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| author | Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> | 2016-07-12 18:18:57 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2016-07-13 11:53:41 -0700 |
| commit | 4f0c40d94461cfd23893a17335b2ab78ecb333c8 (patch) | |
| tree | bb43f8374b6e157c5a412b30d2e528a808939067 /net/dccp/ipv6.c | |
| parent | f4979fcea7fd36d8e2f556abef86f80e0d5af1ba (diff) | |
| download | linux-4f0c40d94461cfd23893a17335b2ab78ecb333c8.tar.gz linux-4f0c40d94461cfd23893a17335b2ab78ecb333c8.tar.bz2 linux-4f0c40d94461cfd23893a17335b2ab78ecb333c8.zip | |
dccp: limit sk_filter trim to payload
Dccp verifies packet integrity, including length, at initial rcv in
dccp_invalid_packet, later pulls headers in dccp_enqueue_skb.
A call to sk_filter in-between can cause __skb_pull to wrap skb->len.
skb_copy_datagram_msg interprets this as a negative value, so
(correctly) fails with EFAULT. The negative length is reported in
ioctl SIOCINQ or possibly in a DCCP_WARN in dccp_close.
Introduce an sk_receive_skb variant that caps how small a filter
program can trim packets, and call this in dccp with the header
length. Excessively trimmed packets are now processed normally and
queued for reception as 0B payloads.
Fixes: 7c657876b63c ("[DCCP]: Initial implementation")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/dccp/ipv6.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/dccp/ipv6.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c index d176f4e66369..3ff137d9471d 100644 --- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c +++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c @@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ lookup: if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) goto discard_and_relse; - return sk_receive_skb(sk, skb, 1) ? -1 : 0; + return __sk_receive_skb(sk, skb, 1, dh->dccph_doff * 4) ? -1 : 0; no_dccp_socket: if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) |