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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-03-28 13:43:46 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-03-28 13:43:46 -0700
commit2c3de1c2d7d68c6ba4c1ecd82c68285f34d9609e (patch)
tree6a09ce761173a966718f9009514dcc90bd9947b7 /kernel
parent9064171268d838b8f283fe111ef086b9479d059a (diff)
parent87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f (diff)
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Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull userns fixes from Eric W Biederman: "The bulk of the changes are fixing the worst consequences of the user namespace design oversight in not considering what happens when one namespace starts off as a clone of another namespace, as happens with the mount namespace. The rest of the changes are just plain bug fixes. Many thanks to Andy Lutomirski for pointing out many of these issues." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted ipc: Restrict mounting the mqueue filesystem vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted yama: Better permission check for ptraceme pid: Handle the exit of a multi-threaded init. scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/pid_namespace.c3
-rw-r--r--kernel/user.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/user_namespace.c11
3 files changed, 15 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
index c1c3dc1c6023..bea15bdf82b0 100644
--- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns)
int nr;
int rc;
struct task_struct *task, *me = current;
+ int init_pids = thread_group_leader(me) ? 1 : 2;
/* Don't allow any more processes into the pid namespace */
disable_pid_allocation(pid_ns);
@@ -230,7 +231,7 @@ void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns)
*/
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
- if (pid_ns->nr_hashed == 1)
+ if (pid_ns->nr_hashed == init_pids)
break;
schedule();
}
diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index e81978e8c03b..8e635a18ab52 100644
--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
.proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
+ .may_mount_sysfs = true,
+ .may_mount_proc = true,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index b14f4d342043..a54f26f82eb2 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -61,6 +61,15 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
kgid_t group = new->egid;
int ret;
+ /*
+ * Verify that we can not violate the policy of which files
+ * may be accessed that is specified by the root directory,
+ * by verifing that the root directory is at the root of the
+ * mount namespace which allows all files to be accessed.
+ */
+ if (current_chrooted())
+ return -EPERM;
+
/* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace
* or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who
* created a user_namespace.
@@ -87,6 +96,8 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
+ update_mnt_policy(ns);
+
return 0;
}