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author | Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> | 2018-02-06 15:36:23 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-02-06 18:32:42 -0800 |
commit | 47adccce3e8a31d315f47183ab1185862b2fc5d4 (patch) | |
tree | aaf982ef67484b702b42440b459cfd648e58dc4e /mm | |
parent | d321599cf6b861beefe92327476b617435c7fc4a (diff) | |
download | linux-47adccce3e8a31d315f47183ab1185862b2fc5d4.tar.gz linux-47adccce3e8a31d315f47183ab1185862b2fc5d4.tar.bz2 linux-47adccce3e8a31d315f47183ab1185862b2fc5d4.zip |
kasan: detect invalid frees for large objects
Patch series "kasan: detect invalid frees".
KASAN detects double-frees, but does not detect invalid-frees (when a
pointer into a middle of heap object is passed to free). We recently had
a very unpleasant case in crypto code which freed an inner object inside
of a heap allocation. This left unnoticed during free, but totally
corrupted heap and later lead to a bunch of random crashes all over kernel
code.
Detect invalid frees.
This patch (of 5):
Detect frees of pointers into middle of large heap objects.
I dropped const from kasan_kfree_large() because it starts propagating
through a bunch of functions in kasan_report.c, slab/slub nearest_obj(),
all of their local variables, fixup_red_left(), etc.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1b45b4fe1d20fc0de1329aab674c1dd973fee723.1514378558.git.dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>a
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm')
-rw-r--r-- | mm/kasan/kasan.c | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | mm/kasan/kasan.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | mm/kasan/report.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | mm/slub.c | 4 |
4 files changed, 9 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c index 8aaee42fcfab..ecb64fda79e6 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c @@ -511,8 +511,7 @@ bool kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object) shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(s8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object)); if (shadow_byte < 0 || shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) { - kasan_report_double_free(cache, object, - __builtin_return_address(1)); + kasan_report_invalid_free(object, __builtin_return_address(1)); return true; } @@ -602,12 +601,11 @@ void kasan_poison_kfree(void *ptr) kasan_poison_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr); } -void kasan_kfree_large(const void *ptr) +void kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr) { - struct page *page = virt_to_page(ptr); - - kasan_poison_shadow(ptr, PAGE_SIZE << compound_order(page), - KASAN_FREE_PAGE); + if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr))) + kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, __builtin_return_address(1)); + /* The object will be poisoned by page_alloc. */ } int kasan_module_alloc(void *addr, size_t size) diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h index 9a768dd71c51..bf353a18c908 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h @@ -107,8 +107,7 @@ static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr) void kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write, unsigned long ip); -void kasan_report_double_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, - void *ip); +void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, void *ip); #if defined(CONFIG_SLAB) || defined(CONFIG_SLUB) void quarantine_put(struct kasan_free_meta *info, struct kmem_cache *cache); diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c index eff12e040498..55916ad21722 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/report.c +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c @@ -326,8 +326,7 @@ static void print_shadow_for_address(const void *addr) } } -void kasan_report_double_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, - void *ip) +void kasan_report_invalid_free(void *object, void *ip) { unsigned long flags; diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index cc71176c6eef..b54f8787c674 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -1356,7 +1356,7 @@ static inline void kmalloc_large_node_hook(void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags) kasan_kmalloc_large(ptr, size, flags); } -static inline void kfree_hook(const void *x) +static inline void kfree_hook(void *x) { kmemleak_free(x); kasan_kfree_large(x); @@ -3910,7 +3910,7 @@ void kfree(const void *x) page = virt_to_head_page(x); if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) { BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page)); - kfree_hook(x); + kfree_hook(object); __free_pages(page, compound_order(page)); return; } |