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authorTycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>2018-12-09 11:24:14 -0700
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2018-12-11 16:32:11 -0800
commitfec7b6690541b8128663a13c9586b1daf42b0a6c (patch)
treec5f07046f22b36ef62ff7cc02511acd0ace8ce9f /kernel
parent6a21cc50f0c7f87dae5259f6cfefe024412313f6 (diff)
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samples: add an example of seccomp user trap
The idea here is just to give a demonstration of how one could safely use the SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF feature to do mount policies. This particular policy is (as noted in the comment) not very interesting, but it serves to illustrate how one might apply a policy dodging the various TOCTOU issues. Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> CC: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> CC: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> CC: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> CC: Akihiro Suda <suda.akihiro@lab.ntt.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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