Bluetooth: Pass initiator/acceptor information to hci_conn_security()

We're interested in whether an authentication request is because of a
remote or local action. So far hci_conn_security() has been used both
for incoming and outgoing actions (e.g. RFCOMM or L2CAP connect
requests) so without some modifications it cannot know which peer is
responsible for requesting authentication.

This patch adds a new "bool initiator" parameter to hci_conn_security()
to indicate which side is responsible for the request and updates the
current users to pass this information correspondingly.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

1 files changed, 8 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index d0f36336b6ce..c8c259f21d80 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ static inline u8 l2cap_get_auth_type(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 }
 
 /* Service level security */
-int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan, bool initiator)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
 	__u8 auth_type;
@@ -785,7 +785,8 @@ int l2cap_chan_check_security(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 
 	auth_type = l2cap_get_auth_type(chan);
 
-	return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, chan->sec_level, auth_type);
+	return hci_conn_security(conn->hcon, chan->sec_level, auth_type,
+				 initiator);
 }
 
 static u8 l2cap_get_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
@@ -1278,7 +1279,7 @@ static void l2cap_do_start(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 		if (!(conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE))
 			return;
 
-		if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan) &&
+		if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true) &&
 		    __l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) {
 			l2cap_start_connection(chan);
 		}
@@ -1357,7 +1358,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 		}
 
 		if (chan->state == BT_CONNECT) {
-			if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan) ||
+			if (!l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true) ||
 			    !__l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) {
 				l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
 				continue;
@@ -1379,7 +1380,7 @@ static void l2cap_conn_start(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 			rsp.scid = cpu_to_le16(chan->dcid);
 			rsp.dcid = cpu_to_le16(chan->scid);
 
-			if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan)) {
+			if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, false)) {
 				if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) {
 					rsp.result = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CR_PEND);
 					rsp.status = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND);
@@ -3849,7 +3850,7 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_connect(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	chan->ident = cmd->ident;
 
 	if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE) {
-		if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan)) {
+		if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, false)) {
 			if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) {
 				l2cap_state_change(chan, BT_CONNECT2);
 				result = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
@@ -7191,7 +7192,7 @@ int l2cap_chan_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan, __le16 psm, u16 cid,
 	if (hcon->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
 		if (chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED) {
 			__clear_chan_timer(chan);
-			if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan))
+			if (l2cap_chan_check_security(chan, true))
 				l2cap_state_change(chan, BT_CONNECTED);
 		} else
 			l2cap_do_start(chan);