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author | Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> | 2018-12-09 11:24:14 -0700 |
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committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2018-12-11 16:32:11 -0800 |
commit | fec7b6690541b8128663a13c9586b1daf42b0a6c (patch) | |
tree | c5f07046f22b36ef62ff7cc02511acd0ace8ce9f /kernel | |
parent | 6a21cc50f0c7f87dae5259f6cfefe024412313f6 (diff) | |
download | linux-fec7b6690541b8128663a13c9586b1daf42b0a6c.tar.gz linux-fec7b6690541b8128663a13c9586b1daf42b0a6c.tar.bz2 linux-fec7b6690541b8128663a13c9586b1daf42b0a6c.zip |
samples: add an example of seccomp user trap
The idea here is just to give a demonstration of how one could safely use
the SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF feature to do mount policies. This particular
policy is (as noted in the comment) not very interesting, but it serves to
illustrate how one might apply a policy dodging the various TOCTOU issues.
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
CC: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
CC: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CC: Akihiro Suda <suda.akihiro@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions