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author | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2016-02-19 23:05:22 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2016-02-21 22:07:09 -0500 |
commit | 8e2fe1d9f1a20924f98ea46931a1d7fb092aa876 (patch) | |
tree | 538a9916d34e6019f250cc5e4246453786e0848e /kernel | |
parent | 8b393f833346e0a5f0cb4269271d47be8fecd372 (diff) | |
download | linux-8e2fe1d9f1a20924f98ea46931a1d7fb092aa876.tar.gz linux-8e2fe1d9f1a20924f98ea46931a1d7fb092aa876.tar.bz2 linux-8e2fe1d9f1a20924f98ea46931a1d7fb092aa876.zip |
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer
Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper
function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK
and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1>
must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer
points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees
that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper
functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL
initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size.
This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that
allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function.
Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases
internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0
or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any
other combinations are not possible to load.
I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing
the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes
needed to the verifier.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 42 |
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 42ba4ccc020b..36dc497deaa3 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -779,15 +779,24 @@ static int check_xadd(struct verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary * and all elements of stack are initialized */ -static int check_stack_boundary(struct verifier_env *env, - int regno, int access_size) +static int check_stack_boundary(struct verifier_env *env, int regno, + int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed) { struct verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state; struct reg_state *regs = state->regs; int off, i; - if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) + if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) { + if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 && + regs[regno].type == CONST_IMM && + regs[regno].imm == 0) + return 0; + + verbose("R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno, + reg_type_str[regs[regno].type], + reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]); return -EACCES; + } off = regs[regno].imm; if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 || @@ -830,15 +839,24 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, return 0; } - if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_STACK || arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || + if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY || arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK; - } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE) { + } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE || + arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO) { expected_type = CONST_IMM; } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) { expected_type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) { expected_type = PTR_TO_CTX; + } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_STACK) { + expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK; + /* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be + * passed in as argument, it's a CONST_IMM type. Final test + * happens during stack boundary checking. + */ + if (reg->type == CONST_IMM && reg->imm == 0) + expected_type = CONST_IMM; } else { verbose("unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type); return -EFAULT; @@ -868,8 +886,8 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n"); return -EACCES; } - err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno, (*mapp)->key_size); - + err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno, (*mapp)->key_size, + false); } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) { /* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call: * check [value, value + map->value_size) validity @@ -879,9 +897,12 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, verbose("invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n"); return -EACCES; } - err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno, (*mapp)->value_size); + err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno, (*mapp)->value_size, + false); + } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE || + arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO) { + bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO); - } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE) { /* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' bytes * from stack pointer 'buf'. Check it * note: regno == len, regno - 1 == buf @@ -891,7 +912,8 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct verifier_env *env, u32 regno, verbose("ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE cannot be first argument\n"); return -EACCES; } - err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno - 1, reg->imm); + err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno - 1, reg->imm, + zero_size_allowed); } return err; |