random: add and use memzero_explicit() for clearing data

zatimend has reported that in his environment (3.16/gcc4.8.3/corei7)
memset() calls which clear out sensitive data in extract_{buf,entropy,
entropy_user}() in random driver are being optimized away by gcc.

Add a helper memzero_explicit() (similarly as explicit_bzero() variants)
that can be used in such cases where a variable with sensitive data is
being cleared out in the end. Other use cases might also be in crypto
code. [ I have put this into lib/string.c though, as it's always built-in
and doesn't need any dependencies then. ]

Fixes kernel bugzilla: 82041

Reported-by: zatimend@hotmail.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

1 files changed, 16 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c
index 992bf30af759..3a3120452a1d 100644
--- a/lib/string.c
+++ b/lib/string.c
@@ -604,6 +604,22 @@ void *memset(void *s, int c, size_t count)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(memset);
 #endif
 
+/**
+ * memzero_explicit - Fill a region of memory (e.g. sensitive
+ *		      keying data) with 0s.
+ * @s: Pointer to the start of the area.
+ * @count: The size of the area.
+ *
+ * memzero_explicit() doesn't need an arch-specific version as
+ * it just invokes the one of memset() implicitly.
+ */
+void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count)
+{
+	memset(s, 0, count);
+	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(s);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(memzero_explicit);
+
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY
 /**
  * memcpy - Copy one area of memory to another