73aade..36231525e22f 100644 --- a/kernel/printk.c +++ b/kernel/printk.c @@ -262,25 +262,47 @@ int dmesg_restrict = 1; int dmesg_restrict; #endif +static int syslog_action_restricted(int type) +{ + if (dmesg_restrict) + return 1; + /* Unless restricted, we allow "read all" and "get buffer size" for everybody */ + return type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER; +} + +static int check_syslog_permissions(int type, bool from_file) +{ + /* + * If this is from /proc/kmsg and we've already opened it, then we've + * already done the capabilities checks at open time. + */ + if (from_file && type != SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN) + return 0; + + if (syslog_action_restricted(type)) { + if (capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) + return 0; + /* For historical reasons, accept CAP_SYS_ADMIN too, with a warning */ + if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN " + "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated).\n"); + return 0; + } + return -EPERM; + } + return 0; +} + int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file) { unsigned i, j, limit, count; int do_clear = 0; char c; - int error = 0; + int error; - /* - * If this is from /proc/kmsg we only do the capabilities checks - * at open time. - */ - if (type == SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN || !from_file) { - if (dmesg_restrict && !capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) - goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */ - if ((type != SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL && - type != SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER) && - !capable(CAP_SYSLOG)) - goto warn; /* switch to return -EPERM after 2.6.39 */ - } + error = check_syslog_permissions(type, from_file); + if (error) + goto out; error = security_syslog(type); if (error) @@ -423,12 +445,6 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, bool from_file) } out: return error; -warn: - /* remove after 2.6.39 */ - if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - WARN_ONCE(1, "Attempt to access syslog with CAP_SYS_ADMIN " - "but no CAP_SYSLOG (deprecated and denied).\n"); - return -EPERM; } SYSCALL_DEFINE3(syslog, int, type, char __user *, buf, int, len) |